DAMASCUS RISING.
Syriana
by Martin Peretz

Yes, I admit it. This is a theme I've been harping on for almost a quarter of a century: Syria sees Lebanon as an illegitimate breakaway from a great empire ruled from and by Damascus. Parts of Iraq and Turkey, and Cyprus in its entirety, are also duchies in this imagined imperium. And, of course, Israel. In the struggle against the Jewish restoration, many Arabs of Palestine called themselves southern Syrians. That provided a rationale for Damascus to fight in every Arab war against the Jews.
Lebanon itself is a contrivance of the French, hewn from the disintegrated Ottoman Empire. Composed of Christians (Maronite Catholics and Greek Orthodox), Sunnis, Shia, and Druze, the country has an intricate sectarian formula for political representation based on a census conducted three-quarters of a century ago. But, off and on, Lebanon has functioned as a tolerably free society, mercantile rather than productive (tourism, banking, cannabis). Since Lebanon has been the weakest Arab state, it has held the distinction of hosting the most Palestinian "refugees." The Palestinians cannot become citizens, and they cannot legally work without a permit, which is hard to get. By now, almost no one in Lebanon cares a fig for the Palestinians.
During the late '70s and early '80s, however, Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) succeeded in establishing a functioning mini-state in southern Lebanon, harassing Israel across the border and ruling the local Shia with a very heavy hand. In 1982, Israel freed itself and southern Lebanon from the onerous dictatorship of its neighbor's Palestinian guests. The PLO was shipped off to Tunis, and the defeated ordinary Palestinians in Lebanon kept on dreaming of their fantasy orange orchards in what was once sand and is now metropolitan Tel Aviv.
But, while all of this was going on, there was an actual civil war being fought with car bombs and militias among the sects in shifting and unstable alliances. It is hard to reconstruct the battle zones of memory. First at the behest of Christian warlords, and then to "protect" the Palestinians (in any case, at least half a decade before the Israeli Defense Forces invaded in 1982), the Syrians arrived to restake their operational claim over Lebanon. Of course, Damascus switched sides as many times as the seasons changed, backing this faction and then another. Even the Maronites, who, with some bourgeois Sunnis, are what is left of authentic Lebanese nationalism, still have figures and followers among them aligned with Bashar Assad's regime: the spineless President Émile Lahoud, for example, and General Michel Aoun, who sometimes puts the title "Marshal" in front of his moniker, la grandeur and all that. The Syrians had developed a near-certain method for keeping politicians in line: assassinate enough of them so that others won't think for a moment of being independent.
This only works up to a point. Over 21 months, Assad successfully targeted at least five politicians and undisciplined journalists, including Rafik Hariri, an idolized zillionaire and former prime minister of the country. Then, a fortnight ago, the Syrians murdered Pierre Gemayel, a minister in the Lebanese cabinet and the son of a former president whose brother, Bashir Gemayel, another president, was also murdered by the Syrians after he had tried to make peace with Israel in 1982. Political parties in Lebanon are typically family affairs at the top but with loyalties running deep within their followers and clansfolk. So, when Hariri was killed, the country rose up--not as one, this being Lebanon, but as more than half, and Syria retreated, at least perfunctorily. Monster demonstrations--attendance at one was estimated to be as large as one million--erupted again after the recent assassination of the second Gemayel to be in Syrian gunsights. The pendulum swings.
What is the chemistry of these demonstrations? Some of it is sheer outrage at the stark freedoms that Syria takes with its neighbor. Some of it is out of fidelity to the individuals whom the Syrians have butchered. Allegiance to the Gemayels is a mix of both. Pierre, the paterfamilias who died in 1984, founded the Phalange in 1936. The fascist tag was not an accident, and violence was not a light habit of the bearer. But Gemayel was not a general like Franco or a philosopher or a cleric like the Catholic priest/fascist dictator of Slovakia. He was a small-town druggist edging over into a thug, with the determination to keep a vibrant autocephalous Maronite Catholicism alive in the country.
These Christians pronounced themselves European. Or at least Lebanese and not Arab. Actually, they did speak French. I recall a trip to Lebanon, in 1982, behind the skirts of the Israeli army. I went with a friend for lunch at Chez Eddie in Beirut, where we were asked whether we wanted a soufflé. Yes, we said, and in 20 minutes, mirabile dictu, it appeared. Just as Eddie was about to place it on the table, a bomb exploded on the other side of the city. But the other side of the city was only two blocks away. So the soufflé exploded, too. Or, rather, imploded. And Eddie, without blanching, told us that we could have another one in 20 minutes. The aplomb of the French Lebanese! The Maronite birth rate declined and that of Muslims increased. Massacres were common in the early days, and the Christians were as much their planners as their victims.
The violent internal vicissitudes of Lebanese politics may appear like the state of nature. But outside factors are often the decisive agents. James Baker has been a decisive outside factor before. After the Gulf war, ostensibly won by a wide coalition comprising Arab forces, Baker richly rewarded Syria for its (non)participation in Kuwait's liberation. He implicitly promised Syria the go-ahead to routinize its hold over Lebanon. To Hafez Assad, this meant the erasure of the border between his country and Lebanon. For more than 20 years, the real capital of Lebanon was Damascus.
Then, in 2005, out of fear that the United States, which had overthrown Saddam Hussein, might now turn its aim at him, Bashar Assad beat a retreat substantial enough for Beirut denizens to break out their Cedars of Lebanon banners. Even the United Nations put an investigation together to identify the Hariri assassins. All paths pointed to Damascus--more specifically, to Assad's brother and brother-in-law, who ran Syrian intelligence. Still, nothing definitive ever happened. Assad began to suspect that his retreat was unnecessary.
Once again, the Bush administration appears to have handed over its Iraq policy to Baker, the man who used to think for George W.'s father. Baker still seems to trust the Assad clan. Now, Baker wants to involve Syria in calming the waters of Babylon. But what will be Assad's price? The tacit U.S. blessing over his restored control of the Lebanese fragment of the Greater Syria imperium, no doubt. Nonetheless, Assad is not capable of doing the chore that Baker wants accomplished. Although he hails from a schismatic Shia sect, Assad cannot manipulate or persuade the Iraqi Shia that they need to ease up on their Sunni enemies. The Shia know perfectly well who Bashar is. They cannot fail to see that, while persecuting Sunnis at home, Assad has been sending Sunni warriors from all over the Muslim world across Syria's border with Iraq, where they massacre Shia on arrival. Just as Baker betrayed the Kurds and Shia of Iraq after the first U.S. military encounter there 15 years ago, the former secretary of state is prepared to betray the Christians and Sunnis and Druze of Lebanon to Syria, and all for a promise that Assad cannot possibly fulfill.