Why V.P. Sharaa’s Statement is Important
Thursday, December 7th, 2006
BY Joshua Landis
Yes, Sharaa still matters. Sharaa has been an integral part of the new Asad regime. He has played "bad cop" to various "good cops." From 2003 to 2005, he was bad cop to Khaddam and Kanaan on the Lebanon issue ( More recently he has played bad cop to Walid Mualem, particularly on the UN investigation of the Hariri murder.
Khaddam wanted to go soft on Lebanon in 2004, permitting a free presidential election during the fall of 2004. Sharaa was the architect of Lahoud's extension. At the time, he argued that the UN Security Council would not take action against Syria with 1559. He was wrong, but was not punished for this at the time, despite wide-spread belief that he should have been by Syria's reformers. He was the instrument by which regime leaders split the "old guard." He articulated the anti-Khaddam line.
Sharaa also argued for the hard Syrian line on Iraq (Jihad) and resistance) in contrast to Khaddam. He probably believing that Saddam would put up more resistance than he did in opposing the American invasion. When this didn't happen and the US went on its Syria offensive, accusing Syria of aiding Iraq's Baathist deadeners, taking in Saddam's WMD, and opening a Ho Chi Min trail, Khaddam was given the Iraq portfolio. Khaddam tried to organize the Sunni tribal leaders in order to deliver them to the Americans and reopen a dialogue with Washington on the basis of delivering Iraqi Sunni cooperation for Lebanon. This strategy failed because Washington would not talk to its enemies, use diplomacy with the Syrians, or pay blackmail (whichever description you prefer).
Following the Hariri murder and the UN investigation of Syria's culpability, Sharaa and Asef Shawkat led a 5 man committee that was tasked with planning Syria's defense and strategy. Only when the aggressive Mehlis phase of the investigation had been undermined by the turning of Husam Husam testimony and the announced resignation of Mehlis was Sharaa kicked upstairs to VP and Mualem made Foreign Minister. Mualem was brought in show a change of Syrian course. He was to play the good cop and indicate to the UN that Syria would cooperate up to a point with the international investigation and try to find a graceful way to deescalate the confrontation in Lebanon and with the International community. By replacing Sharaa with Mualem at the end of 2005, Asad was suggesting that Syria believed it had dodged the Mehlis bullet and needed a new foreign policy face to try to break out of its isolation.
The return of Sharaa as spokesperson in yesterday's statement suggests that the regime leaders are taking him out of mothballs in order to initiate a "bad cop" phase. They may well believe that Washington is determined not to compromise on Lebanon and not to follow the Baker Plan recommendations by resuming real dialogue with Syria. This may mean that Syria is pulling up its socks and preparing to push the confrontation up a notch in order to punish Washington for its refusal to engage Syria and give ground in Lebanon and on the UN investigation.
Syria thinks it has won these battles, or will win them, and that Washington is just being obtuse by not finding a gracefully retreat (as the Baker report recommends) and negotiating with Syria to save what it can of its Lebanon policy without subjecting Lebanon and the region to needless confrontation. My hunch is that Syria is preparing to play for keeps in Lebanon on the issue of bringing down the Siniora government, even if it an escalation means further civil discord and risking violence that could get out of hand. It means blocking Hamas cooperation with Abu Abbas in Palestine and a prisoner return for Israel. It means obstructing American initiatives in Iraq and undermining the Malaki government. It means going to the mat with Saudi Arabia and tightening cooperation with Iran. In effect, Sharaa is saying to the West, "if you want to play this game of chicken, you are foolish. We are not going to blink first or veer from our well known course. You will lose in this game. If you do not negotiate with us in good faith, Lebanon will burn, Palestine will burn, and Iraq will burn. We have the cards and we will play them.”This is why I found Sharaa's statement important. From Alex's comments, I think he shares this concern.
This is no time for the US and Syria to be escalating their conflict. The dangers of further radicalization in the region are real and America’s hand is weak. My hunch is that Syria will win on more fronts that it loses. “Win” is perhaps the wrong word to use. Everyone will be a loser, but Syria will lose less than Lebanon, Palestine or Iraq.
Compromising with Hizbullah in Beirut will not mean a “Tehran on the Mediterranean” as Hisham Melham insisted it would in his PBS News Hour interview with me. This is why I posted my “Babes of Hizbullah” article several days ago. Lebanon will not become Iran, as some claim it will happen should ground be ceded to the Lebanese opposition. (See Helena Cobban's vociferous objection to this post on the grounds that it was sexist and exploitative. Also see her post at "Just World News," her site.)
Allow me to add one anecdote to explain why I believe Lebanon will not become like Khomeini’s Iran. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon forcing two hundred thousand Southern Lebanese to flee up north, a Shiite Imam occupied the apartment on the first floor of a building in which a Lebanese woman friend of mine was living. I had been teaching at International College in Beirut, but had moved to Damascus before the invasion to attend the University of Damascus.
The Imam brought body guards and militia men with him who became a powerful presence in the neighborhood (Saqiet al-Janzeer). They shut down the bars in the quarter and harassed by friend for living alone and for having male visitors to her apartment. She worried that Beirut would turn into Tehran. After some time, the Imam stopped enforcing his puritanical rules on the neighborhood and things returned to normal. The Shiites from the South adapted to Beirut rather than Beirut being transformed into Tehran.
There can be little doubt that finding a compromise with Hizbullah and Aoun will change things in Lebanon in a way that liberal, Western oriented Lebanese will dislike, but perhaps negotiating a compromise will be less damaging to their interests than forcing a confrontation that will become ugly? Having Hizbullah takes more power by force will not serve anyone’s interests