PSALM 6
Monday, December 31, 2007
Charmed_Kief - Majida Elroumi
Why?
HOW CAN I HEAL FROM YOUR LOVE fROM THAT ADDICTION? HOW CAN I STOPP THAT ADDICTION .... ADDICTION OF LOVING YOU.
Moftaraq Al Tareeq-Film Awdet El Ibn El Dal_Majida El Roumi
My darling tastes sugar and salt in the same time
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Nasser son-in-law "lost balance" in fatal London fallCAIRO
(Reuters) - The son-in-law of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, named by Israeli officials as a source for Mossad, "lost his balance" before a fatal fall from his London balcony, Egyptian state media said on Thursday.
Ashraf Marwan, who died on Wednesday, had been living in London for many years after leaving Egyptian government service late in the 1970s.
Israeli media say that Marwan, who was married to Abdel Nasser's daughter Mona, had passed a warning to Israel's Mossad intelligence agency on the eve of the 1973 Middle East war that Egypt and Syria were about to attack.
The Times of London reported that Marwan, 62, had feared for his life after he was publicly accused of being a spy for Mossad three years ago, but said there was also speculation that he may have committed suicide after a serious illness was diagnosed.
Egypt's MENA news agency quoted a source close to the family as saying Marwan suffered from balance problems recently and had been using a cane but had a "strong will" despite health issues.
"A friend of Dr. Marwan who is a member of the Egyptian expatriate community in Britain was on his way to visit him and saw him on the balcony talking on his mobile phone. Then he saw him during his fall after he lost his balance," the source said.
British police said they were looking into the death of an Egyptian in London, and it was being treated as "unexplained" but not suspicious.
"It's understood he may have fallen from a balcony," a police spokesman said. An autopsy was scheduled for Friday.
Essam Abdel Samad, the head of the Union of Egyptians in Europe, said he had spoken to Marwan's maid, who said she was the only other person in the fifth-floor flat at the time.
"She said she was working in the kitchen and he was in his office and the first thing she knew was when someone came to the door and said he had fallen," he told the Egyptian satellite station al-Youm in a call from London.
Marwan worked as a senior information official for both Abdel Nasser and his successor, President Anwar Sadat, but Egyptian media have said he also had intelligence duties.
Gad Shimron, a former Mossad officer turned historian, said Marwan had warned Israel hours before the Egyptian attack in 1973 but Israel decided not to order a general mobilisation.
"We know now, from testimony given by Israeli spymasters and made public years after the Yom Kippur War, that Marwan was the man who tipped off the Mossad," he said.
(Additional reporting by Michael Holden in London)
(Reuters) - The son-in-law of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, named by Israeli officials as a source for Mossad, "lost his balance" before a fatal fall from his London balcony, Egyptian state media said on Thursday.
Ashraf Marwan, who died on Wednesday, had been living in London for many years after leaving Egyptian government service late in the 1970s.
Israeli media say that Marwan, who was married to Abdel Nasser's daughter Mona, had passed a warning to Israel's Mossad intelligence agency on the eve of the 1973 Middle East war that Egypt and Syria were about to attack.
The Times of London reported that Marwan, 62, had feared for his life after he was publicly accused of being a spy for Mossad three years ago, but said there was also speculation that he may have committed suicide after a serious illness was diagnosed.
Egypt's MENA news agency quoted a source close to the family as saying Marwan suffered from balance problems recently and had been using a cane but had a "strong will" despite health issues.
"A friend of Dr. Marwan who is a member of the Egyptian expatriate community in Britain was on his way to visit him and saw him on the balcony talking on his mobile phone. Then he saw him during his fall after he lost his balance," the source said.
British police said they were looking into the death of an Egyptian in London, and it was being treated as "unexplained" but not suspicious.
"It's understood he may have fallen from a balcony," a police spokesman said. An autopsy was scheduled for Friday.
Essam Abdel Samad, the head of the Union of Egyptians in Europe, said he had spoken to Marwan's maid, who said she was the only other person in the fifth-floor flat at the time.
"She said she was working in the kitchen and he was in his office and the first thing she knew was when someone came to the door and said he had fallen," he told the Egyptian satellite station al-Youm in a call from London.
Marwan worked as a senior information official for both Abdel Nasser and his successor, President Anwar Sadat, but Egyptian media have said he also had intelligence duties.
Gad Shimron, a former Mossad officer turned historian, said Marwan had warned Israel hours before the Egyptian attack in 1973 but Israel decided not to order a general mobilisation.
"We know now, from testimony given by Israeli spymasters and made public years after the Yom Kippur War, that Marwan was the man who tipped off the Mossad," he said.
(Additional reporting by Michael Holden in London)
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
The Siege of Lebanon: After Gaza, the Next Domino?
By Peter Brookes
New York Post
BEWARE: The Gaza Strip may be only the first domino to fall this summer in Iran and Syria's push to establish an arc of influence across the Middle East, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon, already teetering on the brink of instability, could easily be next.
The United States, Europe and Arab states need to act immediately to shore up the embattled pro-Western, democratic Lebanese government. Syria, which occupied Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, and Iran, which controls Islamist-terrorist Hezbollah, with help from al Qaeda, already have Lebanon under siege.
Last week saw another assassination of a leading anti-Syrian Lebanese figure - parliamentarian Walid Eido, killed with nine others in a horrific Beirut car bombing.
Eido was an outspoken member of the anti-Damascus March 14th movement, a key organization in effecting Syria's 2005 retreat from Lebanon. Eido is at least the seventh Lebanese anti-Syrian luminary assassinated since February 2005, when Damascus allegedly offed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a car bombing. As always, the Syrian regime denies any involvement.
Some observers suggest the political killings are (among other things) an ongoing plot to undo the March 14th movement's razor-thin majority in the parliament. Following Eido's death, it only holds 68 out of 128 seats in the parliament.
While Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government is calling for a special election on August 5 to replace the murdered lawmakers - including Pierre Gemayel, who was gunned down last November - Emile Lahoud, who occupies the Lebanese presidency thanks to Syrian sponsorship, continues to oppose a by-election.
Eido's killing was also the sixth, and biggest, bombing in or around Lebanon's capital, Beirut, in the last month - and came just days after the United Nations finally established a special court to try Hariri murder suspects - almost all of whom are assuredly Syrian.
In a bid to prevent any Lebanese role in the U.N. tribunal, Syria, Iran and their pawns have ensured political gridlock in Beirut since last November. Pro-Syrian protestors, led by Hezbollah, have besieged Siniora's government with protests, both physical and political, attempting to topple it.
Hezbollah, buoyed by its survival in last summer's war with Israel, has been pressing for a new government - one that would guarantee it enough seats in the Cabinet to assure it a veto on any decision.
Meanwhile, Sunni militants - linked to al Qaeda as well as Syria - have been battling the Lebanese army since May. Fatah al-Islam is holding up in Nahr al Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city. The group threatens to take the conflict to some of the other 11 Palestinian refugee camps across Lebanon, home to as many 400,000 displaced persons, potentially lighting off a larger powder keg of violence in the country of 4 million.
In fact, early June already saw some fighting at Lebanon's largest refugee camp at Ain al Hilweh between another al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al-Islam and the Lebanese army.
And Syria and Iran have re-armed Hezbollah since last summer's war, too - so Hassan Nasrallah's thugs are ready to go against either Israel or the Beirut government, if given the green light from their Tehran and Damascus masters.
Lebanon is clearly nearing a tipping point. The Siniora government may be able to hold out, fighting on multiple fronts, both politically and militarily, against determined foes sponsored by rogue states.
Or the joint efforts of al Qaeda, Hezbollah, splinter groups, Iran and Syria could bring the country to its knees, putting an end to the progress-albeit halting-Lebanon has made since throwing off the shackles of Syrian occupation.
If concerned outside powers don't bolster Lebanon's moderate forces against the Islamists, terrorists and the Tehran-Damascus axis, the odds are against the Siniora government surviving - especially in the aftermath of the Hamas victory to the south in Gaza.
States with a stake in Lebanon need to get on the stick - with a lot more than rhetoric - to prevent Lebanon from succumbing to Islamist/Syrian/Iranian aggression:
* An aircraft carrier on the Lebanese coast would remind Syria that it can't act with impunity. Why not make it French, signaling recently elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy's new foreign policy?
* Economic sanctions have a place, too - especially on Syria and Hezbollah's fund-raising in Europe.
* Also vital: Getting arms to the Lebanese army for crushing Fatah al Islamn - and deterring Hezbollah from acting militarily against the central government.
The fall of Gaza to the most radical elements of Hamas has already emboldened Islamist and jihadist forces across the Middle East. Lebanon's fall would only add fuel to the fire - meaning a tougher road ahead in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror.
By Peter Brookes
New York Post
BEWARE: The Gaza Strip may be only the first domino to fall this summer in Iran and Syria's push to establish an arc of influence across the Middle East, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean. Lebanon, already teetering on the brink of instability, could easily be next.
The United States, Europe and Arab states need to act immediately to shore up the embattled pro-Western, democratic Lebanese government. Syria, which occupied Lebanon from 1976 to 2005, and Iran, which controls Islamist-terrorist Hezbollah, with help from al Qaeda, already have Lebanon under siege.
Last week saw another assassination of a leading anti-Syrian Lebanese figure - parliamentarian Walid Eido, killed with nine others in a horrific Beirut car bombing.
Eido was an outspoken member of the anti-Damascus March 14th movement, a key organization in effecting Syria's 2005 retreat from Lebanon. Eido is at least the seventh Lebanese anti-Syrian luminary assassinated since February 2005, when Damascus allegedly offed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a car bombing. As always, the Syrian regime denies any involvement.
Some observers suggest the political killings are (among other things) an ongoing plot to undo the March 14th movement's razor-thin majority in the parliament. Following Eido's death, it only holds 68 out of 128 seats in the parliament.
While Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government is calling for a special election on August 5 to replace the murdered lawmakers - including Pierre Gemayel, who was gunned down last November - Emile Lahoud, who occupies the Lebanese presidency thanks to Syrian sponsorship, continues to oppose a by-election.
Eido's killing was also the sixth, and biggest, bombing in or around Lebanon's capital, Beirut, in the last month - and came just days after the United Nations finally established a special court to try Hariri murder suspects - almost all of whom are assuredly Syrian.
In a bid to prevent any Lebanese role in the U.N. tribunal, Syria, Iran and their pawns have ensured political gridlock in Beirut since last November. Pro-Syrian protestors, led by Hezbollah, have besieged Siniora's government with protests, both physical and political, attempting to topple it.
Hezbollah, buoyed by its survival in last summer's war with Israel, has been pressing for a new government - one that would guarantee it enough seats in the Cabinet to assure it a veto on any decision.
Meanwhile, Sunni militants - linked to al Qaeda as well as Syria - have been battling the Lebanese army since May. Fatah al-Islam is holding up in Nahr al Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city. The group threatens to take the conflict to some of the other 11 Palestinian refugee camps across Lebanon, home to as many 400,000 displaced persons, potentially lighting off a larger powder keg of violence in the country of 4 million.
In fact, early June already saw some fighting at Lebanon's largest refugee camp at Ain al Hilweh between another al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al-Islam and the Lebanese army.
And Syria and Iran have re-armed Hezbollah since last summer's war, too - so Hassan Nasrallah's thugs are ready to go against either Israel or the Beirut government, if given the green light from their Tehran and Damascus masters.
Lebanon is clearly nearing a tipping point. The Siniora government may be able to hold out, fighting on multiple fronts, both politically and militarily, against determined foes sponsored by rogue states.
Or the joint efforts of al Qaeda, Hezbollah, splinter groups, Iran and Syria could bring the country to its knees, putting an end to the progress-albeit halting-Lebanon has made since throwing off the shackles of Syrian occupation.
If concerned outside powers don't bolster Lebanon's moderate forces against the Islamists, terrorists and the Tehran-Damascus axis, the odds are against the Siniora government surviving - especially in the aftermath of the Hamas victory to the south in Gaza.
States with a stake in Lebanon need to get on the stick - with a lot more than rhetoric - to prevent Lebanon from succumbing to Islamist/Syrian/Iranian aggression:
* An aircraft carrier on the Lebanese coast would remind Syria that it can't act with impunity. Why not make it French, signaling recently elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy's new foreign policy?
* Economic sanctions have a place, too - especially on Syria and Hezbollah's fund-raising in Europe.
* Also vital: Getting arms to the Lebanese army for crushing Fatah al Islamn - and deterring Hezbollah from acting militarily against the central government.
The fall of Gaza to the most radical elements of Hamas has already emboldened Islamist and jihadist forces across the Middle East. Lebanon's fall would only add fuel to the fire - meaning a tougher road ahead in Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror.
Analysis: A Decision Needed On Syria
by Anshel Pfeffer, Jerusalem Post
We have watched in horror a series of blunders that have weakened Israel ’s deterrence and her ability to defend the nation. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and (newly elected) President Shimon Peres with Yossi Beilin gave us the failed Oslo and deliberately built up the military capability of the PLO, known as Fatah. We watched the miserable judgement of then Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2000 at Camp David, begging Yassir Arafat to accept Judea, Samaria , Gaza , the Jordan Valley and that part of Jerusalem which was controlled by Jordan from 1948 to 1967. In 2004 we watched Ehud Olmert advise then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to abandon Gush Katif/Gaza.
We also watched Sharon surrender Gush Katif/Gaza in August 2005 and knowingly open the door wide for the Muslim Arab Palestinians to establish a global terror base. First, Sharon evicted 10,000 Jewish men, women and children after which he destroyed their homes, synagogues, schools, farms, industries and cemeteries. The bribe didn’t work as hordes of Arab Muslim Palestinians swarmed into Gaza , looted and destroyed the innovative greenhouses which had been left for the Palestinians to utilize for their livelihoods.
Now the Hamas and Fatah Muslim Arab Palestinians are tearing each other apart. Their civil war has destroyed what was left of a Palestinian society that had done very well with the Israelis governing, building education, health care and industries that provided excellent employment by the Israeli farmers’ innovative bug-free agricultural industries. Later, as Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert pledged to abandon all the territory vital to Israel ’s defense and especially the heart of Judaism’s ancient historical holy sites. We watched Olmert ship weapons and ammunition to Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (aka Abu Mazen) and his Force 17 Presidential Guard. Abu Mazen had inherited the leadership of Fatah - whose "militant" wing is the Al Aksa Brigades of Abu Mazen’s regime. Forty percent (40%) of Fatah and joined the more terroristic Hamas, bringing with them all their arms which were delivered to them by Ehud Olmert at the insistence of the State Department.
Now the Hamas Muslim Arab Palestinians have beaten the Fatah and are in full control and they are murdering each other with a delight only seen among Islamists. As of June 15th Hamas has taken over Gaza completely, capturing all the weapons, ammunition, trucks, etc. supplied to Fatah by the U.S. and Israel .
All of these former leaders, who led the Jewish nation of Israel into existential danger by their inept, corrupt, weak, cowardly, craven, pretend leaders should be indicted, brought to trial and, if found guilty of treason, should be executed or imprisoned for life.
Presently Olmert and his Kadima gang of defeatists are in seemingly secret negotiations with Bashar Assad of Syria to abandon the Golan Heights down to the shores of Lake Kinneret , the best security from attack by Syria . For 40 years Syria has not been able to attack Israel because from the Heights - especially from Mt. Hermon , Mt. Dov and the Sheba’a Farms observation posts, Israel can see if Syria begins military or terrorist movements toward Israel as soon as Syria moves one tank from storage.
This pathetically stupid failure of nerve and resolve is telling Israelis that he will sign a surrender paper with Syria ’s weak President, Bashar Assad, who could be overthrown in a year with another ruthless dictator taking his place and, of course, abrogating prior agreements - as do all Muslim leaders. None of the hundreds of treaties or agreements made by the Arab Muslim countries have been kept, even those they’ve contracted with each other....according to Shimon Peres.
Arab Muslim leaders - under Koranic law - can make and break a treaty with the Jewish State of Israel, given the Koranic Mandate that all territory once held by Islam must be re-taken by force. IF the Israeli people accept the judgement and decisions of the inept Olmert, along with Barak and Peres, in conjunction with the Labor Left, they will be responsible for the missiles that will inevitably follow.
by Anshel Pfeffer, Jerusalem Post
We have watched in horror a series of blunders that have weakened Israel ’s deterrence and her ability to defend the nation. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and (newly elected) President Shimon Peres with Yossi Beilin gave us the failed Oslo and deliberately built up the military capability of the PLO, known as Fatah. We watched the miserable judgement of then Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2000 at Camp David, begging Yassir Arafat to accept Judea, Samaria , Gaza , the Jordan Valley and that part of Jerusalem which was controlled by Jordan from 1948 to 1967. In 2004 we watched Ehud Olmert advise then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to abandon Gush Katif/Gaza.
We also watched Sharon surrender Gush Katif/Gaza in August 2005 and knowingly open the door wide for the Muslim Arab Palestinians to establish a global terror base. First, Sharon evicted 10,000 Jewish men, women and children after which he destroyed their homes, synagogues, schools, farms, industries and cemeteries. The bribe didn’t work as hordes of Arab Muslim Palestinians swarmed into Gaza , looted and destroyed the innovative greenhouses which had been left for the Palestinians to utilize for their livelihoods.
Now the Hamas and Fatah Muslim Arab Palestinians are tearing each other apart. Their civil war has destroyed what was left of a Palestinian society that had done very well with the Israelis governing, building education, health care and industries that provided excellent employment by the Israeli farmers’ innovative bug-free agricultural industries. Later, as Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert pledged to abandon all the territory vital to Israel ’s defense and especially the heart of Judaism’s ancient historical holy sites. We watched Olmert ship weapons and ammunition to Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (aka Abu Mazen) and his Force 17 Presidential Guard. Abu Mazen had inherited the leadership of Fatah - whose "militant" wing is the Al Aksa Brigades of Abu Mazen’s regime. Forty percent (40%) of Fatah and joined the more terroristic Hamas, bringing with them all their arms which were delivered to them by Ehud Olmert at the insistence of the State Department.
Now the Hamas Muslim Arab Palestinians have beaten the Fatah and are in full control and they are murdering each other with a delight only seen among Islamists. As of June 15th Hamas has taken over Gaza completely, capturing all the weapons, ammunition, trucks, etc. supplied to Fatah by the U.S. and Israel .
All of these former leaders, who led the Jewish nation of Israel into existential danger by their inept, corrupt, weak, cowardly, craven, pretend leaders should be indicted, brought to trial and, if found guilty of treason, should be executed or imprisoned for life.
Presently Olmert and his Kadima gang of defeatists are in seemingly secret negotiations with Bashar Assad of Syria to abandon the Golan Heights down to the shores of Lake Kinneret , the best security from attack by Syria . For 40 years Syria has not been able to attack Israel because from the Heights - especially from Mt. Hermon , Mt. Dov and the Sheba’a Farms observation posts, Israel can see if Syria begins military or terrorist movements toward Israel as soon as Syria moves one tank from storage.
This pathetically stupid failure of nerve and resolve is telling Israelis that he will sign a surrender paper with Syria ’s weak President, Bashar Assad, who could be overthrown in a year with another ruthless dictator taking his place and, of course, abrogating prior agreements - as do all Muslim leaders. None of the hundreds of treaties or agreements made by the Arab Muslim countries have been kept, even those they’ve contracted with each other....according to Shimon Peres.
Arab Muslim leaders - under Koranic law - can make and break a treaty with the Jewish State of Israel, given the Koranic Mandate that all territory once held by Islam must be re-taken by force. IF the Israeli people accept the judgement and decisions of the inept Olmert, along with Barak and Peres, in conjunction with the Labor Left, they will be responsible for the missiles that will inevitably follow.
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
DEBKAfile Exclusive: Damascus ordered Sunday's Katyusha attack on N. Israeli Kiryat Shemona, causing no casualties. But there is more to come
A Katyusha rocket that did not explode in Wadi Taibeh north of Israeli border
The three 107mm rockets fired against Kiryat Shemona from Wadi Taiba Sunday, June 17, by a Palestinian radical group called Ansar Allah based in the Ain Hilwa refugee camp near Sidon was ordered by Syrian military intelligence as the first in a series, DEBKAfile’s military sources report. Hizballah intelligence officers supplied the rockets and pinpointed the launching site to make sure they struck the Israeli town. Residents rushed for bomb shelters for the first time since the Lebanon War ended eleven months ago. A factory and parked vehicles were damaged.
The hit squad drove up in a rental Toyota, rigged the rockets and drove off.
DEBKAfile’s intelligence sources report that Syria and Hizballah are preparing an escalating series of rocket barrages against norhern Israel civilian and military locations in the coming weeks. It is a stage in an overall plan orchestrated by Tehran, Damascus and Hizballah to stage attacks in Lebanon, Israel and Palestinian territory. Its objectives are to destabilize the pro-Western Siniora government in Beirut and whittle down Israel’s deterrent strength.
Rocketing Kiryat Shemona was Stage 3 of the plan. Two rockets damaged a factory and a parked vehicle in separate parts of Kiryat Shemona. A third landed near a UNIFIL position inside Lebanon.
Stage one is the five-week old radical Islamic, pro-Damascus uprising in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, which the Lebanese army has not yet subdued. Stage two was Hamas’ just-completed capture of the Gaza Strip from Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.
DEBKAfile’s military sources disclose that in the name of “restraint,” Israel’s government and military leaders refrain from connecting the dots of the campaign ahead and its links to Tehran and Damascus in time to foil it, in the same way as they glossed over Hizballah’s build-up for the 2006 Lebanon war.
According to our intelligence sources, a former Fatah officer called Jamal Suleiman is Ansar Allah’s leader. He moved to Damascus in the 1980s and returned to the Ain Hilwa in Lebanon in April loaded with cash. He then began recruiting for his Ansar al Allah, working to exactly the same Damascus-designed format as the Fatah al-Islam was embedded in the northern camp of Nahr al-Bared.
If Israeli leaders refuse to call a spade a spade, Fatah leaders are more outspoken. Sunday, Azam al Ahmad declared in an interview in Ramallah that the perpetrators of the crime [against the Palestinian Authority in Gaza] are the same people who sent assassins to murder the Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri, “Both come from the same hand [Syria],” he said.
A Katyusha rocket that did not explode in Wadi Taibeh north of Israeli border
The three 107mm rockets fired against Kiryat Shemona from Wadi Taiba Sunday, June 17, by a Palestinian radical group called Ansar Allah based in the Ain Hilwa refugee camp near Sidon was ordered by Syrian military intelligence as the first in a series, DEBKAfile’s military sources report. Hizballah intelligence officers supplied the rockets and pinpointed the launching site to make sure they struck the Israeli town. Residents rushed for bomb shelters for the first time since the Lebanon War ended eleven months ago. A factory and parked vehicles were damaged.
The hit squad drove up in a rental Toyota, rigged the rockets and drove off.
DEBKAfile’s intelligence sources report that Syria and Hizballah are preparing an escalating series of rocket barrages against norhern Israel civilian and military locations in the coming weeks. It is a stage in an overall plan orchestrated by Tehran, Damascus and Hizballah to stage attacks in Lebanon, Israel and Palestinian territory. Its objectives are to destabilize the pro-Western Siniora government in Beirut and whittle down Israel’s deterrent strength.
Rocketing Kiryat Shemona was Stage 3 of the plan. Two rockets damaged a factory and a parked vehicle in separate parts of Kiryat Shemona. A third landed near a UNIFIL position inside Lebanon.
Stage one is the five-week old radical Islamic, pro-Damascus uprising in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, which the Lebanese army has not yet subdued. Stage two was Hamas’ just-completed capture of the Gaza Strip from Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.
DEBKAfile’s military sources disclose that in the name of “restraint,” Israel’s government and military leaders refrain from connecting the dots of the campaign ahead and its links to Tehran and Damascus in time to foil it, in the same way as they glossed over Hizballah’s build-up for the 2006 Lebanon war.
According to our intelligence sources, a former Fatah officer called Jamal Suleiman is Ansar Allah’s leader. He moved to Damascus in the 1980s and returned to the Ain Hilwa in Lebanon in April loaded with cash. He then began recruiting for his Ansar al Allah, working to exactly the same Damascus-designed format as the Fatah al-Islam was embedded in the northern camp of Nahr al-Bared.
If Israeli leaders refuse to call a spade a spade, Fatah leaders are more outspoken. Sunday, Azam al Ahmad declared in an interview in Ramallah that the perpetrators of the crime [against the Palestinian Authority in Gaza] are the same people who sent assassins to murder the Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri, “Both come from the same hand [Syria],” he said.
Monday, May 07, 2007
Beware the siren Lebanon
By Steven Erlanger
JERUSALEM: ARIEL SHARON wakes up from his long coma in a sweat and says he's had a terrible nightmare. "What was it?" ask his aides. "I dreamed we were back in Lebanon."
The bitter joke, which has been making the rounds here since the war against Hezbollah last summer, goes to the heart of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's broken career. For a quarter-century, Lebanon has been the graveyard of Israeli politicians reckless enough to venture there.
Some, like Menachem Begin, never emerged again. That may be the fate of Olmert. A government commission issued a scathing first report last week on his leadership during the first five days of the war. A final segment, due some time this summer, may well urge him to resign. His foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, has already said he should.
Some politicians, like Sharon, managed to stagger out of Lebanon and eventually revive — despite, in his case, having been labeled by many a war criminal for not preventing or halting massacres of Palestinians by Israel's Lebanese Christian allies.
When he did emerge, his famous impetuosity was seared away. In a sense, it was the nightmare of Lebanon that had taught Sharon patience and allowed him to become a statesman in his second career.
Ehud
Today in Africa & Middle East
Car bombs kill 25 in western Iraqi city of RamadiLebanon: Graveyard of Israeli politiciansEgypt and other Arab countries not willing to pressure Sudan on DarfurBarak, the former Labor Party prime minister, hopes for just such a resurrection.
It was Barak who suddenly pulled Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 to concentrate — in vain — on efforts to make peace first with Syria and then with the Palestinians. But his was a unilateral act, and neither he nor his successors reinforced it with the retaliation he had promised Hezbollah if it violated the border. Many Israelis now believe the combination made last summer's war inevitable.
"Lebanon has significantly harmed or destroyed the political careers of nearly every Israeli politician that has touched it," said Chuck Freilich, formerly Israel's deputy national security adviser and now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "The reason is not simply the nature of Lebanon, but the nature of Israeli decision-making in the last few decades, which has been shortsighted, focused on the immediate future and not part of a thought-out strategy."
But there is also a broader question of what might work in the specific conundrum of Lebanon. A sectarian patchwork of a state without a powerful central government or army, Lebanon has always been riven by religion and ethnicity and dominated by external forces like Syria or externally sponsored ones like Hezbollah and, before it, the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In trying to attack its enemies within Lebanon, Israel has always come up against the difficulties of conventional warfare against nonstate actors taking refuge in a semi-state.
Mark Heller, director of research for the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, notes that Lebanon itself was never an enemy, "but a theater in which the enemy operates" without a central address.
So Lebanon has become a marker, he said, for "the inability of the Israeli public in general, and the political system in particular, to adapt to the fact that it can't hold governments and armies to the same standards in Lebanon that it was holding them to before 1982 — before Lebanon."
In 1982, Sharon, as defense minister, pressed Begin into a full-scale attack on the PLO and Yasser Arafat, to deny them Lebanon as a theater of operations for attacks on Israel.
At first, the war went spectacularly well, and Arafat had to slink off to Tunis. But Sharon and Israel fell victim to the classic trap of assuming that Lebanon could be restructured to Israel's liking. The hand-picked Christian president, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated nine days before he was to take office; the initially welcoming Shiites of southern Lebanon revolted against their occupiers. Hezbollah, with the help of Iran, took hold.
Clinton Bailey, an Israeli scholar of the Bedouin culture, was an Israeli intelligence officer at the time. As he and I traveled to the Awali River in 1983, he told me: "We knew where the Palestinians had every gun — in this building, on the second floor, third window from the left. But what we didn't know was that the Shiites would turn against us."
Israel's occupation lasted 18 years, testimony to a continuing illusion of what it might be possible to accomplish, if only the Lebanese could be freed from outside pressures like Syria and Iran to follow their own self-interest. Of course, that never happened.
So what made Olmert's war so astonishing was that despite his long apprenticeship to Sharon, he bought all the old assumptions about Lebanon, hoping to have a masterstroke against Hezbollah by turning the central government of Fuad Siniora against it. Instead, the Israeli decision to bomb all over Lebanon, and not just Hezbollah targets in the south, weakened Siniora.
his Lebanese trauma, most Israelis believe, Sharon would not have gone to war. He would have responded, "but in a limited way, and in his own time, and in a way that would hurt the other side — Hezbollah — and not the Lebanese government," said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University. Sharon used to say: "As far as action on the border with Lebanon goes: don't do whatever doesn't need to be done."
The inexperienced, incurious Olmert "didn't realize he was getting into a real war," Avineri said. Rather, the parliamentary committee found, "The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one."
As damning, the report said, "His decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel." Amnon Rubinstein, a former legislator and cabinet minister who is now at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, said simply: "Lebanon is a swamp; that's why all the answers are sticky."
"Olmert is blamed," he said, "but he had no good alternatives to reach his stated goals."
Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, said, however, that it was easy for Olmert to be seduced by the claim that "air power alone can do it."
"That thesis," Feldman said, "fell on very receptive ears, and for good reason — because the civilian and military leadership were traumatized by the 18 years in Lebanon." The half-hearted war, he said, "was precisely the heritage of the demons of Israel's previous experiences in Lebanon."
Given
By Steven Erlanger
JERUSALEM: ARIEL SHARON wakes up from his long coma in a sweat and says he's had a terrible nightmare. "What was it?" ask his aides. "I dreamed we were back in Lebanon."
The bitter joke, which has been making the rounds here since the war against Hezbollah last summer, goes to the heart of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's broken career. For a quarter-century, Lebanon has been the graveyard of Israeli politicians reckless enough to venture there.
Some, like Menachem Begin, never emerged again. That may be the fate of Olmert. A government commission issued a scathing first report last week on his leadership during the first five days of the war. A final segment, due some time this summer, may well urge him to resign. His foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, has already said he should.
Some politicians, like Sharon, managed to stagger out of Lebanon and eventually revive — despite, in his case, having been labeled by many a war criminal for not preventing or halting massacres of Palestinians by Israel's Lebanese Christian allies.
When he did emerge, his famous impetuosity was seared away. In a sense, it was the nightmare of Lebanon that had taught Sharon patience and allowed him to become a statesman in his second career.
Ehud
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It was Barak who suddenly pulled Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 to concentrate — in vain — on efforts to make peace first with Syria and then with the Palestinians. But his was a unilateral act, and neither he nor his successors reinforced it with the retaliation he had promised Hezbollah if it violated the border. Many Israelis now believe the combination made last summer's war inevitable.
"Lebanon has significantly harmed or destroyed the political careers of nearly every Israeli politician that has touched it," said Chuck Freilich, formerly Israel's deputy national security adviser and now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "The reason is not simply the nature of Lebanon, but the nature of Israeli decision-making in the last few decades, which has been shortsighted, focused on the immediate future and not part of a thought-out strategy."
But there is also a broader question of what might work in the specific conundrum of Lebanon. A sectarian patchwork of a state without a powerful central government or army, Lebanon has always been riven by religion and ethnicity and dominated by external forces like Syria or externally sponsored ones like Hezbollah and, before it, the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In trying to attack its enemies within Lebanon, Israel has always come up against the difficulties of conventional warfare against nonstate actors taking refuge in a semi-state.
Mark Heller, director of research for the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, notes that Lebanon itself was never an enemy, "but a theater in which the enemy operates" without a central address.
So Lebanon has become a marker, he said, for "the inability of the Israeli public in general, and the political system in particular, to adapt to the fact that it can't hold governments and armies to the same standards in Lebanon that it was holding them to before 1982 — before Lebanon."
In 1982, Sharon, as defense minister, pressed Begin into a full-scale attack on the PLO and Yasser Arafat, to deny them Lebanon as a theater of operations for attacks on Israel.
At first, the war went spectacularly well, and Arafat had to slink off to Tunis. But Sharon and Israel fell victim to the classic trap of assuming that Lebanon could be restructured to Israel's liking. The hand-picked Christian president, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated nine days before he was to take office; the initially welcoming Shiites of southern Lebanon revolted against their occupiers. Hezbollah, with the help of Iran, took hold.
Clinton Bailey, an Israeli scholar of the Bedouin culture, was an Israeli intelligence officer at the time. As he and I traveled to the Awali River in 1983, he told me: "We knew where the Palestinians had every gun — in this building, on the second floor, third window from the left. But what we didn't know was that the Shiites would turn against us."
Israel's occupation lasted 18 years, testimony to a continuing illusion of what it might be possible to accomplish, if only the Lebanese could be freed from outside pressures like Syria and Iran to follow their own self-interest. Of course, that never happened.
So what made Olmert's war so astonishing was that despite his long apprenticeship to Sharon, he bought all the old assumptions about Lebanon, hoping to have a masterstroke against Hezbollah by turning the central government of Fuad Siniora against it. Instead, the Israeli decision to bomb all over Lebanon, and not just Hezbollah targets in the south, weakened Siniora.
his Lebanese trauma, most Israelis believe, Sharon would not have gone to war. He would have responded, "but in a limited way, and in his own time, and in a way that would hurt the other side — Hezbollah — and not the Lebanese government," said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University. Sharon used to say: "As far as action on the border with Lebanon goes: don't do whatever doesn't need to be done."
The inexperienced, incurious Olmert "didn't realize he was getting into a real war," Avineri said. Rather, the parliamentary committee found, "The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one."
As damning, the report said, "His decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel." Amnon Rubinstein, a former legislator and cabinet minister who is now at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, said simply: "Lebanon is a swamp; that's why all the answers are sticky."
"Olmert is blamed," he said, "but he had no good alternatives to reach his stated goals."
Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, said, however, that it was easy for Olmert to be seduced by the claim that "air power alone can do it."
"That thesis," Feldman said, "fell on very receptive ears, and for good reason — because the civilian and military leadership were traumatized by the 18 years in Lebanon." The half-hearted war, he said, "was precisely the heritage of the demons of Israel's previous experiences in Lebanon."
Given
Again, Israeli gloom is misplaced
Claims Israel failed in Lebanon are premature - just as was similar condemnation 30 years ago, says edward luttwak
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 October War there was much joy in the Arab world. The myth of Israeli invincibility had been shattered by the surprise Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the Syrian offensive that swept across the Golan Heights. In Israel, there was harsh criticism of political and military chiefs alike, who were blamed for the loss of close to 3,000 soldiers in a war that ended without a clear victory. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff David Elazar and the chief of military intelligence were all discredited and soon replaced.
It was only later that a sense of proportion was regained, ironically by the Egyptian and Syrian leaders before anyone else. While commentators in Israel and around the world were still mourning (or gloating over) Israel's
Commentators endorsed Nasrallah’s claim. In fact, Israeli casualty figures show that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967
lost military supremacy, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad soberly recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 ceasefire on the Golan Heights, which remains unviolated.
Only in retrospect is it easier to read the 1973 war. Israel had been caught by surprise because perfectly good intelligence was misinterpreted in a climate of arrogant over-confidence. The fronts, left almost unguarded, were largely overrun. The Egyptians had an excellent war plan and fought well, Syrian tanks advanced boldly and, even where a lone Israeli brigade held out, they kept attacking in wave after wave for three days and nights. Within 48 hours, Israel seemed on the verge of defeat on both fronts. But as soon as its army was fully mobilised, as soon as the reservist brigades that made up nine-tenths of its strength were ready to deploy for battle, it turned out that they could stop both the Egyptian and Syrian armies in their tracks, and start their own advance almost immediately.
The war ended with Israeli forces 70 miles from Cairo, and less than 20 miles from Damascus. As for the Israeli air force, its strength over the battlefields was certainly blunted by concentrated anti-aircraft missiles and guns, but its air-combat supremacy prevented almost all attacks by the large Egyptian and Syrian air forces, while allowing it to bomb heavily almost at will. That was the real military balance of the 1973 war, which was obscured at the time by an over-reaction to Israel being taken by surprise and the usual fog of war.
The situation today, with the Lebanon war just ended, is the same. Future historians will no doubt see things much more clearly, but some gross misperceptions are perfectly obvious even now. That even the heaviest and best protected of tanks are sometimes penetrated by the latest anti-tank missiles should really not surprise anyone - they cannot be invulnerable, but still did well
Future historians will see things much more clearly, but gross misperceptions of this Lebanon war are perfectly obvious even now
enough in limiting Israeli casualties. Likewise, the lack of defences against short-range rockets with small warheads is unsurprising. Such weapons are just not powerful enough to justify the expenditure of many billions of dollars for laser weapon systems the size of football fields.
Many commentators repeated and endorsed Nasrallah's claim that his Hezbollah fighters fought much more bravely than the regular soldiers of Arab states in previous wars with Israel. In 1973 after crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian infantrymen by the thousand stood their ground unflinchingly against advancing 50-ton Israeli tanks, attacking them successfully with their puny hand-held weapons. They were in the open, flat desert, with none of the cover and protection that the Hezbollah had in their stone-built villages in Lebanon's rugged terrain. Later, within the few square miles of the so-called "Chinese farm" near the Suez Canal, the Israelis lost more soldiers against the Egyptians in a single day and night than the 116 - including the victims of accidents and friendly fire - killed in a month of war in Lebanon. Hezbollah certainly did not run away and did hold their ground, but their mediocrity is revealed by the casualties they inflicted, which were very few. When an Israeli reconnaissance company attacked the mountain town of Bint Jbail losing eight men in one night, that number was perceived in Israel and broadcast around the world as a disastrous loss. Any Allied veteran of the second world war's 1943-1945 Italian campaign must have been amazed by this reaction. There too it was one stone-built village and hilltop town after another and, though the Germans were outnumbered, outgunned and poorly supplied, a company that went against them would consider the loss of only eight men fortunate; attacking forces could suffer massive casualties. Israeli casualty figures in this month's war in the Lebanon demonstrate that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967.
What is perfectly true is that the Israelis lacked a coherent war plan, so that even
Israel lacked a coherent war plan; even its most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive
their most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive, while the ground actions were hesitant and inconclusive. There was, of course, a fully developed plan in the contingency folders - a sophisticated blend of swift amphibious, airborne and ground penetrations to reach deep behind the front, before rolling back, so as to destroy Hezbollah positions one by one from the rear, all the way to the Israeli border.
That plan was not implemented because of the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians. It had been a fair assumption that thousands of Hezbollah rockets fired in concentrated barrages would kill many civilians, perhaps hundreds of them each day. Barrages compensate for the inaccuracy of unguided rockets, and produce powerful compound blast effects. That would have made a large-scale offensive by more than 45,000 soldiers a compelling necessity, politically justifying the hundreds of casualties that it would cost.
Hezbollah, however, distributed its rockets to village militias, which were very good at hiding them from air attacks, and sheltering them from artillery and probing Israeli unmanned air vehicles, but quite incapable of launching them effectively, in waves against common targets.
Instead of hundreds of dead civilians, the Israelis were therefore losing one or two a day; and even after three weeks, the grand total was less than that caused by some one-man suicide bombings. That made it politically unacceptable to launch the planned offensive: which would have incurred many more casualties and would not have eradicated Hezbollah anyway since it is a political movement in arms, and not just an army or a bunch of gunmen.
For that very reason, the outcome of the war is likely to be viewed in the long term as more satisfactory than many now seem to believe it. Nasrallah is not another Arafat, who was fighting for eternal Palestine rather than the present generation of Palestinians (whose prosperity and safety he was always willing to sacrifice for the cause). Nasrallah has a political constituency, and it happens to be centered in southern Lebanon. Implicitly
The outcome of the war is likely to be more satisfactory for Israel than many now seem to believe
accepting responsibility for having started the war, Nasrallah has directed his Hezbollah to focus on rapid reconstruction in villages and towns, right up to the Israeli border. He cannot start another round of fighting because that would destroy everything again. Yet another unexpected result of the war is that Nasrallah's power-base in southern Lebanon is now a hostage to Hezbollah's good behaviour.
Claims Israel failed in Lebanon are premature - just as was similar condemnation 30 years ago, says edward luttwak
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 October War there was much joy in the Arab world. The myth of Israeli invincibility had been shattered by the surprise Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the Syrian offensive that swept across the Golan Heights. In Israel, there was harsh criticism of political and military chiefs alike, who were blamed for the loss of close to 3,000 soldiers in a war that ended without a clear victory. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff David Elazar and the chief of military intelligence were all discredited and soon replaced.
It was only later that a sense of proportion was regained, ironically by the Egyptian and Syrian leaders before anyone else. While commentators in Israel and around the world were still mourning (or gloating over) Israel's
Commentators endorsed Nasrallah’s claim. In fact, Israeli casualty figures show that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967
lost military supremacy, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad soberly recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 ceasefire on the Golan Heights, which remains unviolated.
Only in retrospect is it easier to read the 1973 war. Israel had been caught by surprise because perfectly good intelligence was misinterpreted in a climate of arrogant over-confidence. The fronts, left almost unguarded, were largely overrun. The Egyptians had an excellent war plan and fought well, Syrian tanks advanced boldly and, even where a lone Israeli brigade held out, they kept attacking in wave after wave for three days and nights. Within 48 hours, Israel seemed on the verge of defeat on both fronts. But as soon as its army was fully mobilised, as soon as the reservist brigades that made up nine-tenths of its strength were ready to deploy for battle, it turned out that they could stop both the Egyptian and Syrian armies in their tracks, and start their own advance almost immediately.
The war ended with Israeli forces 70 miles from Cairo, and less than 20 miles from Damascus. As for the Israeli air force, its strength over the battlefields was certainly blunted by concentrated anti-aircraft missiles and guns, but its air-combat supremacy prevented almost all attacks by the large Egyptian and Syrian air forces, while allowing it to bomb heavily almost at will. That was the real military balance of the 1973 war, which was obscured at the time by an over-reaction to Israel being taken by surprise and the usual fog of war.
The situation today, with the Lebanon war just ended, is the same. Future historians will no doubt see things much more clearly, but some gross misperceptions are perfectly obvious even now. That even the heaviest and best protected of tanks are sometimes penetrated by the latest anti-tank missiles should really not surprise anyone - they cannot be invulnerable, but still did well
Future historians will see things much more clearly, but gross misperceptions of this Lebanon war are perfectly obvious even now
enough in limiting Israeli casualties. Likewise, the lack of defences against short-range rockets with small warheads is unsurprising. Such weapons are just not powerful enough to justify the expenditure of many billions of dollars for laser weapon systems the size of football fields.
Many commentators repeated and endorsed Nasrallah's claim that his Hezbollah fighters fought much more bravely than the regular soldiers of Arab states in previous wars with Israel. In 1973 after crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian infantrymen by the thousand stood their ground unflinchingly against advancing 50-ton Israeli tanks, attacking them successfully with their puny hand-held weapons. They were in the open, flat desert, with none of the cover and protection that the Hezbollah had in their stone-built villages in Lebanon's rugged terrain. Later, within the few square miles of the so-called "Chinese farm" near the Suez Canal, the Israelis lost more soldiers against the Egyptians in a single day and night than the 116 - including the victims of accidents and friendly fire - killed in a month of war in Lebanon. Hezbollah certainly did not run away and did hold their ground, but their mediocrity is revealed by the casualties they inflicted, which were very few. When an Israeli reconnaissance company attacked the mountain town of Bint Jbail losing eight men in one night, that number was perceived in Israel and broadcast around the world as a disastrous loss. Any Allied veteran of the second world war's 1943-1945 Italian campaign must have been amazed by this reaction. There too it was one stone-built village and hilltop town after another and, though the Germans were outnumbered, outgunned and poorly supplied, a company that went against them would consider the loss of only eight men fortunate; attacking forces could suffer massive casualties. Israeli casualty figures in this month's war in the Lebanon demonstrate that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967.
What is perfectly true is that the Israelis lacked a coherent war plan, so that even
Israel lacked a coherent war plan; even its most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive
their most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive, while the ground actions were hesitant and inconclusive. There was, of course, a fully developed plan in the contingency folders - a sophisticated blend of swift amphibious, airborne and ground penetrations to reach deep behind the front, before rolling back, so as to destroy Hezbollah positions one by one from the rear, all the way to the Israeli border.
That plan was not implemented because of the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians. It had been a fair assumption that thousands of Hezbollah rockets fired in concentrated barrages would kill many civilians, perhaps hundreds of them each day. Barrages compensate for the inaccuracy of unguided rockets, and produce powerful compound blast effects. That would have made a large-scale offensive by more than 45,000 soldiers a compelling necessity, politically justifying the hundreds of casualties that it would cost.
Hezbollah, however, distributed its rockets to village militias, which were very good at hiding them from air attacks, and sheltering them from artillery and probing Israeli unmanned air vehicles, but quite incapable of launching them effectively, in waves against common targets.
Instead of hundreds of dead civilians, the Israelis were therefore losing one or two a day; and even after three weeks, the grand total was less than that caused by some one-man suicide bombings. That made it politically unacceptable to launch the planned offensive: which would have incurred many more casualties and would not have eradicated Hezbollah anyway since it is a political movement in arms, and not just an army or a bunch of gunmen.
For that very reason, the outcome of the war is likely to be viewed in the long term as more satisfactory than many now seem to believe it. Nasrallah is not another Arafat, who was fighting for eternal Palestine rather than the present generation of Palestinians (whose prosperity and safety he was always willing to sacrifice for the cause). Nasrallah has a political constituency, and it happens to be centered in southern Lebanon. Implicitly
The outcome of the war is likely to be more satisfactory for Israel than many now seem to believe
accepting responsibility for having started the war, Nasrallah has directed his Hezbollah to focus on rapid reconstruction in villages and towns, right up to the Israeli border. He cannot start another round of fighting because that would destroy everything again. Yet another unexpected result of the war is that Nasrallah's power-base in southern Lebanon is now a hostage to Hezbollah's good behaviour.
Why Israel’s war went wrong
Israeli writer igal sarna says war in Lebanon has transformed the opinions of his countrymen
Last Saturday, with the impending ceasefire already in the air, I drove along Israel's northern border to the village of Zar'it. It was here, on July 12, that two Israeli soldiers where kidnapped, starting "the second Lebanon war", as it's now called, that has left more than 1,300 people dead, most of them Lebanese.
A woman who lives in Zar'it told me how her husband was ambushed in the very same place on June 6, 1969. It's a little valley where it's difficult to see far and easy to set a trap. She said the Israeli army knew exactly how dangerous the spot was but had done little to prevent a further ambush.
The fact is, little was done to prevent this summer's war, if anything. Two armies came face to face, spoiling for a fight - a Shia militia, well armed by Iran, and the great Israeli army, well equipped by the US. Neither could
A month ago, I wrote: ‘This is the most senseless war we have ever had’. A thousand readers cursed me
be restrained by their weak governments - the helpless Lebanese government on the one hand, and a beginner Israeli one, only recently elected, on the other. Both Hezbollah and the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) had opposite interests from their civilian populations, who wanted a quiet border and economic prosperity after long-lasting wars. "When everything is over," said the woman from Zar'it, "we will punish the generals who were in charge."
A month ago, in the first week of the war, when it had the overwhelming support of the Israeli public, I wrote in Yediot Aharonoth, Israel's largest daily paper, that "this could be the most senseless war we have ever got involved in. All that is happening could have been predicted and could have been taken care of - if there was an experienced Israeli political echelon and a restricting American influence."
About 1,300 readers cursed me, using Ynet, the newspaper's online edition, to call me an idiot or a traitor.
But by the time of the ceasefire the Israeli mood had changed radically. With the rising number of army casualties, the public had grown sober.
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert an even stronger moral influence than civilian casualties, because in Israel soldiers are considered to be "the children of everybody". Furthermore, military casualties are a sign that the system isn't working. Because this war was more transparent to the Israeli media than any war before, defective military actions were exposed. The reputation of the army, it transpired, was much higher than its operational capacity.
What went wrong? Part of the answer is to be found in our huge victory in 1967, when Israel managed, in a six-day blitzkrieg, to capture territories three times bigger than its own. The seeds of the next defeat can often be found in military victory.
Since 1967, the IDF has trained its fighters against Palestinians in the occupied territories. It has been a fight of the strong against the weak, which reached its destructive climax during the days of the
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert a strong moral influence as they are considered to be everybody’s children
second intifada, when Apache helicopters were used against Palestinian vans and special operations units against refugee camp children.
Since then, a once-powerful army has been reduced to managing road-blocks and acting as security guards, rather than training for the next big war.
The IDF went into Lebanon in the past fortnight not expecting to meet bloody resistance from a determined enemy, sophisticated and well-equipped with long and short range missiles, an enemy that fires back and hits cities, tanks and helicopters.
And that's why the Israel of mid-August is a sober, hurt and scared nation, completely different from the Israel of mid-July.
Some say this mood will lead to political moderation, maybe even to an all-inclusive treaty. But bitter experience says that painful failure is often followed by a new military effort to erase the trauma, bringing with it further tragedy.
Israeli writer igal sarna says war in Lebanon has transformed the opinions of his countrymen
Last Saturday, with the impending ceasefire already in the air, I drove along Israel's northern border to the village of Zar'it. It was here, on July 12, that two Israeli soldiers where kidnapped, starting "the second Lebanon war", as it's now called, that has left more than 1,300 people dead, most of them Lebanese.
A woman who lives in Zar'it told me how her husband was ambushed in the very same place on June 6, 1969. It's a little valley where it's difficult to see far and easy to set a trap. She said the Israeli army knew exactly how dangerous the spot was but had done little to prevent a further ambush.
The fact is, little was done to prevent this summer's war, if anything. Two armies came face to face, spoiling for a fight - a Shia militia, well armed by Iran, and the great Israeli army, well equipped by the US. Neither could
A month ago, I wrote: ‘This is the most senseless war we have ever had’. A thousand readers cursed me
be restrained by their weak governments - the helpless Lebanese government on the one hand, and a beginner Israeli one, only recently elected, on the other. Both Hezbollah and the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) had opposite interests from their civilian populations, who wanted a quiet border and economic prosperity after long-lasting wars. "When everything is over," said the woman from Zar'it, "we will punish the generals who were in charge."
A month ago, in the first week of the war, when it had the overwhelming support of the Israeli public, I wrote in Yediot Aharonoth, Israel's largest daily paper, that "this could be the most senseless war we have ever got involved in. All that is happening could have been predicted and could have been taken care of - if there was an experienced Israeli political echelon and a restricting American influence."
About 1,300 readers cursed me, using Ynet, the newspaper's online edition, to call me an idiot or a traitor.
But by the time of the ceasefire the Israeli mood had changed radically. With the rising number of army casualties, the public had grown sober.
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert an even stronger moral influence than civilian casualties, because in Israel soldiers are considered to be "the children of everybody". Furthermore, military casualties are a sign that the system isn't working. Because this war was more transparent to the Israeli media than any war before, defective military actions were exposed. The reputation of the army, it transpired, was much higher than its operational capacity.
What went wrong? Part of the answer is to be found in our huge victory in 1967, when Israel managed, in a six-day blitzkrieg, to capture territories three times bigger than its own. The seeds of the next defeat can often be found in military victory.
Since 1967, the IDF has trained its fighters against Palestinians in the occupied territories. It has been a fight of the strong against the weak, which reached its destructive climax during the days of the
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert a strong moral influence as they are considered to be everybody’s children
second intifada, when Apache helicopters were used against Palestinian vans and special operations units against refugee camp children.
Since then, a once-powerful army has been reduced to managing road-blocks and acting as security guards, rather than training for the next big war.
The IDF went into Lebanon in the past fortnight not expecting to meet bloody resistance from a determined enemy, sophisticated and well-equipped with long and short range missiles, an enemy that fires back and hits cities, tanks and helicopters.
And that's why the Israel of mid-August is a sober, hurt and scared nation, completely different from the Israel of mid-July.
Some say this mood will lead to political moderation, maybe even to an all-inclusive treaty. But bitter experience says that painful failure is often followed by a new military effort to erase the trauma, bringing with it further tragedy.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
Rice and Moualem Meet: Has Syria Won?
Saturday, May 5th, 2007 By joshua Landis
"Has Syria won?" This is the question that a number of reporters have asked me on the heals of Rice's meeting with Walid Moualem at Sharm al-Sheikh.
First, it is necessary to take the larger perspective. The meeting was not about Syria. It was about Iran. Michael Slackman of the NYTimes gets it right when he concludes: "Little changed in what many here saw as the crucial factor: relations between Iran and the United States."
Mottaki, Iran's F.M. walked out of the dinner, where Rice and he might have met, before Rice arrived. The Americans tried to spin this as Iranian prudery at work. Evidently, the excuse was that a Ukrainian violinist in a red dress had a plunging neckline. Mottaki couldn't abide the flesh and took Iranian leave. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack cracked, "I'm not sure what woman he was afraid of, the one in the red dress or the secretary of state."
Mottaki was more honest. He explained that the US needs Iran more than Iran needs the US. The US had not prepared for the meeting properly and was not willing to discuss the an agenda important to Iran, comsequently Iran passed up the chance to talk to the Americans at the ministerial level.
Mr. Mottaki said of Washington’s stance in remarks made at a news conference at the end of the two-day meeting. “Even the ordinary people of the United States realize that the policies pursued by the United States in Iraq are flawed, and they at least must admit that the policies have failed.” Iraq has been pressuring the US to sit down with Iran and Syria to help it reduce violence: “It is in my country’s interest, really, to see a reduction in the tensions,” said the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari.
Mattaki is correct. The American public wants President Bush to engage Iran and Syria. The situation in Iraq demands it. Very troubling documents have surfaced recently that demonstrate that Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki is helping Iran infiltrate the two leading Shiite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, America's enemy in Iraq, and of Hakim's Badr forces, which is backed by the US.
Saudi Arabia is upset by Iran's internal takeover of the Iraqi security forces, which has been done under American noses. Not only has Maliki been unable to stop this, but increasingly, it seems he is supporting it. Irans takeover is documented in this report by Memri. Iraqi secret memos written by Maliki to Sadr warn the Shiite militia leader to hide his lieutenants during the surge lest Washington kill them. More detailed is this Washington Times article, which quotes from a 40-page Saudi assessment of Iran's influence over Iraq's security forces. The author of the report, Mr. Obaid, writes: "Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units." Hakim's Badr Organization, which is 25,000-strong and has roughly 3 million supporters, is the "key vehicle Iran is using to achieve its military, security and intelligence aims." The Saudis believe that Iran has thuroughly penetrated the new Iraqi state that the US is building.
Iran is in an increasingly strong position in Iraq and can afford to wait for America to recognize its failure. This is why Mottaki walked out on Rice. He doesn't want to give the Bush administration a photo opportunity for nothing. Beggars can not be choosers. This is the message, Iran is sending Americans.
Syria
"Isolation has failed." Walid Moualem, Syria's foreign minister, said on al-Jazeera last night. The N.Y. Times agrees, "But perhaps the most significant development, many people here said, was the more humble face of American diplomacy. This change suggests that the Bush administration now agrees with what Arab leaders have been saying for years: that Washington cannot succeed in the Middle East with unilateral action."
Here is what the N.Y. Times writes:
On Thursday, Ms. Rice met for 30 minutes with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem. It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Bush recalled his ambassador from Damascus in February 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister.
The decision to unfreeze relations came after State Department officials concluded that directly asking Syria to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was worth facing criticism from conservative hawks in Washington who argue that America should not talk to its foes.
But despite the opening, the issue of Lebanon remains a huge obstacle to American-Syrian ties. The Bush administration still plans to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the Hariri assassination, an inquest that is adamantly opposed in Damascus.
Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former senior adviser on Arab-Israeli relations at the State Department, said neither the United States nor Syria was willing to deliver what the other wanted. Syria, he said, wants the Hariri tribunal to go away, while the United States wants Syria to help with Iraq and to rein in the militant Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
Even so, he said, the Bush administration, running out of options in the Middle East, “may be looking for another lever to pull in Iraq, Lebanon and the peace process.”
Washington Post
Rice said she repeated to Moualem the U.S. concern about "foreign fighters," who are recruited by the group al-Qaeda in Iraq and pass through Syria, and asked for cooperation in stopping them. But she cautioned against reading too much into the meeting. "Let's take this one step at a time," she said. "I'm very glad we had the opportunity . . . but this was not about anything other than Iraq, and we will certainly see whether we can observe words being followed by deeds."
Tehran Times:
"I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me," Rice said after the first Cabinet-level talks in years between the countries. "It's a start," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said after the 30-minute session. Iraq's embattled prime minister was among those leaning on the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran, arguing they could help lessen the violence in neighboring Iraq.
Until now, Rice and President Bush had said Syria well knew what it could do to help Iraq — tighten its border — and did not need the U.S. to point it out. The U.S. claims Syria looks the other way while fighters from many countries cross its border to join the ranks of al-Qaeda and other insurgent or terrorist groups in Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said Syria had somewhat stemmed the flow of foreign fighters. "There has been some movement by the Syrians," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. "There has been a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq" for more than a month.
The administration has said it worries that Syria will use any contact with the U.S. as leverage in a dispute over alleged Syrian meddling in fragile Lebanon. Rice said that subject did not come up Thursday.
"We are serious and we expect the United States to show the same seriousness," Moallem said. "We agreed to continue dialogue."
Buthaina Shaaban:
Expatriates Minister Bussaina Shaaban has said that Thursday's meeting between the two foreign ministers on the sidelines of an international conference on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh was "proof of the recognition by the US administration that it finds itself in an impasse in Iraq."
"It is also proof that the American administration needs the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors and of several other countries," she said.
"It changes nothing with regard to Syria's stance on the unity and territorial integrity" of Iraq, Shaaban said, adding "The main solution is establishing a timetable for withdrawal" of US forces from Iraq.
The Syrian press has almost no mention of the Moualem-Rice meeting on their Websites. In part, this is because it is Saturday, the weekend, but also they are not trumpeting the meeting. On the one hand Syria did not gain much. The US met with Syria in order to assuage Iraqi and Arab demands that the US re-engage, as well as to undercut opposition at home. The Democrats have been scoring points by pointing out how stupid the isolation policy has become. On the other hand, Syria is not trumpeting the meeting in order to maintain solidarity with Iran. Washington will want to suggest that it can split Syria from Iran. Syria does not want to give the impression that it is breaking ranks with Iran.
Conclusion:
The meeting was a mitigated win for Syria because it signalled an end to Syria's formal isolation by the Bush administration. President Bush was wrong about Iraq. It did not become a show piece of American power or democracy promotion. Bashar, who called the US invasion illegal and an expression of imperialism that would be a disaster for Iraq and the whole Arab World on a par with 1948 or the WWI post war settlements, has been proven largely correct. Even Saudi authorities agree. They are Washington's closest allies; they now call the occupation illegal. Americans recognize the adventure as a disaster. Bashar proved he could read the Arab street better than Bush. The administration predicted that by this time Arabs would be laying wreaths at its feet for bringing them freedom, progress and the American way. Syria is coming out of isolation just as Washington finds itself out in the cold, its policies out of sync with the rest of the world. Bashar is not the "blind eye doctor" or "bumbling" neophyte, as most analysts argued. Bush and America were blind.
There is nothing sweet about this victory, however. Everyone is a loser. The Iraqis most of all.
What has Syria lost? Syria lost Lebanon, which in the greater scheme of things is a good thing. But the process was bungled. Rather than coming in the context of a broader regional peace deal that would have included Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was forced unilaterally, leaving Syrians feeling vengeful and victimized. With Washington's attempt to yank Lebanon away from Syria's orbit without accommodating Syria's legitimate demand for the Golan, Bush ensured that Syria would resist with all its guile and limited might. This led to the murder of Hariri, Lebanon's invaluable uniter. It has ensured the disintegration of Lebanon's delicate sectarian fabric. Lebanon is in tatters, pulled to the breaking point between the antipodes of Syria and Iran on one side and the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This is the result of Washington's divide-and-rule policy. Smart diplomacy might have avoided this.
Hizbullah has not been tamed or brought into Lebanon's political process, as it should have been. Israel's summer war, meant to destroy Hizbullah, only added to the weakening of all sides. Like a wounded lion, Hizbullah will exact a price for the West's high-handed attempts to ignore Shiite grievances. It is already exacting that price by opposing the Hariri tribunal, rearming, and bringing the Lebanese government and economy to a standstill. Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel as a proxy for Syria and as an inducement to Israel to cough up the Golan has been reduced. Because of Hizbullah's weakness, Syrians have less hope of getting the Golan back today. All the same, their determination to do so has not been undermined. This is a recipe for continued conflict and unhappiness to everyone.
Washington was unable to starve the Syrians into compliance through economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Syria's economy, although growing at a higher lever than it was in 2003 when the war in Iraq began, is not performing as it should be. 1.3 million Iraqi refugees in Syria are creating many difficulties. Rather than the Europeans helping with the reform process and offering expertise and assistance, they have stood on the side lines. The economic barriers with Europe are beginning to come down, but it will take years before relations return to the pre-2003 level. Reviving economic relations with Washington will take much longer. A web of sanction laws have been spun over the last four years that will be very hard to undo.
Bashar has survived, consolidated his power, and turned the tables on the US, but the victory is pyrrhic. Syria has lost a lot in the past 4 years.
Saturday, May 5th, 2007 By joshua Landis
"Has Syria won?" This is the question that a number of reporters have asked me on the heals of Rice's meeting with Walid Moualem at Sharm al-Sheikh.
First, it is necessary to take the larger perspective. The meeting was not about Syria. It was about Iran. Michael Slackman of the NYTimes gets it right when he concludes: "Little changed in what many here saw as the crucial factor: relations between Iran and the United States."
Mottaki, Iran's F.M. walked out of the dinner, where Rice and he might have met, before Rice arrived. The Americans tried to spin this as Iranian prudery at work. Evidently, the excuse was that a Ukrainian violinist in a red dress had a plunging neckline. Mottaki couldn't abide the flesh and took Iranian leave. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack cracked, "I'm not sure what woman he was afraid of, the one in the red dress or the secretary of state."
Mottaki was more honest. He explained that the US needs Iran more than Iran needs the US. The US had not prepared for the meeting properly and was not willing to discuss the an agenda important to Iran, comsequently Iran passed up the chance to talk to the Americans at the ministerial level.
Mr. Mottaki said of Washington’s stance in remarks made at a news conference at the end of the two-day meeting. “Even the ordinary people of the United States realize that the policies pursued by the United States in Iraq are flawed, and they at least must admit that the policies have failed.” Iraq has been pressuring the US to sit down with Iran and Syria to help it reduce violence: “It is in my country’s interest, really, to see a reduction in the tensions,” said the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari.
Mattaki is correct. The American public wants President Bush to engage Iran and Syria. The situation in Iraq demands it. Very troubling documents have surfaced recently that demonstrate that Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki is helping Iran infiltrate the two leading Shiite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, America's enemy in Iraq, and of Hakim's Badr forces, which is backed by the US.
Saudi Arabia is upset by Iran's internal takeover of the Iraqi security forces, which has been done under American noses. Not only has Maliki been unable to stop this, but increasingly, it seems he is supporting it. Irans takeover is documented in this report by Memri. Iraqi secret memos written by Maliki to Sadr warn the Shiite militia leader to hide his lieutenants during the surge lest Washington kill them. More detailed is this Washington Times article, which quotes from a 40-page Saudi assessment of Iran's influence over Iraq's security forces. The author of the report, Mr. Obaid, writes: "Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units." Hakim's Badr Organization, which is 25,000-strong and has roughly 3 million supporters, is the "key vehicle Iran is using to achieve its military, security and intelligence aims." The Saudis believe that Iran has thuroughly penetrated the new Iraqi state that the US is building.
Iran is in an increasingly strong position in Iraq and can afford to wait for America to recognize its failure. This is why Mottaki walked out on Rice. He doesn't want to give the Bush administration a photo opportunity for nothing. Beggars can not be choosers. This is the message, Iran is sending Americans.
Syria
"Isolation has failed." Walid Moualem, Syria's foreign minister, said on al-Jazeera last night. The N.Y. Times agrees, "But perhaps the most significant development, many people here said, was the more humble face of American diplomacy. This change suggests that the Bush administration now agrees with what Arab leaders have been saying for years: that Washington cannot succeed in the Middle East with unilateral action."
Here is what the N.Y. Times writes:
On Thursday, Ms. Rice met for 30 minutes with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem. It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Bush recalled his ambassador from Damascus in February 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister.
The decision to unfreeze relations came after State Department officials concluded that directly asking Syria to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was worth facing criticism from conservative hawks in Washington who argue that America should not talk to its foes.
But despite the opening, the issue of Lebanon remains a huge obstacle to American-Syrian ties. The Bush administration still plans to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the Hariri assassination, an inquest that is adamantly opposed in Damascus.
Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former senior adviser on Arab-Israeli relations at the State Department, said neither the United States nor Syria was willing to deliver what the other wanted. Syria, he said, wants the Hariri tribunal to go away, while the United States wants Syria to help with Iraq and to rein in the militant Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
Even so, he said, the Bush administration, running out of options in the Middle East, “may be looking for another lever to pull in Iraq, Lebanon and the peace process.”
Washington Post
Rice said she repeated to Moualem the U.S. concern about "foreign fighters," who are recruited by the group al-Qaeda in Iraq and pass through Syria, and asked for cooperation in stopping them. But she cautioned against reading too much into the meeting. "Let's take this one step at a time," she said. "I'm very glad we had the opportunity . . . but this was not about anything other than Iraq, and we will certainly see whether we can observe words being followed by deeds."
Tehran Times:
"I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me," Rice said after the first Cabinet-level talks in years between the countries. "It's a start," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said after the 30-minute session. Iraq's embattled prime minister was among those leaning on the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran, arguing they could help lessen the violence in neighboring Iraq.
Until now, Rice and President Bush had said Syria well knew what it could do to help Iraq — tighten its border — and did not need the U.S. to point it out. The U.S. claims Syria looks the other way while fighters from many countries cross its border to join the ranks of al-Qaeda and other insurgent or terrorist groups in Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said Syria had somewhat stemmed the flow of foreign fighters. "There has been some movement by the Syrians," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. "There has been a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq" for more than a month.
The administration has said it worries that Syria will use any contact with the U.S. as leverage in a dispute over alleged Syrian meddling in fragile Lebanon. Rice said that subject did not come up Thursday.
"We are serious and we expect the United States to show the same seriousness," Moallem said. "We agreed to continue dialogue."
Buthaina Shaaban:
Expatriates Minister Bussaina Shaaban has said that Thursday's meeting between the two foreign ministers on the sidelines of an international conference on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh was "proof of the recognition by the US administration that it finds itself in an impasse in Iraq."
"It is also proof that the American administration needs the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors and of several other countries," she said.
"It changes nothing with regard to Syria's stance on the unity and territorial integrity" of Iraq, Shaaban said, adding "The main solution is establishing a timetable for withdrawal" of US forces from Iraq.
The Syrian press has almost no mention of the Moualem-Rice meeting on their Websites. In part, this is because it is Saturday, the weekend, but also they are not trumpeting the meeting. On the one hand Syria did not gain much. The US met with Syria in order to assuage Iraqi and Arab demands that the US re-engage, as well as to undercut opposition at home. The Democrats have been scoring points by pointing out how stupid the isolation policy has become. On the other hand, Syria is not trumpeting the meeting in order to maintain solidarity with Iran. Washington will want to suggest that it can split Syria from Iran. Syria does not want to give the impression that it is breaking ranks with Iran.
Conclusion:
The meeting was a mitigated win for Syria because it signalled an end to Syria's formal isolation by the Bush administration. President Bush was wrong about Iraq. It did not become a show piece of American power or democracy promotion. Bashar, who called the US invasion illegal and an expression of imperialism that would be a disaster for Iraq and the whole Arab World on a par with 1948 or the WWI post war settlements, has been proven largely correct. Even Saudi authorities agree. They are Washington's closest allies; they now call the occupation illegal. Americans recognize the adventure as a disaster. Bashar proved he could read the Arab street better than Bush. The administration predicted that by this time Arabs would be laying wreaths at its feet for bringing them freedom, progress and the American way. Syria is coming out of isolation just as Washington finds itself out in the cold, its policies out of sync with the rest of the world. Bashar is not the "blind eye doctor" or "bumbling" neophyte, as most analysts argued. Bush and America were blind.
There is nothing sweet about this victory, however. Everyone is a loser. The Iraqis most of all.
What has Syria lost? Syria lost Lebanon, which in the greater scheme of things is a good thing. But the process was bungled. Rather than coming in the context of a broader regional peace deal that would have included Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was forced unilaterally, leaving Syrians feeling vengeful and victimized. With Washington's attempt to yank Lebanon away from Syria's orbit without accommodating Syria's legitimate demand for the Golan, Bush ensured that Syria would resist with all its guile and limited might. This led to the murder of Hariri, Lebanon's invaluable uniter. It has ensured the disintegration of Lebanon's delicate sectarian fabric. Lebanon is in tatters, pulled to the breaking point between the antipodes of Syria and Iran on one side and the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This is the result of Washington's divide-and-rule policy. Smart diplomacy might have avoided this.
Hizbullah has not been tamed or brought into Lebanon's political process, as it should have been. Israel's summer war, meant to destroy Hizbullah, only added to the weakening of all sides. Like a wounded lion, Hizbullah will exact a price for the West's high-handed attempts to ignore Shiite grievances. It is already exacting that price by opposing the Hariri tribunal, rearming, and bringing the Lebanese government and economy to a standstill. Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel as a proxy for Syria and as an inducement to Israel to cough up the Golan has been reduced. Because of Hizbullah's weakness, Syrians have less hope of getting the Golan back today. All the same, their determination to do so has not been undermined. This is a recipe for continued conflict and unhappiness to everyone.
Washington was unable to starve the Syrians into compliance through economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Syria's economy, although growing at a higher lever than it was in 2003 when the war in Iraq began, is not performing as it should be. 1.3 million Iraqi refugees in Syria are creating many difficulties. Rather than the Europeans helping with the reform process and offering expertise and assistance, they have stood on the side lines. The economic barriers with Europe are beginning to come down, but it will take years before relations return to the pre-2003 level. Reviving economic relations with Washington will take much longer. A web of sanction laws have been spun over the last four years that will be very hard to undo.
Bashar has survived, consolidated his power, and turned the tables on the US, but the victory is pyrrhic. Syria has lost a lot in the past 4 years.
Saturday, May 05, 2007
الانتخابات الفرنسية: ساركو ضد سيغو.. والحكم بايرو
يدعونه في فرنسا باختصار «ساركو».. انه وزير الداخلية المستقيل نيكولا ساركوزي الذي حقق أعلى نسبة في اقتراع 22 ابريل الجاري مما أهله لتقاسم شوط ثان مع مرشحة الحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي سيغولين رويال التي يدعوها أنصارها توددا بسيغو. على عادة الفرنسين في «التدليع».
وجهان جديدان في الساحة الفرنسية وإن كانا ليس بالنكرتين على الرغم من أن كليهما في بداية العقد الخامس من عمره.. يرمزان على اختلافهما في الموقع والخلفية إلى تحول جوهري في الحقل السياسي الفرنسي الذي تشكل منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة عام 1958.
فإذا كانت سيغولين رويال هي أول امرأة تصل للشوط الثاني من الانتخابات الرئاسية في فرنسا، فإن نيكولا ساركوزي هو ابن المهاجر الذي استطاع أن يوحد اليمين الفرنسي حول شخصه، منتزعا مركز الصدارة من وجوه العائلات العريقة التي يتحدر منها عادة زعماء التيار الديغولي.
أقبل الفرنسيون على الانتخابات الأخيرة بوتيرة غير مسبوقة، وشغلوا بالحملة الرئاسية أكثر من أي وقت مضى، وبلغت نسبة المشاركة في الاقتراع 84 % (في مقابل 71% في انتخابات 2002).
أفلت نجوم المسرح السياسي الفرنسي المألوفة مثل العجوز اليميني المتطرف جان ماري لبان الذي عاد إلى نسبة العشرة بالمائة التي كانت له في الثمانينات ولم يتمكن من تحقيق مفاجأة سباق 2002 (الصعود للشوط الثاني). وانهار الحزب الشيوعي الفرنسي العريق فلم يحقق مرشحه ماري جورج بيفي الا نسبة هامشية لا تتجاوز 1 بالمائة.
كثير من المحللين ذهبوا إلى أن الحقل السياسي الفرنسي عاد إلى الثنائية المألوفة بين اليمين الديغولي واليسار المعتدل، في حين اعتبر البعض الآخر أن النسبة العالية التي حققها مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو (18.55) مؤشر بروز قطب سياسي ثالث سيضفي نكهة جديدة على الحياة السياسية الفرنسية. ومهما كان الأمر، اتفق الجميع على أن صوت بايرو سيكون مرجحا في الشوط الأخير من السباق الرئاسي المتوقع يوم 6 مايو القادم.
ينتمي الثلاثة إلى الجيل نفسه، فهم من مواليد بداية الخمسينات، ويتفقون في خاصية مشتركة إضافية وهي كونهم انبثقوا من حطام تشكيلاتهم السياسية.
ولنبدأ من المرشح اليميني نيكولا ساركوزي الذي استأثر بدون شك بالأضواء خلال الحملة الأخيرة واستطاع أن يمحورها حول نفسه.
ولد نيكولا ساركوزي عام 1955 في باريس من أب هونغري من أصل يهودي يوناني وأم يهودية شرقية، التقيا سنة 1944 فارين من الجحيم النازي مرورا بالنسب وألمانيا، استطاع المهاجر الهونغري الاندماج في أوساط الطبقة الوسطى الفرنسية التي تربى فيها أولاده الذين اختاروا مهنة الأعمال والتجارة باستثناء نيكولا الذي درس العلوم السياسية وتردد بين الصحافة والمحاماة، قبل ان تجرفه السياسة في عمر مبكر. انتمى لحزب اتحاد الجمهوريين عام 1976 والتحق بشيراك عندما أسس حزبه الديغولي عام 1976. ارتبط ارتباطا وثيقا في الحزب بشارل باسكوا الذي اعتبر أنه «الوجه التوأم له».
أصبح نائبا ولم تتجاوز سنه الرابعة والثلاثين. وتقلد وزارة المالية في حكومة بالادير وعمره 38 سنة، وغدا في الوقت نفسه ناطقا باسم الحكومة.
كانت طعنة ساركوزي الأولى لمعلمه شيراك عام 1995 عندما دعم منافسه بالادير الذي هزم في الشوط الأول من الاقتراع، ولذا غاب عن حكومة جوبيه التي تشكلت بعد وصول شيراك للسلطة، ولم يعد للوزارة إلا عام 2002 عندما تولى مقاليد الداخلية ثم المالية قبل أن يعود لوزارة الداخلية في حكومة خصمه اللدود رئيس الوزارء الحالي دفلبين ومنها ترشح للكرسي الأسمى.
لم يختلف الفرنسيون حول شخصية سياسية منذ ميتران مثل اختلافهم حول ساركوزي الذي استمالهم بحياته الشخصية المضطربة وزواجه المثير من عارضة الأزياء سيسيليا ذات الأصل اليهودي الروماني التي تعرف عليها عام 1984 وزوجها لصديقه النجم التلفزيوني جاك مارتين قبل أن يتزوجها سنة 1996. صرحت سيسيليا عام 2004 للصحافة بأنها «فخورة بأن شرايينها خالية من أي دم فرنسي» مما جلب لساركوزي من الضرر ما لم تجلبه له مغامراتها العاطفية الطائشة.
ساركوزي ماكينة سياسية مكتملة بطاقته الفريدة وقدراته الفائقة على التحكم في وسائل الإعلام. وعلاقاته الواسعة في الوسط المالي، وكفاءاته العالية في التنظيم.
وقد أهلته هذه المزايا لتوحيد تيارات اليمين في حزب سياسي جامع هو حزب «الاتحاد من أجل حركة شعبية» الذي اصبح رئيسه منذ نشأته عام 2002.
وبرئاسة الحزب ضمن ساركوزي التغلب على كل منافسيه من اليمين، وفي مقدمتهم الرئيس شيراك ورئيس حكومته دفلبين اللذين يبادلانه الكراهية والنفور، حتى لو اضطرا لدعمه في الانتخابات الحالية.
وعلى الرغم من أن ثقافة ساركوزي متواضعة ولم يكن بارعا في الدراسة الجامعية، إلا أنه الف عدة كتب في السنوات الاخيرة تناولت مواضيع فكرية وسياسية شتى من العلمانية إلى العولمة والعلاقات الدولية. ولم يتردد في حملته الأخيرة في الانتقال من موضوعات الدين إلى التحليل النفسي إلى التقنيات الجينية، ناجحا في كل مرة في توجيه الأنظار إليه.
ومع أن ساركوزي أحال في بعض خطبه إلى التراث الاشتراكي الفرنسي مستشهدا بجان جوريس وميتران، إلا أنه نافس اليمين المتطرف في أرضيته المألوفة، مركزا حملته حول الهوية الفرنسية المهددة، وتعهد بإنشاء وزارة خاصة بالهوية والهجرة، مما ولد نقمة واسعة عليه.
فابن المهاجر المرشح اليوم لرئاسة فرنسا خاطب الأفارقة مقترحا عليهم اعادة تصور استراتيجية الهجرة بالانتقال من «الهجرة المفروضة إلى الهجرة المنتقاة» التي اعتبرها الرئيس السنغالي عبد الله واد مفهوما عنصريا ومحاولة مدانة» لنهب الأدمغة الإفريقية.
والسياسي من أصل يهودي المندمج في النسيج العلماني الفرنسي، لم يتردد في المطالبة بمراجعة النظام العلماني بإعادة الاعتبار للدين في المسلك التربوي وفي القيم الجماعية منوها في أحد خطبه «بفرنسا الحروب الصليبية والكنائس» وهو نفسه الذي أشرف على إنشاء مجلس أعلى لمسلمي فرنسا يمثلهم لدى السلطات العمومية.
نجحت مقاربة ساركوزي في انتزاع قاعدة الجبهة الشعبية المتطرفة، وذهب بوضوح إلى القول إنه يرحب بمؤيدي ليبان داخل اليمين الجمهوري وأنه مستعد «لأن يبحث عنهم واحد واحدا».
اتهم ساركوزي بميوله الأمريكية وانبهاره باليمين المحافظ الحاكم في واشنطن، حتى ولو أراد في الواقع تقمص شخصية كلينتون الساحرة، الديناميكية. وقد تحدث بعد نجاحه على طريقة الأمريكيين عن «الحلم الفرنسي الجديد» القائم على ثالوت الهوية، السلطة والعمل ضمن «جمهورية متآخية».
يقدم اليوم ساركو وجها جديدا لليمين الفرنسي، يجمع بين الحس الوطني الديغولي والليبرالية الانغلوساكسونية والتقليد الأمريكي المحافظ.
ترجح أغلب استطلاعات الرأي فوزه في الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات في مقابل منافسته الاشتراكية، بنت الضابط الاستعماري التي ولدت قبله بسنتين في دكار عاصمة السنغال (1953).
درست سيغو الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية مثل ساركوزي وإن كانت تميزت عنه بالولوج للمدرسة الإدارية الفرنسية، ذلك المعهد العريق الذي تخرجت منه أبرز عناصر النخبة السياسية الفرنسية.
في المدرسة الإدارية تعرفت على فرانسوا هولاند الذي أصبح شريكها في البيت منذ عام 1970 ولها منه 4 أولاد وإن لم يتزوجا رسميا.
دخلت سيغو الساحة السياسية مبكرا، وانتمت للحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي عام 1978 والتحقت بديوان الرئيس ميتران منذ عام 1982 قبل أن تتقلد الوزارة في حكومة بريغفوا عام 1992 مسؤولة عن البيئة، وتعود لها عام 1997 وزيرة للتعليم ثم الأسرة في حكومة جوسبين في عهد شيراك.
ولم يكن ثمة ما يهيئ الفتاة المتمردة التي تربت سياسيا في سرايا الحزب لمنافسة اقطاب التيار الاشتراكي من قدامي الساسة المحترفين من امثال دومنيك ستروس كان وجاك لانغ ولوران فابيوس. ومع ذلك تمكنت سيغو من التغلب على منافسيها فانتخبها الحزب مرشحة عنه يوم 16 نوفمبر 2006 لتكون أول مرشحة نسائية ذات وزن هام في الانتخابات الرئاسية الفرنسية.
ولم تكن سيغو لتنتزع هذا الموقع، لولا أن الحزب الذي أسسه ميتران في بداية السبعينات قد شهد تحولات جذرية، بعد هزيمة أمينه العام جوسبان عام 1995 وخروجه من المعترك السياسي إثر مفاجأة إقصائه من الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات وتقدم جان ماري لبان عليه.
ففي الوقت الذي كان يرمز الحزب في الثمانينات للتحديث والتغيير، أصبح ينظر إليه في العقدين الأخيرين بأنه تشكيلة جامدة، عاجزة عن التجدد والتطور الذاتي.
وقد لمس الفرنسيون في شخصية السيدة رويال صورة المرأة الحديثة المتطورة التي تبنت الخطاب الاشتراكي التقليدي ولم تتردد في استخدام مصطلحات ومفاهيم جديدة عليه. تحدثت سيغو في حملتها عن «الديمقراطية المجددة» وعن حوار الثقافات، ورفعت شعار «الميثاق الجمهوري» الذي سيفضي إلى إنشاء جمهورية سادسة تتجاوز قسمة اليمين واليسار التي أصبحت بحسب رأيها متجاوزة.
تحدثت عن اعجابها برئيس الوزراء البريطاني توني بلير وبنظريته «الطريق الثالث» وتعهدت في لغة شاعرية صوفية برد البسمة إلى شفاه الفرنسيين وإعادة الدفء إلى قلوبهم.
يتهمها خصومها بالسطحية والتناقض والسذاجة وضعف الاطلاع على الشؤون الخارجية، ويضربون مثلا على ذلك ارتداؤها البياض (لون السواد في الصين) في زيارتها لسور الصين العظيم، ومطالبتها بتحريم الطاقة النووية السلمية على ايران، وتهجمها على نظام طالبان الذي توهمت أنه لا يزال قائما بعد خمس سنوات من الإطاحة به.
لم تفقد سيغولين رويال الأمل بعد إعلان نتائج الشوط الأول من الانتخابات الذي حصلت فيه على نسبة 25.8 %. وما دامت تعي أن أصوات التشيكلات اليسارية الصغيرة عاجزة عن تأمين الدعم المطلوب لفوزها، فإنها اتجهت الى مغازلة مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو، مقترحة عليه اشراكه في الحكومة بل التعاون معه في انشاء قطب جمهوري جديد يشمل الوسط واليسار.
رفض بايرو العرض، واختار السلامة، واعيا بأنه لا يتحكم في أصوات ناخبيه، متعهدا بمحاولة جمعهم في تشكيلة جديدة، تكون نواة منبر دعاه بالحزب الديمقراطي.
فهل سيتمكن بايرو من التأثير على توازنات الساحة السياسية الفرنسية بإنشاء هذا القطب الجديد الذي يرث حزب الوسط الصغير الذي يرأسه منذ عام 1998.
يتفق المراقبون على أن بايرو هو نجم الانتخابات الأخيرة باعتبار النتائج الباهرة التي حققها (في مقابل 6،84 في انتخابات 2002).
فهذا الأديب البارع الذي تغلب بطريقة مفاجئة على التأتأة التي كانت تحول بينه والتواصل مع الناس، استفاد بصفة واضحة من الأزمة الداخلية للحقل السياسي الفرنسي، وتمكن من استمالة بقايا التيار المسيحي المتنور، وقد نجح في توجيه النظر إلى ثغرات ونقائض النظام السياسي الفرنسي السائد منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة.
وتشير استطلاعات الرأي الأخيرة إلى أن قاعدته الانتخابية ستتوزع بالتناصف تقريبا على المرشحين الباقين في السباق، بالرغم من تودد سيغولين رويال وتوقع ساركوزي المتفائل.. وكما يقول المثل الفرنسي المشهور «لا احد يحصل على الزبدة وثمن الزبدة».
لها اهمية كبيرة على الساحة العالمية كما هي مهمة على الساحة الداخلي وما يمكن بان يعود على الشعب الفرنسي من اوضاع افضل قدر المستطاع عما هي عليه. إن المشكلات الداخلية التي مرت بها فرنسا في الفترة الاخيرة في حاجة إلى معالجة جريئة ولكن يجب بان تكون ايجابية وكلا المرشحين يضع المصلحة العليا الفرنسية فوق كل اعتبار. إن العرب ينتظروا نتائج الانتخابات حيث قد يكون هناك من متغيرات لابد من التعايش معها والحفاظ على كل تلك المكتسبات السياسية السابقة مع فرنسا.
يدعونه في فرنسا باختصار «ساركو».. انه وزير الداخلية المستقيل نيكولا ساركوزي الذي حقق أعلى نسبة في اقتراع 22 ابريل الجاري مما أهله لتقاسم شوط ثان مع مرشحة الحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي سيغولين رويال التي يدعوها أنصارها توددا بسيغو. على عادة الفرنسين في «التدليع».
وجهان جديدان في الساحة الفرنسية وإن كانا ليس بالنكرتين على الرغم من أن كليهما في بداية العقد الخامس من عمره.. يرمزان على اختلافهما في الموقع والخلفية إلى تحول جوهري في الحقل السياسي الفرنسي الذي تشكل منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة عام 1958.
فإذا كانت سيغولين رويال هي أول امرأة تصل للشوط الثاني من الانتخابات الرئاسية في فرنسا، فإن نيكولا ساركوزي هو ابن المهاجر الذي استطاع أن يوحد اليمين الفرنسي حول شخصه، منتزعا مركز الصدارة من وجوه العائلات العريقة التي يتحدر منها عادة زعماء التيار الديغولي.
أقبل الفرنسيون على الانتخابات الأخيرة بوتيرة غير مسبوقة، وشغلوا بالحملة الرئاسية أكثر من أي وقت مضى، وبلغت نسبة المشاركة في الاقتراع 84 % (في مقابل 71% في انتخابات 2002).
أفلت نجوم المسرح السياسي الفرنسي المألوفة مثل العجوز اليميني المتطرف جان ماري لبان الذي عاد إلى نسبة العشرة بالمائة التي كانت له في الثمانينات ولم يتمكن من تحقيق مفاجأة سباق 2002 (الصعود للشوط الثاني). وانهار الحزب الشيوعي الفرنسي العريق فلم يحقق مرشحه ماري جورج بيفي الا نسبة هامشية لا تتجاوز 1 بالمائة.
كثير من المحللين ذهبوا إلى أن الحقل السياسي الفرنسي عاد إلى الثنائية المألوفة بين اليمين الديغولي واليسار المعتدل، في حين اعتبر البعض الآخر أن النسبة العالية التي حققها مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو (18.55) مؤشر بروز قطب سياسي ثالث سيضفي نكهة جديدة على الحياة السياسية الفرنسية. ومهما كان الأمر، اتفق الجميع على أن صوت بايرو سيكون مرجحا في الشوط الأخير من السباق الرئاسي المتوقع يوم 6 مايو القادم.
ينتمي الثلاثة إلى الجيل نفسه، فهم من مواليد بداية الخمسينات، ويتفقون في خاصية مشتركة إضافية وهي كونهم انبثقوا من حطام تشكيلاتهم السياسية.
ولنبدأ من المرشح اليميني نيكولا ساركوزي الذي استأثر بدون شك بالأضواء خلال الحملة الأخيرة واستطاع أن يمحورها حول نفسه.
ولد نيكولا ساركوزي عام 1955 في باريس من أب هونغري من أصل يهودي يوناني وأم يهودية شرقية، التقيا سنة 1944 فارين من الجحيم النازي مرورا بالنسب وألمانيا، استطاع المهاجر الهونغري الاندماج في أوساط الطبقة الوسطى الفرنسية التي تربى فيها أولاده الذين اختاروا مهنة الأعمال والتجارة باستثناء نيكولا الذي درس العلوم السياسية وتردد بين الصحافة والمحاماة، قبل ان تجرفه السياسة في عمر مبكر. انتمى لحزب اتحاد الجمهوريين عام 1976 والتحق بشيراك عندما أسس حزبه الديغولي عام 1976. ارتبط ارتباطا وثيقا في الحزب بشارل باسكوا الذي اعتبر أنه «الوجه التوأم له».
أصبح نائبا ولم تتجاوز سنه الرابعة والثلاثين. وتقلد وزارة المالية في حكومة بالادير وعمره 38 سنة، وغدا في الوقت نفسه ناطقا باسم الحكومة.
كانت طعنة ساركوزي الأولى لمعلمه شيراك عام 1995 عندما دعم منافسه بالادير الذي هزم في الشوط الأول من الاقتراع، ولذا غاب عن حكومة جوبيه التي تشكلت بعد وصول شيراك للسلطة، ولم يعد للوزارة إلا عام 2002 عندما تولى مقاليد الداخلية ثم المالية قبل أن يعود لوزارة الداخلية في حكومة خصمه اللدود رئيس الوزارء الحالي دفلبين ومنها ترشح للكرسي الأسمى.
لم يختلف الفرنسيون حول شخصية سياسية منذ ميتران مثل اختلافهم حول ساركوزي الذي استمالهم بحياته الشخصية المضطربة وزواجه المثير من عارضة الأزياء سيسيليا ذات الأصل اليهودي الروماني التي تعرف عليها عام 1984 وزوجها لصديقه النجم التلفزيوني جاك مارتين قبل أن يتزوجها سنة 1996. صرحت سيسيليا عام 2004 للصحافة بأنها «فخورة بأن شرايينها خالية من أي دم فرنسي» مما جلب لساركوزي من الضرر ما لم تجلبه له مغامراتها العاطفية الطائشة.
ساركوزي ماكينة سياسية مكتملة بطاقته الفريدة وقدراته الفائقة على التحكم في وسائل الإعلام. وعلاقاته الواسعة في الوسط المالي، وكفاءاته العالية في التنظيم.
وقد أهلته هذه المزايا لتوحيد تيارات اليمين في حزب سياسي جامع هو حزب «الاتحاد من أجل حركة شعبية» الذي اصبح رئيسه منذ نشأته عام 2002.
وبرئاسة الحزب ضمن ساركوزي التغلب على كل منافسيه من اليمين، وفي مقدمتهم الرئيس شيراك ورئيس حكومته دفلبين اللذين يبادلانه الكراهية والنفور، حتى لو اضطرا لدعمه في الانتخابات الحالية.
وعلى الرغم من أن ثقافة ساركوزي متواضعة ولم يكن بارعا في الدراسة الجامعية، إلا أنه الف عدة كتب في السنوات الاخيرة تناولت مواضيع فكرية وسياسية شتى من العلمانية إلى العولمة والعلاقات الدولية. ولم يتردد في حملته الأخيرة في الانتقال من موضوعات الدين إلى التحليل النفسي إلى التقنيات الجينية، ناجحا في كل مرة في توجيه الأنظار إليه.
ومع أن ساركوزي أحال في بعض خطبه إلى التراث الاشتراكي الفرنسي مستشهدا بجان جوريس وميتران، إلا أنه نافس اليمين المتطرف في أرضيته المألوفة، مركزا حملته حول الهوية الفرنسية المهددة، وتعهد بإنشاء وزارة خاصة بالهوية والهجرة، مما ولد نقمة واسعة عليه.
فابن المهاجر المرشح اليوم لرئاسة فرنسا خاطب الأفارقة مقترحا عليهم اعادة تصور استراتيجية الهجرة بالانتقال من «الهجرة المفروضة إلى الهجرة المنتقاة» التي اعتبرها الرئيس السنغالي عبد الله واد مفهوما عنصريا ومحاولة مدانة» لنهب الأدمغة الإفريقية.
والسياسي من أصل يهودي المندمج في النسيج العلماني الفرنسي، لم يتردد في المطالبة بمراجعة النظام العلماني بإعادة الاعتبار للدين في المسلك التربوي وفي القيم الجماعية منوها في أحد خطبه «بفرنسا الحروب الصليبية والكنائس» وهو نفسه الذي أشرف على إنشاء مجلس أعلى لمسلمي فرنسا يمثلهم لدى السلطات العمومية.
نجحت مقاربة ساركوزي في انتزاع قاعدة الجبهة الشعبية المتطرفة، وذهب بوضوح إلى القول إنه يرحب بمؤيدي ليبان داخل اليمين الجمهوري وأنه مستعد «لأن يبحث عنهم واحد واحدا».
اتهم ساركوزي بميوله الأمريكية وانبهاره باليمين المحافظ الحاكم في واشنطن، حتى ولو أراد في الواقع تقمص شخصية كلينتون الساحرة، الديناميكية. وقد تحدث بعد نجاحه على طريقة الأمريكيين عن «الحلم الفرنسي الجديد» القائم على ثالوت الهوية، السلطة والعمل ضمن «جمهورية متآخية».
يقدم اليوم ساركو وجها جديدا لليمين الفرنسي، يجمع بين الحس الوطني الديغولي والليبرالية الانغلوساكسونية والتقليد الأمريكي المحافظ.
ترجح أغلب استطلاعات الرأي فوزه في الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات في مقابل منافسته الاشتراكية، بنت الضابط الاستعماري التي ولدت قبله بسنتين في دكار عاصمة السنغال (1953).
درست سيغو الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية مثل ساركوزي وإن كانت تميزت عنه بالولوج للمدرسة الإدارية الفرنسية، ذلك المعهد العريق الذي تخرجت منه أبرز عناصر النخبة السياسية الفرنسية.
في المدرسة الإدارية تعرفت على فرانسوا هولاند الذي أصبح شريكها في البيت منذ عام 1970 ولها منه 4 أولاد وإن لم يتزوجا رسميا.
دخلت سيغو الساحة السياسية مبكرا، وانتمت للحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي عام 1978 والتحقت بديوان الرئيس ميتران منذ عام 1982 قبل أن تتقلد الوزارة في حكومة بريغفوا عام 1992 مسؤولة عن البيئة، وتعود لها عام 1997 وزيرة للتعليم ثم الأسرة في حكومة جوسبين في عهد شيراك.
ولم يكن ثمة ما يهيئ الفتاة المتمردة التي تربت سياسيا في سرايا الحزب لمنافسة اقطاب التيار الاشتراكي من قدامي الساسة المحترفين من امثال دومنيك ستروس كان وجاك لانغ ولوران فابيوس. ومع ذلك تمكنت سيغو من التغلب على منافسيها فانتخبها الحزب مرشحة عنه يوم 16 نوفمبر 2006 لتكون أول مرشحة نسائية ذات وزن هام في الانتخابات الرئاسية الفرنسية.
ولم تكن سيغو لتنتزع هذا الموقع، لولا أن الحزب الذي أسسه ميتران في بداية السبعينات قد شهد تحولات جذرية، بعد هزيمة أمينه العام جوسبان عام 1995 وخروجه من المعترك السياسي إثر مفاجأة إقصائه من الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات وتقدم جان ماري لبان عليه.
ففي الوقت الذي كان يرمز الحزب في الثمانينات للتحديث والتغيير، أصبح ينظر إليه في العقدين الأخيرين بأنه تشكيلة جامدة، عاجزة عن التجدد والتطور الذاتي.
وقد لمس الفرنسيون في شخصية السيدة رويال صورة المرأة الحديثة المتطورة التي تبنت الخطاب الاشتراكي التقليدي ولم تتردد في استخدام مصطلحات ومفاهيم جديدة عليه. تحدثت سيغو في حملتها عن «الديمقراطية المجددة» وعن حوار الثقافات، ورفعت شعار «الميثاق الجمهوري» الذي سيفضي إلى إنشاء جمهورية سادسة تتجاوز قسمة اليمين واليسار التي أصبحت بحسب رأيها متجاوزة.
تحدثت عن اعجابها برئيس الوزراء البريطاني توني بلير وبنظريته «الطريق الثالث» وتعهدت في لغة شاعرية صوفية برد البسمة إلى شفاه الفرنسيين وإعادة الدفء إلى قلوبهم.
يتهمها خصومها بالسطحية والتناقض والسذاجة وضعف الاطلاع على الشؤون الخارجية، ويضربون مثلا على ذلك ارتداؤها البياض (لون السواد في الصين) في زيارتها لسور الصين العظيم، ومطالبتها بتحريم الطاقة النووية السلمية على ايران، وتهجمها على نظام طالبان الذي توهمت أنه لا يزال قائما بعد خمس سنوات من الإطاحة به.
لم تفقد سيغولين رويال الأمل بعد إعلان نتائج الشوط الأول من الانتخابات الذي حصلت فيه على نسبة 25.8 %. وما دامت تعي أن أصوات التشيكلات اليسارية الصغيرة عاجزة عن تأمين الدعم المطلوب لفوزها، فإنها اتجهت الى مغازلة مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو، مقترحة عليه اشراكه في الحكومة بل التعاون معه في انشاء قطب جمهوري جديد يشمل الوسط واليسار.
رفض بايرو العرض، واختار السلامة، واعيا بأنه لا يتحكم في أصوات ناخبيه، متعهدا بمحاولة جمعهم في تشكيلة جديدة، تكون نواة منبر دعاه بالحزب الديمقراطي.
فهل سيتمكن بايرو من التأثير على توازنات الساحة السياسية الفرنسية بإنشاء هذا القطب الجديد الذي يرث حزب الوسط الصغير الذي يرأسه منذ عام 1998.
يتفق المراقبون على أن بايرو هو نجم الانتخابات الأخيرة باعتبار النتائج الباهرة التي حققها (في مقابل 6،84 في انتخابات 2002).
فهذا الأديب البارع الذي تغلب بطريقة مفاجئة على التأتأة التي كانت تحول بينه والتواصل مع الناس، استفاد بصفة واضحة من الأزمة الداخلية للحقل السياسي الفرنسي، وتمكن من استمالة بقايا التيار المسيحي المتنور، وقد نجح في توجيه النظر إلى ثغرات ونقائض النظام السياسي الفرنسي السائد منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة.
وتشير استطلاعات الرأي الأخيرة إلى أن قاعدته الانتخابية ستتوزع بالتناصف تقريبا على المرشحين الباقين في السباق، بالرغم من تودد سيغولين رويال وتوقع ساركوزي المتفائل.. وكما يقول المثل الفرنسي المشهور «لا احد يحصل على الزبدة وثمن الزبدة».
لها اهمية كبيرة على الساحة العالمية كما هي مهمة على الساحة الداخلي وما يمكن بان يعود على الشعب الفرنسي من اوضاع افضل قدر المستطاع عما هي عليه. إن المشكلات الداخلية التي مرت بها فرنسا في الفترة الاخيرة في حاجة إلى معالجة جريئة ولكن يجب بان تكون ايجابية وكلا المرشحين يضع المصلحة العليا الفرنسية فوق كل اعتبار. إن العرب ينتظروا نتائج الانتخابات حيث قد يكون هناك من متغيرات لابد من التعايش معها والحفاظ على كل تلك المكتسبات السياسية السابقة مع فرنسا.
منظمة دولية تؤكد وصول الجنرال الإيراني إلى تركيا بجواز سفر سوري
آصف شوكت "باع" علي اصغري إلى"سي أي أيه"
كشفت مصادر متطابقة في دمشق واسطنبول امس ان رئيس المخابرات العسكرية السورية اللواء آصف شوكت هو المسؤول عن تسليم نائب وزير الدفاع الإيراني الأسبق علي رضا اصغري الى عملاء المخابرات المركزية الاميركية "سي اي ايه" في اطار صفقة بين النظام السوري والادارة الاميركية لم تحدد طبيعتها بعد.
ونقل موقع " الحقيقة " الالكتروني السوري عن مصادره في دمشق واسطنبول أن اللواء آصف شوكت هو من تولى عملية الاتصال بالأميركيين وإعلامهم بوجود علي اصغري في دمشق وإمكانية تسليمهم إياه بموجب عملية أمنية مركبة شارك الملحق العسكري التركي في دمشق , الذي يتولى في الآن نفسه مهمة ضابط الاتصال بالمخابرات التركية والتنسيق الأمني مع المخابرات السورية منذ توقيع اتفاق أضنة الأمني بين البلدين في أكتوبر .1998
واشارت المصادر الى ان جواز السفر الخاص الذي قدم به اصغري من إيران إلى سورية في ديسمبر الماضي كان ممهورا بعبارة " مسموح له السفر بهذا الجواز إلى سورية فقط " , الأمر الذي يعني أنه كان بحاجة إلى وثيقة سفر أخرى ليغادر بها إلى تركيا .
وأوضحت المصادر ذاتها انها حصلت من أحد موظفي فرع تركيا في " المنظمة الكاثوليكية الدولية للهجرة " , وهي المنظمة العالمية الوحيدة المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة في مجال مساعدة طالبي الهجرة وتنسق مع هذه الأخيرة في كل ما يتصل بذلك , تؤكد أن علي رضا اصغري وصل إلى تركيا بوثيقة سفر سورية قدمت لها مع أوراقه الأخرى من قبل القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول لتنظيم " هجرته " إلى الولايات المتحدة دون أن يحضر صاحب العلاقة (أصغري) شخصيا إلى مركز المنظمة المشار إليها . وتشير هذه الرسالة إلى أن وثيقة " الهجرة " الخاصة بعلي رضا اصغري تم تنظيمها " لصالح القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول " بتاريخ 25 يناير الماضي .
وتتقاطع هذه المعلومات التي تؤكد أن المخابرات السورية استخرجت للمسؤول الايراني السابق وثيقة سفر موقتة بالاتفاق مع السفارة التركية بدمشق , وتحديدا ضابط الاتصال الأمني, تمكنه من مغادرة مطار دمشق ودخول مطار أتاتورك في اسطنبول دون لفت الانتباه . فموجب الاتفاق الأمني بين إيران وسورية يتوجب على دمشق منع أي مواطن إيراني من مغادرة الأراضي السورية إلى بلد ثالث إذا كان جواز سفره لا يسمح له بذلك , أو إذا كانت السلطات السورية تلقت طلبا بها المعنى بشأن شخص معين . وتقوم سلطات أمن المطارات السورية , التي تسيطر عليها المخابرات الجوية , بتخزين هذه المعلومات في أجهزة كومبيوتر نقاط الخروج لتنفيذ ما يلزم بهذا الخصوص .
واكدت المصادر أن الجنرال اصغري تعرض لعملية خداع من قبل آصف شوكت لدفعه إلى السفر إلى تركيا بإرادته الشخصية , حيث تم تدبير " صفقة تجارية " صورية مغرية بالمواد التي يتاجر بها , وهي الزيت التركي والسوري عادة , مع أحد التجار الأتراك . وحين أخبر شوكت بأن جوازه لا يسمح له بالسفر خارج سورية , تولى هذا الأخير استخراج وثيقة سفر سورية مؤقتة له , وإعلام الأتراك والأميركيين بالأمر , من أجل تسهيل عملية سفره ومن أجل تضليل نقاط أمن المخابرات الجوية في مطار دمشق!
آصف شوكت "باع" علي اصغري إلى"سي أي أيه"
كشفت مصادر متطابقة في دمشق واسطنبول امس ان رئيس المخابرات العسكرية السورية اللواء آصف شوكت هو المسؤول عن تسليم نائب وزير الدفاع الإيراني الأسبق علي رضا اصغري الى عملاء المخابرات المركزية الاميركية "سي اي ايه" في اطار صفقة بين النظام السوري والادارة الاميركية لم تحدد طبيعتها بعد.
ونقل موقع " الحقيقة " الالكتروني السوري عن مصادره في دمشق واسطنبول أن اللواء آصف شوكت هو من تولى عملية الاتصال بالأميركيين وإعلامهم بوجود علي اصغري في دمشق وإمكانية تسليمهم إياه بموجب عملية أمنية مركبة شارك الملحق العسكري التركي في دمشق , الذي يتولى في الآن نفسه مهمة ضابط الاتصال بالمخابرات التركية والتنسيق الأمني مع المخابرات السورية منذ توقيع اتفاق أضنة الأمني بين البلدين في أكتوبر .1998
واشارت المصادر الى ان جواز السفر الخاص الذي قدم به اصغري من إيران إلى سورية في ديسمبر الماضي كان ممهورا بعبارة " مسموح له السفر بهذا الجواز إلى سورية فقط " , الأمر الذي يعني أنه كان بحاجة إلى وثيقة سفر أخرى ليغادر بها إلى تركيا .
وأوضحت المصادر ذاتها انها حصلت من أحد موظفي فرع تركيا في " المنظمة الكاثوليكية الدولية للهجرة " , وهي المنظمة العالمية الوحيدة المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة في مجال مساعدة طالبي الهجرة وتنسق مع هذه الأخيرة في كل ما يتصل بذلك , تؤكد أن علي رضا اصغري وصل إلى تركيا بوثيقة سفر سورية قدمت لها مع أوراقه الأخرى من قبل القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول لتنظيم " هجرته " إلى الولايات المتحدة دون أن يحضر صاحب العلاقة (أصغري) شخصيا إلى مركز المنظمة المشار إليها . وتشير هذه الرسالة إلى أن وثيقة " الهجرة " الخاصة بعلي رضا اصغري تم تنظيمها " لصالح القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول " بتاريخ 25 يناير الماضي .
وتتقاطع هذه المعلومات التي تؤكد أن المخابرات السورية استخرجت للمسؤول الايراني السابق وثيقة سفر موقتة بالاتفاق مع السفارة التركية بدمشق , وتحديدا ضابط الاتصال الأمني, تمكنه من مغادرة مطار دمشق ودخول مطار أتاتورك في اسطنبول دون لفت الانتباه . فموجب الاتفاق الأمني بين إيران وسورية يتوجب على دمشق منع أي مواطن إيراني من مغادرة الأراضي السورية إلى بلد ثالث إذا كان جواز سفره لا يسمح له بذلك , أو إذا كانت السلطات السورية تلقت طلبا بها المعنى بشأن شخص معين . وتقوم سلطات أمن المطارات السورية , التي تسيطر عليها المخابرات الجوية , بتخزين هذه المعلومات في أجهزة كومبيوتر نقاط الخروج لتنفيذ ما يلزم بهذا الخصوص .
واكدت المصادر أن الجنرال اصغري تعرض لعملية خداع من قبل آصف شوكت لدفعه إلى السفر إلى تركيا بإرادته الشخصية , حيث تم تدبير " صفقة تجارية " صورية مغرية بالمواد التي يتاجر بها , وهي الزيت التركي والسوري عادة , مع أحد التجار الأتراك . وحين أخبر شوكت بأن جوازه لا يسمح له بالسفر خارج سورية , تولى هذا الأخير استخراج وثيقة سفر سورية مؤقتة له , وإعلام الأتراك والأميركيين بالأمر , من أجل تسهيل عملية سفره ومن أجل تضليل نقاط أمن المخابرات الجوية في مطار دمشق!
Thursday, May 03, 2007
The wisdom of Ronald Reagan speaks down the years
Gerard Baker
If you hang around Los Angeles for a day to two you will see enough strange things to fill a respectable screenplay.
The biggest news this week was the surprise comeback of Britney Spears, who returned to touring after a three-year break. She showed up unannounced at the House of Blues in Anaheim, clad in a brunette wig, knee-high go-go boots and a fur coat that revealed glimpses of a jewel-encrusted bra.
Lip-synching her way through the full repertoire of Spears classics, she won rave reviews from her neglected fans. “She looked so freaking hot,” Julie West, 16, told the Los Angeles Times.
But if you think that odd, consider this. Ten Republican presidential hopefuls gathered here last night to make their case that they should be the next US president. Though no-one showed up in a jewel-encrusted bra (Rudolph Giuliani presumably resisting what must have been a powerful temptation), the event was still an unusual spectacle in this part of Southern California.
Los Angeles is hostile territory for Republicans. The city’s entertainment elite is committed to the belief that conservatives are so evil that they should only ever be portrayed in adult films and played by Manichean-looking British actors.
Republicans have also alienated the city’s massive Latino population – once thought of as potentially solid Republican voters – with a nativist message on immigration.
So what were these Republican hopefuls doing here, or more accurately, just outside the metropolis in the lumpy scrubland of the Simi Valley? The answer is Ronald Reagan.
The candidates had been invited by Nancy Reagan to the Reagan Presidential Library. The event was a useful reminder of the power the Reagan legacy has over Republicans. Margaret Thatcher, Mr Reagan’s partner in the 1980s, is now seen as something of a liability by her party. There are a few Republican intellectuals who would like American conservatives to follow suit and tone down some of the Reagan-worship. Some think the roots of today’s conservative crisis actually go back to Mr Reagan and his simple embrace of free markets and assertive American idealism.
Even some of those who admired the former president think he is simply no longer relevant – that the Reagan message of smaller government and firm resolve against global ideological enemies is just not suited to the modern challenges of rising economic insecurity and the diverse and complex threat from Islamic radicalism.
That the world is a different place from 25 years ago ought not to be in dispute. But it seems to me that the problem with the Republican Party in the past five years is not that it has tried unsuccessfully to apply the Reagan principles to modern times, but that they have misappropriated the Reagan legacy for their own ill-advised and indefensible objectives.
The Reagan imprimatur has been rolled out and sent into service in defence of things the great man would find incomprehensible. He stood for less government, for a start, but Republicans have joyfully expanded the size and scope of government, while ignoring a looming fiscal catastrophe from an ageing population.
Mr Reagan cut taxes from absurdly high levels to regenerate American enterprise. This successful approach has turned over the years into a calcified dogma that says no Republican can challenge the contention that taxes should be cut all the time and as often as possible, whatever the economic circumstances, on the alchemist’s proposition that such cuts will always and everywhere “pay for themselves” in increased government revenues.
In foreign policy, Mr Reagan’s legacy has also been traduced by his would-be successors. He did indeed challenge the prevailing diplomatic assumptions and directly took on the enemies of freedom in the world. But he never shrank from making uncomfortable compromises with reality. So distorted has US foreign policy discussion on the Right become that some of the things Mr Reagan did would probably provoke cries of appeasement if they were done today. In 1983, for example, after 200 US Marines were murdered by a suicide truck bomber in Lebanon, Mr Reagan immediately pulled all US forces out of the country.
My favourite story about him concerns the US invasion of Grenada, just after that infamous Beirut incident in 1983. It illustrates the kind of wisdom that has been sorely lacking in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in the last five years.
The President was being briefed on the invasion plans by his senior military officers just before the Grenada operation. As was often the case, Mr Reagan did not seem to be paying close attention, according to one of those present. But when the briefing was over he had one question. He wanted to hear again the number of troops the planners were going to send in. He was told a figure and shook his head. “Make it twice that,” he told a slightly puzzled general. Asked why, the President said calmly: “If Jimmy Carter had sent 16 helicopters rather than eight to Desert One to rescue the US hostages in Iran in 1980, you’d be sitting here briefing him today, not me.” Grenada was not Iraq, but just as assuredly George W. Bush is no Ronald Reagan.
What may be most relevant about Reagan is this: he became President in the midst of one of those periodic crises of American self-confidence, in which the nation’s spirit had been sapped by a disastrous war, a series of scandals that undermined confidence in government and the failures of a comically inept Administration.
Within a few years the President had led the American people back to an improbable victory in the Cold War and an unchallenged status as the world’s economic superpower. America needs that leadership again.
Gerard Baker
If you hang around Los Angeles for a day to two you will see enough strange things to fill a respectable screenplay.
The biggest news this week was the surprise comeback of Britney Spears, who returned to touring after a three-year break. She showed up unannounced at the House of Blues in Anaheim, clad in a brunette wig, knee-high go-go boots and a fur coat that revealed glimpses of a jewel-encrusted bra.
Lip-synching her way through the full repertoire of Spears classics, she won rave reviews from her neglected fans. “She looked so freaking hot,” Julie West, 16, told the Los Angeles Times.
But if you think that odd, consider this. Ten Republican presidential hopefuls gathered here last night to make their case that they should be the next US president. Though no-one showed up in a jewel-encrusted bra (Rudolph Giuliani presumably resisting what must have been a powerful temptation), the event was still an unusual spectacle in this part of Southern California.
Los Angeles is hostile territory for Republicans. The city’s entertainment elite is committed to the belief that conservatives are so evil that they should only ever be portrayed in adult films and played by Manichean-looking British actors.
Republicans have also alienated the city’s massive Latino population – once thought of as potentially solid Republican voters – with a nativist message on immigration.
So what were these Republican hopefuls doing here, or more accurately, just outside the metropolis in the lumpy scrubland of the Simi Valley? The answer is Ronald Reagan.
The candidates had been invited by Nancy Reagan to the Reagan Presidential Library. The event was a useful reminder of the power the Reagan legacy has over Republicans. Margaret Thatcher, Mr Reagan’s partner in the 1980s, is now seen as something of a liability by her party. There are a few Republican intellectuals who would like American conservatives to follow suit and tone down some of the Reagan-worship. Some think the roots of today’s conservative crisis actually go back to Mr Reagan and his simple embrace of free markets and assertive American idealism.
Even some of those who admired the former president think he is simply no longer relevant – that the Reagan message of smaller government and firm resolve against global ideological enemies is just not suited to the modern challenges of rising economic insecurity and the diverse and complex threat from Islamic radicalism.
That the world is a different place from 25 years ago ought not to be in dispute. But it seems to me that the problem with the Republican Party in the past five years is not that it has tried unsuccessfully to apply the Reagan principles to modern times, but that they have misappropriated the Reagan legacy for their own ill-advised and indefensible objectives.
The Reagan imprimatur has been rolled out and sent into service in defence of things the great man would find incomprehensible. He stood for less government, for a start, but Republicans have joyfully expanded the size and scope of government, while ignoring a looming fiscal catastrophe from an ageing population.
Mr Reagan cut taxes from absurdly high levels to regenerate American enterprise. This successful approach has turned over the years into a calcified dogma that says no Republican can challenge the contention that taxes should be cut all the time and as often as possible, whatever the economic circumstances, on the alchemist’s proposition that such cuts will always and everywhere “pay for themselves” in increased government revenues.
In foreign policy, Mr Reagan’s legacy has also been traduced by his would-be successors. He did indeed challenge the prevailing diplomatic assumptions and directly took on the enemies of freedom in the world. But he never shrank from making uncomfortable compromises with reality. So distorted has US foreign policy discussion on the Right become that some of the things Mr Reagan did would probably provoke cries of appeasement if they were done today. In 1983, for example, after 200 US Marines were murdered by a suicide truck bomber in Lebanon, Mr Reagan immediately pulled all US forces out of the country.
My favourite story about him concerns the US invasion of Grenada, just after that infamous Beirut incident in 1983. It illustrates the kind of wisdom that has been sorely lacking in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in the last five years.
The President was being briefed on the invasion plans by his senior military officers just before the Grenada operation. As was often the case, Mr Reagan did not seem to be paying close attention, according to one of those present. But when the briefing was over he had one question. He wanted to hear again the number of troops the planners were going to send in. He was told a figure and shook his head. “Make it twice that,” he told a slightly puzzled general. Asked why, the President said calmly: “If Jimmy Carter had sent 16 helicopters rather than eight to Desert One to rescue the US hostages in Iran in 1980, you’d be sitting here briefing him today, not me.” Grenada was not Iraq, but just as assuredly George W. Bush is no Ronald Reagan.
What may be most relevant about Reagan is this: he became President in the midst of one of those periodic crises of American self-confidence, in which the nation’s spirit had been sapped by a disastrous war, a series of scandals that undermined confidence in government and the failures of a comically inept Administration.
Within a few years the President had led the American people back to an improbable victory in the Cold War and an unchallenged status as the world’s economic superpower. America needs that leadership again.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion
Book Review by Amir Taheri
One of the nightmares of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the mullah who ruled Iran with an iron fist for a decade, was ha he called "the Americanization of Islam."
Khomeini feared that the infiltration of such an American ideas as the rule of law, democracy, the rights of the individual, alternative life-styles and, above all, the separation of religion and state, into Muslim communities would undermine commitment to the faith. For the old curmudgeon, the slogan "Death to America!" was as important as any testimony of faith.
Paul M. Barrett, a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal, however, shows that millions of Muslims live in the United States, the homeland of "The Great Satan", without abandoning their faith. In a sense, Muslims enjoy far ore religious freedom in the United States than they do in the Islamic Republic built by Khomeini. (In the US, all versions of Islam are free to practice and propagate. In the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, only the Khomeinist version has full freedom.)
No one knows for sure how many Muslims there are in the United States, and Barrett offers no conclusive figures. Estimates, however, put the number at anything between three to six million. It is unfortunate that Barrett did not pay more attention to the need for establishing a credible figure to help end an old controversy on the subject.
Barrett starts by dispelling a number of common misconceptions with regard to American Muslims. For example, he shows that, contrary to common assumptions, black Americans do not form a majority of Muslims in the US. (They are only 20 per cent, mostly recent converts to Islam.) The largest bloc of Muslims in the US, some 34 per cent, belongs to Indians and Pakistanis, recent immigrants who started arriving in large numbers only after the 1970s. Turks, Iranians and "others" account for the remainder.
According to Barrett, some 85 per cent of American Muslims are Sunnis, with the Shiites accounting for the remaining 15 per cent. What is not clear, however, is whether Barrett includes the Nation of Islam, a mostly Afro-American movement, in the Sunni column.
Barrett offers a number of surprising facts. For examples, almost 60 per cent of American Muslims hold college or university degrees, more than twice the number for average Americans. Most American Muslims work in service industries, especially in managerial positions, and earn 20 per cent more than the average American.
Thanks to continued massive immigration, especially from India and Pakistan, and because of larger families, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the US. It also attracts the largest number of converts, in competition not only against Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Baha'ism, but also against such fashionable sects such as The Church of Scientology. Barrett also reminds his readers that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world.
Barrett's book has no clear structure and could be read as a series of independent reportages. He devotes a god part of the book to the portraits of seven Muslims, supposed to represent the diversity of the American Muslims. He gives each of the seven a label: "scholar", "activist", and "feminist" for example.
Of the seven, only one, Osama Siblani, is a Shiite. Of Lebanese origin, Siblani immigrated to the US from Lebanon in 1976 and settled in Dearborn, Michigan, the stronghold of Arab-Americans since the middle of the last century. Siblani, who publishes the newspaper Arab American, the largest Arab [publication in the US, emerges as a complex figure. On the one hand, he is a great admirer of the so-called "American dream" while, on the other, his paper blames the US for much that goes wrong in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A passionate supporter of the Hezballah, a branch of the Khomeinist movement, Siblani is critical of Lebanese politicians and parties that resist its attempt to seize power in Beirut.
One of the colorful figures presented by Barrett is Siraj Wahhaj, an African-American Muslim who promotes many of the themes, such as self-reliance and hard work, originally developed by Malcolm X. Wahhaj believes that the US will one day adopt the Shariaa as its basic law to save itself from alcohol, drugs, gambling, pornography and prostitution.
It is hard to see in what way the seven individuals portrayed here represent Muslims in the United States. In fact, speaking of a single Muslim community in the US, or anywhere else for that matter, could be misleading. Islam is a faith that is adhered to and practiced individually. There are no formal church structures as in Christianity, and certainly no priesthood and papacy.
The fact is worth stressing for at least two reasons.
The first concerns integration. The so-called "American melting pot" cannot integrate people as communities. It integrates people from countless backgrounds and cultures only as individuals. To lump millions of people from dozens of different cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds together because of their assumed common faith is an exercise in artificial communiatrianism.
There is a second reason why putting the emphasis on the community aspect of Islam in America is wrong. This is because American Muslims have different cultural aspirations and political sensibilities. In the year 2000, for example, American Muslims of Arab and Iranian origin voted overwhelmingly for George W Bush while Muslims of Afro-American background chose Al Gore. In 2004, most Arab-Americans , along with Afro-American Muslims, voted against Bush while Muslims of Indo-Pakistani and Iranian origin, remained loyal to Bush.
Barrett devotes a good part of the book to his thoughts about what should be done to improve relations between American Muslims and the broader American reality.
Sadly, his analysis is often shaky while he offers few serious suggestions. Barrett's claim that Muslim students from the Middle East, bring radicalism to America is certainly hard to sustain. There is evidence that things work the other way round. It is in US universities that Muslim students from the Middle Eats become radicalized.
Two examples would suffice to illustrate the point.
First, all nine members of the leadership of the Iranian Trotskyite party that helped the mullahs overthrow the Shah in 1979 were graduates of US universities while five members of the first ministerial Cabinet set up by Khomeini were naturalized American citizens of Iranian origin.
Second, between 1970 and 2002 the US was the single most important source of funding for radical Islamist movements outside the Middle East. It was also in Dallas, Texas, that in 1985 the various branches of Hezbollah managed to hold their first and only international gathering outside Iran
.
Today, the bulk of the anti-American material that is used in the Muslim world is produced in the United States itself, mostly by non-Muslims.
Barrette's most surprising recommendation is that the US should modify its foreign policy and enforce some measure of censorship in order not to hurt Muslim "sensibilities." The truth, however, is that millions of Muslims immigrated to the US precisely because they wanted to live in a society based on freedom of belief and expression
Book Review by Amir Taheri
One of the nightmares of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the mullah who ruled Iran with an iron fist for a decade, was ha he called "the Americanization of Islam."
Khomeini feared that the infiltration of such an American ideas as the rule of law, democracy, the rights of the individual, alternative life-styles and, above all, the separation of religion and state, into Muslim communities would undermine commitment to the faith. For the old curmudgeon, the slogan "Death to America!" was as important as any testimony of faith.
Paul M. Barrett, a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal, however, shows that millions of Muslims live in the United States, the homeland of "The Great Satan", without abandoning their faith. In a sense, Muslims enjoy far ore religious freedom in the United States than they do in the Islamic Republic built by Khomeini. (In the US, all versions of Islam are free to practice and propagate. In the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, only the Khomeinist version has full freedom.)
No one knows for sure how many Muslims there are in the United States, and Barrett offers no conclusive figures. Estimates, however, put the number at anything between three to six million. It is unfortunate that Barrett did not pay more attention to the need for establishing a credible figure to help end an old controversy on the subject.
Barrett starts by dispelling a number of common misconceptions with regard to American Muslims. For example, he shows that, contrary to common assumptions, black Americans do not form a majority of Muslims in the US. (They are only 20 per cent, mostly recent converts to Islam.) The largest bloc of Muslims in the US, some 34 per cent, belongs to Indians and Pakistanis, recent immigrants who started arriving in large numbers only after the 1970s. Turks, Iranians and "others" account for the remainder.
According to Barrett, some 85 per cent of American Muslims are Sunnis, with the Shiites accounting for the remaining 15 per cent. What is not clear, however, is whether Barrett includes the Nation of Islam, a mostly Afro-American movement, in the Sunni column.
Barrett offers a number of surprising facts. For examples, almost 60 per cent of American Muslims hold college or university degrees, more than twice the number for average Americans. Most American Muslims work in service industries, especially in managerial positions, and earn 20 per cent more than the average American.
Thanks to continued massive immigration, especially from India and Pakistan, and because of larger families, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the US. It also attracts the largest number of converts, in competition not only against Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Baha'ism, but also against such fashionable sects such as The Church of Scientology. Barrett also reminds his readers that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world.
Barrett's book has no clear structure and could be read as a series of independent reportages. He devotes a god part of the book to the portraits of seven Muslims, supposed to represent the diversity of the American Muslims. He gives each of the seven a label: "scholar", "activist", and "feminist" for example.
Of the seven, only one, Osama Siblani, is a Shiite. Of Lebanese origin, Siblani immigrated to the US from Lebanon in 1976 and settled in Dearborn, Michigan, the stronghold of Arab-Americans since the middle of the last century. Siblani, who publishes the newspaper Arab American, the largest Arab [publication in the US, emerges as a complex figure. On the one hand, he is a great admirer of the so-called "American dream" while, on the other, his paper blames the US for much that goes wrong in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A passionate supporter of the Hezballah, a branch of the Khomeinist movement, Siblani is critical of Lebanese politicians and parties that resist its attempt to seize power in Beirut.
One of the colorful figures presented by Barrett is Siraj Wahhaj, an African-American Muslim who promotes many of the themes, such as self-reliance and hard work, originally developed by Malcolm X. Wahhaj believes that the US will one day adopt the Shariaa as its basic law to save itself from alcohol, drugs, gambling, pornography and prostitution.
It is hard to see in what way the seven individuals portrayed here represent Muslims in the United States. In fact, speaking of a single Muslim community in the US, or anywhere else for that matter, could be misleading. Islam is a faith that is adhered to and practiced individually. There are no formal church structures as in Christianity, and certainly no priesthood and papacy.
The fact is worth stressing for at least two reasons.
The first concerns integration. The so-called "American melting pot" cannot integrate people as communities. It integrates people from countless backgrounds and cultures only as individuals. To lump millions of people from dozens of different cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds together because of their assumed common faith is an exercise in artificial communiatrianism.
There is a second reason why putting the emphasis on the community aspect of Islam in America is wrong. This is because American Muslims have different cultural aspirations and political sensibilities. In the year 2000, for example, American Muslims of Arab and Iranian origin voted overwhelmingly for George W Bush while Muslims of Afro-American background chose Al Gore. In 2004, most Arab-Americans , along with Afro-American Muslims, voted against Bush while Muslims of Indo-Pakistani and Iranian origin, remained loyal to Bush.
Barrett devotes a good part of the book to his thoughts about what should be done to improve relations between American Muslims and the broader American reality.
Sadly, his analysis is often shaky while he offers few serious suggestions. Barrett's claim that Muslim students from the Middle East, bring radicalism to America is certainly hard to sustain. There is evidence that things work the other way round. It is in US universities that Muslim students from the Middle Eats become radicalized.
Two examples would suffice to illustrate the point.
First, all nine members of the leadership of the Iranian Trotskyite party that helped the mullahs overthrow the Shah in 1979 were graduates of US universities while five members of the first ministerial Cabinet set up by Khomeini were naturalized American citizens of Iranian origin.
Second, between 1970 and 2002 the US was the single most important source of funding for radical Islamist movements outside the Middle East. It was also in Dallas, Texas, that in 1985 the various branches of Hezbollah managed to hold their first and only international gathering outside Iran
.
Today, the bulk of the anti-American material that is used in the Muslim world is produced in the United States itself, mostly by non-Muslims.
Barrette's most surprising recommendation is that the US should modify its foreign policy and enforce some measure of censorship in order not to hurt Muslim "sensibilities." The truth, however, is that millions of Muslims immigrated to the US precisely because they wanted to live in a society based on freedom of belief and expression
Saturday, April 28, 2007
What is to become of the Magen Abraham Synagogue in Wadi Abou Jemil-Beirut?
See Also:Heritage and History News Feed
After a relative halt in the constructions and refurbishments in Downtown Beirut, due to the recent Israeli/American aggressions followed by the latest national political strife, the pace seems to be finally picking up. The Beirut Souks Project, a modern shopping district, replacing the traditional markets is now taking shape and its expected beauty is very visible. According to Solidere, it will include facilities totalling 100,000 sqms of floor space and 60,000 sqms of pedestrian areas and landscaped squares. We are to expect around 200 shops, an office building, a gold souk and jeweler’s market, an entertainment complex comprising cinemas, restaurants and games arcades, an international department store, and of course an underground 2600 car park which has already been completed. Very impressive indeed!A few miles away however, stands a long forgotten and decaying architectural body, in need of urgent attention to wash off its years of suffering and sorrow that characterize most of the ruins located along what was known as the demarcation lines.The Magen Abraham Synagogue in Wadi Abou Jemil is probably the last remaining symbol that Lebanon''s currently vanishing Jewish community was in fact once fully integrated into Lebanese economic, social, cultural and political life. Actually, when Greater Lebanon was proclaimed in 1920, they were the only Middle Eastern Jewish community to be constitutionally protected!The Synagogue was built during an era of prosperity, throughout which the Lebanese Jewish community began to flock towards the Wadi Abu Jemil district, making it their cultural, religious, social and economic centre.In fact, Lebanon was the only Arab state to see its Jewish community increase after the establishment of Israel. Lebanese Jews remained generally opposed to the Zionist movement and their attachment to life in Lebanon as full Lebanese citizens was stronger than their sympathy for Israel.During The 1958 conflict however, many Jews left for Europe, the U.S. and South America. Again, very few went to Israel. Like most other Lebanese who emigrated, Lebanese Jews remained attached to their homeland.Following the June Arab-Israeli war and the civil war of 1975, Wadi Abu Jemil was deserted, and the synagogue was closed. Located near the old city centre, it was unfortunately caught between the conflicting factions. But ironically, the synagogue took most of the damage from direct Israeli shell fire during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon.When later on Solidere was created, Beirut’s City Centre started undergoing a full fledge face lift. The restoration of the synagogue didn’t seem to come up in any of the plans, until a project to build a massive Hariri Mosque in the Martyrs’ Square area took form.At the time, there was need to acquire more land in the chosen spot. It is believed that Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had concocted a deal with the Safra family (one of the most established Jewish banking families in the world), whereby they donated land they owned for the mosque, in exchange for Hariri’s adoption of the Synagogue’s restoration. The anticipated project also included a garden, surrounding the Synagogue, open to downtown strollers. This would have been the icing or the cherry that would crown Rafiq Hariri’s political career and diplomacy. Things did not go quite as planned…Currently the Mosque is completed, and Rafiq Hariri’s remnants from his horrifying assassination (god rests his soul) is buried within its premises…and the Synagogue is still plunged in its deep slumber. Is it destined to perish in oblivion?
See Also:Heritage and History News Feed
After a relative halt in the constructions and refurbishments in Downtown Beirut, due to the recent Israeli/American aggressions followed by the latest national political strife, the pace seems to be finally picking up. The Beirut Souks Project, a modern shopping district, replacing the traditional markets is now taking shape and its expected beauty is very visible. According to Solidere, it will include facilities totalling 100,000 sqms of floor space and 60,000 sqms of pedestrian areas and landscaped squares. We are to expect around 200 shops, an office building, a gold souk and jeweler’s market, an entertainment complex comprising cinemas, restaurants and games arcades, an international department store, and of course an underground 2600 car park which has already been completed. Very impressive indeed!A few miles away however, stands a long forgotten and decaying architectural body, in need of urgent attention to wash off its years of suffering and sorrow that characterize most of the ruins located along what was known as the demarcation lines.The Magen Abraham Synagogue in Wadi Abou Jemil is probably the last remaining symbol that Lebanon''s currently vanishing Jewish community was in fact once fully integrated into Lebanese economic, social, cultural and political life. Actually, when Greater Lebanon was proclaimed in 1920, they were the only Middle Eastern Jewish community to be constitutionally protected!The Synagogue was built during an era of prosperity, throughout which the Lebanese Jewish community began to flock towards the Wadi Abu Jemil district, making it their cultural, religious, social and economic centre.In fact, Lebanon was the only Arab state to see its Jewish community increase after the establishment of Israel. Lebanese Jews remained generally opposed to the Zionist movement and their attachment to life in Lebanon as full Lebanese citizens was stronger than their sympathy for Israel.During The 1958 conflict however, many Jews left for Europe, the U.S. and South America. Again, very few went to Israel. Like most other Lebanese who emigrated, Lebanese Jews remained attached to their homeland.Following the June Arab-Israeli war and the civil war of 1975, Wadi Abu Jemil was deserted, and the synagogue was closed. Located near the old city centre, it was unfortunately caught between the conflicting factions. But ironically, the synagogue took most of the damage from direct Israeli shell fire during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon.When later on Solidere was created, Beirut’s City Centre started undergoing a full fledge face lift. The restoration of the synagogue didn’t seem to come up in any of the plans, until a project to build a massive Hariri Mosque in the Martyrs’ Square area took form.At the time, there was need to acquire more land in the chosen spot. It is believed that Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had concocted a deal with the Safra family (one of the most established Jewish banking families in the world), whereby they donated land they owned for the mosque, in exchange for Hariri’s adoption of the Synagogue’s restoration. The anticipated project also included a garden, surrounding the Synagogue, open to downtown strollers. This would have been the icing or the cherry that would crown Rafiq Hariri’s political career and diplomacy. Things did not go quite as planned…Currently the Mosque is completed, and Rafiq Hariri’s remnants from his horrifying assassination (god rests his soul) is buried within its premises…and the Synagogue is still plunged in its deep slumber. Is it destined to perish in oblivion?
Thursday, April 19, 2007
Deterring a Nuclear 9/11 click herre for full article
Caitlin Talmadge
Can a nuclear terrorist attack be deterred? Nuclear forensic techniques to identify the origins of nuclear materials are improving, but significant associated strategic, political, diplomatic, and organizational challenges have yet to be sufficiently addressed.
Caitlin Talmadge
Can a nuclear terrorist attack be deterred? Nuclear forensic techniques to identify the origins of nuclear materials are improving, but significant associated strategic, political, diplomatic, and organizational challenges have yet to be sufficiently addressed.
Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship
Emile El-Hokayem is a research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.
Terms such as “proxy” and “client” are often used to characterize the power dynamic between Hizballah and its allies Iran and Syria. These states’ vital resources and indispensable political sponsorship elevated Hizballah to the position it enjoys today. They each played a central role in past decisions of momentous importance for Hizballah. Today, however, this image of Hizballah as a client of Iran and Syria has become obsolete due to the power base the Shi‘ite group has nurtured and expanded in Lebanon and the growing political capital it has acquired in the Middle East thanks to at least the perception of its military victories, be they real or not, particularly in the summer 2006 war against Israel.
By holding its ground against Israel, the region’s strongest military, Hizballah demonstrated its capacity to shake the Lebanese and regional political landscape. Hizballah resisted Israel’s onslaught without substantive Syrian support. By partnering with Hizballah, Syria hoped to defy isolation and reclaim its role as a pivotal power in the region, as well as give the Asad regime a new lease on life. The shifting dynamics of this relationship, however, with Hizballah asserting itself as a more-autonomous actor, have considerable implications for policies aimed at engaging or isolating Syria, as well as for dealing with the Hizballah challenge.
Hizballah has acquired a degree of autonomy and flexibility in recent years vis-à-vis Syria. Long gone are the days when Damascus’s rules and influence determined Hizballah’s activities, guaranteeing the predictability and restraint that prevented full-blown war. Hizballah has emerged as a more-independent player able to operate in Lebanon and the wider Middle East on its own terms.
Syria and Hizballah maintain complex relations that have evolved considerably over the past 25 years, shifting to fit their strategic interests and ideological agendas. Yet, two crucial changes, one in the early 1990s when Syria established itself as the unquestioned dominant player in Lebanon and the other ongoing since 2000 as Hizballah gradually grows stronger, have redefined how they interact and led them to reassess their relative positions. Hizballah has acquired enough confidence and prestige to become more than just a pawn for Syria to manipulate. Today, for strategic and ideological motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria.
Download the full article, available in Adobe Acrobat [.pdf] format
Emile El-Hokayem is a research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.
Terms such as “proxy” and “client” are often used to characterize the power dynamic between Hizballah and its allies Iran and Syria. These states’ vital resources and indispensable political sponsorship elevated Hizballah to the position it enjoys today. They each played a central role in past decisions of momentous importance for Hizballah. Today, however, this image of Hizballah as a client of Iran and Syria has become obsolete due to the power base the Shi‘ite group has nurtured and expanded in Lebanon and the growing political capital it has acquired in the Middle East thanks to at least the perception of its military victories, be they real or not, particularly in the summer 2006 war against Israel.
By holding its ground against Israel, the region’s strongest military, Hizballah demonstrated its capacity to shake the Lebanese and regional political landscape. Hizballah resisted Israel’s onslaught without substantive Syrian support. By partnering with Hizballah, Syria hoped to defy isolation and reclaim its role as a pivotal power in the region, as well as give the Asad regime a new lease on life. The shifting dynamics of this relationship, however, with Hizballah asserting itself as a more-autonomous actor, have considerable implications for policies aimed at engaging or isolating Syria, as well as for dealing with the Hizballah challenge.
Hizballah has acquired a degree of autonomy and flexibility in recent years vis-à-vis Syria. Long gone are the days when Damascus’s rules and influence determined Hizballah’s activities, guaranteeing the predictability and restraint that prevented full-blown war. Hizballah has emerged as a more-independent player able to operate in Lebanon and the wider Middle East on its own terms.
Syria and Hizballah maintain complex relations that have evolved considerably over the past 25 years, shifting to fit their strategic interests and ideological agendas. Yet, two crucial changes, one in the early 1990s when Syria established itself as the unquestioned dominant player in Lebanon and the other ongoing since 2000 as Hizballah gradually grows stronger, have redefined how they interact and led them to reassess their relative positions. Hizballah has acquired enough confidence and prestige to become more than just a pawn for Syria to manipulate. Today, for strategic and ideological motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria.
Download the full article, available in Adobe Acrobat [.pdf] format
Friday, April 13, 2007
عربية تقترب من إطاحة الرجل الذي يعد مهندس الإطاحة بنظام صدام
واشنطن: طلحة جبريل بات من المرجح ان تطيح علاقة بين بول وولفويتز رئيس البنك الدولي وعشيقته شاها علي رضا ذات الاصول العربية، على الرغم من ان البيت الابيض اعلن وقوفه الى جانب بول وولفويتز الذي يعد المهندس الرئيسي لغزو العراق.
وكان بول وولفويتز قد تدخل لنقل صديقته شاها علي رضا من البنك الدولي الى الخارجية الاميركية ومنحها راتباً أعلى من راتب الوزيرة كوندوليزا رايس. وبادر بول وولفويتز عند انتخابه رئيساً للبنك الدولي في منتصف 2005 التدخل الى نقل شاها التي ظلت تعمل مع البنك منذ ثمانية أعوام، للعمل في وزارة الخارجية الأميركية، لتفادي تضارب المصالح وذلك حسب قوانين البنك التي تمنع ترؤوس شخص لفرد من عائلته. وانتقلت شاها التي كانت تعمل موظفة علاقات عامة في البنك الدولي الى وزارة الخارجية الاميركية لتعمل مستشارة هناك في مكتب ليزا تشيني ابنة نائب الرئيس الاميركي.
واتخذ بول وولفويتز قراراً بزيادة كبيرة وسريعة في مرتبها المعفي من الضرائب في البنك الدولي حيث بلغ 193 ألف دولار أميركي سنوياً، أي أكثر من المرتب الذي تتقاضاه وزيرة الخارجية الأميركية، كوندوليزا رايس نفسها، والذي يبلغ 186 الف دولار سنوياً قبل خصم الضرائب منه.
يشار الى ان شاها علي رضا ولدت في ليبيا من أب ليبي وأم من اصول سورية، وتربت شاها في تونس والسعودية وبريطانيا وتزوجت من بلنت علي رضا في الثمانينات ثم انتقلت معه الى الولايات المتحدة ، بعد ان كانت قد حصلت على درجة الماجستير في العلاقات الدولية من جامعة اكسفورد. ويقول الذين يعرفونها عن قرب انها تتمتع بكفاءة عالية في مجال العلاقات العامة وانفصلت شاها عن زوجها كما ان وولفويتز منفصل هو الآخر عن زوجته. ولم يدافع مجلس مديري البنك الدولي، في البيان الذي اصدره امس عن بول وولفويتز، مما عزز التكهنات بانه سيضطر للاستقالة، بل إن مجلس ادارة البنك وجه أعنف توبيخ للرجل خلال مسيرة حياته السياسية. ويتوقع ان تخيم تداعيات هذه الفضيحة على الاجتماعات السنوية المشتركة بين البنك الدولي وصندوق النقد الدولي التي ستبدأ اليوم في واشنطن. وأصدر المجلس بعد اجتماع دام ساعات طويلة واستمر حتى فجر امس بياناً يقول إن وولفويتز لم يقم بالتفاوض من أجل تعيين عشيقته وتحديد قيمة مرتبها فقط، بل قدم تعليمات مفصلة لتنفيذ ذلك، وتفادي عرض الموضوع على الجهات المعنية داخل البنك للحصول على الموافقة. وقال بيان مجلس مديري البنك (24 مديرا كل واحد يمثل الدول الرئيسية التي تساهم في البنك) «سوف يتحرك المديرون التنفيذيون سريعا للوصول الى خلاصة حول احتمالات يمكن اتخاذها، وسوف ينظر المديرون التنفيذيون الى كل القوانين والظروف واضعين في الاعتبار ما يمس البنك». واعتبر مراقبون ان هذا البيان ليس تأييدا لموقف وولفويتز، ولا حتى شبه تأييد، بل انه يشكك، بطريقة دبلوماسية، في الاعذار التي قدمها وولفويتز. كما ان البيان يشير الى «ما يمس البنك» مما يعني ان المديرين التنفيذيين يضعون اعتباراً اكبر لسمعة البنك، ويعتبرون انها اهم من سمعة بول وولفويتز. وقال البيان إن مجلس المديرين لا يفكر في الإجراء الذي ينبغي له اتخاذه، إذا ما قرر أنه لا بد من ذلك. وتصاعدت مطالبة ممثلي موظفي البنك باستقالة وولفويتز بسبب الفضيحة، فيما قال وولفويتز انه سيقبل اي قرار يتخذه مجلس ادارة البنك. وقال اتحاد موظفي البنك إنه بالإضافة إلى ما حدث، حصلت شاها رضا على ترقية وزيادة في المرتب «مبالغ فيهما». وقال البيان الذي يمثل اكثر من عشرة آلاف شخص يعملون في البنك في كل انحاء العالم «ساهم المدير العام في تدمير سمعة البنك، ويجب عليه، حفاظا على هذه السمعة ان يستقيل استقالة مشرفة».
وكان بول وولفويتز قد أقر بالفضيحة واستهل مؤتمره الصحافي أول من امس بالقول «ساقول بعض الكلمات حول الموضوع الذي يدور في عقولكم ... جئت هنا قبل سنتين وطرحت مسألة احتمال تعارض المصالح على لجنة الاخلاقيات وكان رأي اللجنة ان تتم ترقية ونقل شاها رضا ...وكان من المفترض ان لا أقحم نفسي في الموضوع لذا ارتكبت خطأ واعتذر عنه»، وكان وولفويتز يأمل أن يؤدي اعترافه بالخطأ إلى الحيلولة دون خروج المسألة من السيطرة. والمفارقة ان بول وولفويتز شدد مجدداً في ندوته الصحافية على ضرورة «مكافحة الفساد» في العالم وهو الشعار الذي جاء يحمله الى البنك الدولي. كما تحدث عن نشاط البنك في محاربة الفقر في العالم. ومنذ توليه مهامه داخل البنك كان يرى أن الحواجز التي تعرقل التنمية في البلدان الفقيرة تتمثل في تفشي الفساد بنسب مرتفعة داخل الحكومات. وكان قد قال في خطاب القاه العام الماضي في اندونيسيا «الفساد هو أصل الداء الذي يجعل الحكومات لا تعمل».
وقال مصدر مطلع داخل البنك طلب عدم ذكر اسمه لـ«الشرق الأوسط» إن بول وولفويتز حاول استباق خروج الفضيحة الى العلن وبحث مع بعض مستشاريه القانونيين كيفية ان تمتد الحصانة التي يوفرها العمل داخل البنك الدولي لتشمل الفترة ما قبل انتخابه رئيساً وما بعد ترك منصبه.
وعمل وولفويتز نائبا لوزير الدفاع دونالد رمسفيلد، وكان من الذين وضعوا ونفذوا خطة غزو العراق. ويعتبر من المحافظين الجدد (تحالف المسيحيين واليهود المتطرفين) لكن لم تكن هناك اعترضات على تعيينه في ذلك الوقت لأن اغلبية الشعب الاميركي كانت تؤيد غزو العراق. وكان بول وولفويتز يرى ان اطاحة نظام صدام حسين «ستؤدي الى انبثاق عصر جديد وازدهار الديمقراطية في الشرق الاوسط»، وتوقع ان يستقبل الشعب العراقي القوات الاميركية على اعتبار انها «قوات تحرير».
* تعتبر شاها علي رضا التي ولدت في طرابلس بليبيا من أب ليبي وأم سورية كبرت في تونس والسعودية وبريطانيا ثم انتقلت الى الولايات المتحدة بعد زواجها من بوليند علي شاها في آخر الثمانينات. ودرست شاها في مدرسة لندن الاقتصادية قبل اخذها درجة الماجستير في العلاقات الدولية من جامعة أكسفورد حيث درست في كلية سان أنتوني. وتخصصت شاها في الشرق الأوسط حيث نفذت بحثا ميدانيا في عدد من الدول العربية قبل انضمامها الى البنك الدولي، وعملت في المؤسسة الوطنية للديمقراطية، حيث بدأت وقادت برامج عن الشرق الأوسط في المؤسسة منذ انضمامها للبنك الدولي عام 1997. حيث عملت بالشرق الأوسط وشمال افريقيا في مجال التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية ومنسقة المجتمع المدني في مكتب رئيس المكتب الاقتصادي. وفي يوليو(تموز) 2002، اصبحت نائبة المدير للشؤون الخارجية في البنك الدولي، وهي تعمل الآن مع بنت نائب الرئيس الاميركي ديك تشيني (ليز تشيني) في وزارة الخارجية.
وارتبطت شاها مع رئيس البنك الدولي الحالي بول وولفويتز منذ ان كان وكيل وزارة الدفاع في إدارة الرئيس الاميركي بوش.
واشنطن: طلحة جبريل بات من المرجح ان تطيح علاقة بين بول وولفويتز رئيس البنك الدولي وعشيقته شاها علي رضا ذات الاصول العربية، على الرغم من ان البيت الابيض اعلن وقوفه الى جانب بول وولفويتز الذي يعد المهندس الرئيسي لغزو العراق.
وكان بول وولفويتز قد تدخل لنقل صديقته شاها علي رضا من البنك الدولي الى الخارجية الاميركية ومنحها راتباً أعلى من راتب الوزيرة كوندوليزا رايس. وبادر بول وولفويتز عند انتخابه رئيساً للبنك الدولي في منتصف 2005 التدخل الى نقل شاها التي ظلت تعمل مع البنك منذ ثمانية أعوام، للعمل في وزارة الخارجية الأميركية، لتفادي تضارب المصالح وذلك حسب قوانين البنك التي تمنع ترؤوس شخص لفرد من عائلته. وانتقلت شاها التي كانت تعمل موظفة علاقات عامة في البنك الدولي الى وزارة الخارجية الاميركية لتعمل مستشارة هناك في مكتب ليزا تشيني ابنة نائب الرئيس الاميركي.
واتخذ بول وولفويتز قراراً بزيادة كبيرة وسريعة في مرتبها المعفي من الضرائب في البنك الدولي حيث بلغ 193 ألف دولار أميركي سنوياً، أي أكثر من المرتب الذي تتقاضاه وزيرة الخارجية الأميركية، كوندوليزا رايس نفسها، والذي يبلغ 186 الف دولار سنوياً قبل خصم الضرائب منه.
يشار الى ان شاها علي رضا ولدت في ليبيا من أب ليبي وأم من اصول سورية، وتربت شاها في تونس والسعودية وبريطانيا وتزوجت من بلنت علي رضا في الثمانينات ثم انتقلت معه الى الولايات المتحدة ، بعد ان كانت قد حصلت على درجة الماجستير في العلاقات الدولية من جامعة اكسفورد. ويقول الذين يعرفونها عن قرب انها تتمتع بكفاءة عالية في مجال العلاقات العامة وانفصلت شاها عن زوجها كما ان وولفويتز منفصل هو الآخر عن زوجته. ولم يدافع مجلس مديري البنك الدولي، في البيان الذي اصدره امس عن بول وولفويتز، مما عزز التكهنات بانه سيضطر للاستقالة، بل إن مجلس ادارة البنك وجه أعنف توبيخ للرجل خلال مسيرة حياته السياسية. ويتوقع ان تخيم تداعيات هذه الفضيحة على الاجتماعات السنوية المشتركة بين البنك الدولي وصندوق النقد الدولي التي ستبدأ اليوم في واشنطن. وأصدر المجلس بعد اجتماع دام ساعات طويلة واستمر حتى فجر امس بياناً يقول إن وولفويتز لم يقم بالتفاوض من أجل تعيين عشيقته وتحديد قيمة مرتبها فقط، بل قدم تعليمات مفصلة لتنفيذ ذلك، وتفادي عرض الموضوع على الجهات المعنية داخل البنك للحصول على الموافقة. وقال بيان مجلس مديري البنك (24 مديرا كل واحد يمثل الدول الرئيسية التي تساهم في البنك) «سوف يتحرك المديرون التنفيذيون سريعا للوصول الى خلاصة حول احتمالات يمكن اتخاذها، وسوف ينظر المديرون التنفيذيون الى كل القوانين والظروف واضعين في الاعتبار ما يمس البنك». واعتبر مراقبون ان هذا البيان ليس تأييدا لموقف وولفويتز، ولا حتى شبه تأييد، بل انه يشكك، بطريقة دبلوماسية، في الاعذار التي قدمها وولفويتز. كما ان البيان يشير الى «ما يمس البنك» مما يعني ان المديرين التنفيذيين يضعون اعتباراً اكبر لسمعة البنك، ويعتبرون انها اهم من سمعة بول وولفويتز. وقال البيان إن مجلس المديرين لا يفكر في الإجراء الذي ينبغي له اتخاذه، إذا ما قرر أنه لا بد من ذلك. وتصاعدت مطالبة ممثلي موظفي البنك باستقالة وولفويتز بسبب الفضيحة، فيما قال وولفويتز انه سيقبل اي قرار يتخذه مجلس ادارة البنك. وقال اتحاد موظفي البنك إنه بالإضافة إلى ما حدث، حصلت شاها رضا على ترقية وزيادة في المرتب «مبالغ فيهما». وقال البيان الذي يمثل اكثر من عشرة آلاف شخص يعملون في البنك في كل انحاء العالم «ساهم المدير العام في تدمير سمعة البنك، ويجب عليه، حفاظا على هذه السمعة ان يستقيل استقالة مشرفة».
وكان بول وولفويتز قد أقر بالفضيحة واستهل مؤتمره الصحافي أول من امس بالقول «ساقول بعض الكلمات حول الموضوع الذي يدور في عقولكم ... جئت هنا قبل سنتين وطرحت مسألة احتمال تعارض المصالح على لجنة الاخلاقيات وكان رأي اللجنة ان تتم ترقية ونقل شاها رضا ...وكان من المفترض ان لا أقحم نفسي في الموضوع لذا ارتكبت خطأ واعتذر عنه»، وكان وولفويتز يأمل أن يؤدي اعترافه بالخطأ إلى الحيلولة دون خروج المسألة من السيطرة. والمفارقة ان بول وولفويتز شدد مجدداً في ندوته الصحافية على ضرورة «مكافحة الفساد» في العالم وهو الشعار الذي جاء يحمله الى البنك الدولي. كما تحدث عن نشاط البنك في محاربة الفقر في العالم. ومنذ توليه مهامه داخل البنك كان يرى أن الحواجز التي تعرقل التنمية في البلدان الفقيرة تتمثل في تفشي الفساد بنسب مرتفعة داخل الحكومات. وكان قد قال في خطاب القاه العام الماضي في اندونيسيا «الفساد هو أصل الداء الذي يجعل الحكومات لا تعمل».
وقال مصدر مطلع داخل البنك طلب عدم ذكر اسمه لـ«الشرق الأوسط» إن بول وولفويتز حاول استباق خروج الفضيحة الى العلن وبحث مع بعض مستشاريه القانونيين كيفية ان تمتد الحصانة التي يوفرها العمل داخل البنك الدولي لتشمل الفترة ما قبل انتخابه رئيساً وما بعد ترك منصبه.
وعمل وولفويتز نائبا لوزير الدفاع دونالد رمسفيلد، وكان من الذين وضعوا ونفذوا خطة غزو العراق. ويعتبر من المحافظين الجدد (تحالف المسيحيين واليهود المتطرفين) لكن لم تكن هناك اعترضات على تعيينه في ذلك الوقت لأن اغلبية الشعب الاميركي كانت تؤيد غزو العراق. وكان بول وولفويتز يرى ان اطاحة نظام صدام حسين «ستؤدي الى انبثاق عصر جديد وازدهار الديمقراطية في الشرق الاوسط»، وتوقع ان يستقبل الشعب العراقي القوات الاميركية على اعتبار انها «قوات تحرير».
* تعتبر شاها علي رضا التي ولدت في طرابلس بليبيا من أب ليبي وأم سورية كبرت في تونس والسعودية وبريطانيا ثم انتقلت الى الولايات المتحدة بعد زواجها من بوليند علي شاها في آخر الثمانينات. ودرست شاها في مدرسة لندن الاقتصادية قبل اخذها درجة الماجستير في العلاقات الدولية من جامعة أكسفورد حيث درست في كلية سان أنتوني. وتخصصت شاها في الشرق الأوسط حيث نفذت بحثا ميدانيا في عدد من الدول العربية قبل انضمامها الى البنك الدولي، وعملت في المؤسسة الوطنية للديمقراطية، حيث بدأت وقادت برامج عن الشرق الأوسط في المؤسسة منذ انضمامها للبنك الدولي عام 1997. حيث عملت بالشرق الأوسط وشمال افريقيا في مجال التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية ومنسقة المجتمع المدني في مكتب رئيس المكتب الاقتصادي. وفي يوليو(تموز) 2002، اصبحت نائبة المدير للشؤون الخارجية في البنك الدولي، وهي تعمل الآن مع بنت نائب الرئيس الاميركي ديك تشيني (ليز تشيني) في وزارة الخارجية.
وارتبطت شاها مع رئيس البنك الدولي الحالي بول وولفويتز منذ ان كان وكيل وزارة الدفاع في إدارة الرئيس الاميركي بوش.
Pelosi's Misguided Middle East Visit
Dr. Marcy Newman,
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (right) at AIPAC's annual policy conference. (AIPAC)This week U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi concluded her visit to the Middle East in Damascus, Syria, to which President George W. Bush's response was that her visit "sends mixed messages." While Pelosi's delegation to the region should be met with applause for refusing to participate in isolating Syria, her visit to Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria should be met with a great deal of caution.Twice in the last month Pelosi delivered a speech -- of more or less the same message -- before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) annual policy conference and before the Israeli Knesset. In these speeches, she unequivocally stated: "When Israel is threatened, America's interests in the region are threatened. America's commitment to Israel's security needs is unshakable." Statements such as this have made Pelosi, along with her traveling companion Congressman Tom Lantos, one of the top ten recipients of AIPAC donations. She received a standing ovation for these sentiments in the Knesset where she linked the U.S. and Israel's "common cause": " a safe and secure Israel living in peace with her neighbors."Perhaps Pelosi genuinely wants to secure peace in the region. If this were the case, however, we would have seen some indication of balance in her fact-finding mission. While in Israel, Pelosi discussed her visits with the families of Israeli soldiers taken last summer in Gaza and Lebanon, naming them and relaying stories about them. Not once was a Palestinian or Lebanese killed or wounded in Israel's wars dignified with any such humanizing gesture. Instead Pelosi focused entirely on Hezbollah's violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 for failing to disarm. Not once did she mention Israel's almost daily violation of that same resolution with military jets invading Lebanese airspace or recent military incursions into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, she failed to mention Israel's continued occupation of Shaaba Farms and Ghajar, which are also violations of 1701; nor did she engage with serious discussions of the occupation of the Golan Heights or the Palestinian Territories with leaders in the region.If Pelosi, Lantos, and the other congressional leaders traveling in their delegation wanted to understand what peace means to all parties they could have spent their time in Lebanon meeting with victims of Israel's war and she could have toured the areas of the country destroyed by Israel. She could have visited with Lebanese families affected by American-made cluster bombs. Such meetings could have helped Pelosi to respond to a report on her desk from the State Department, which states Israel may have violated legal agreements made with the U.S. in the 1970s when it dropped between 2.6 and 4 million American-made cluster munitions on Lebanon last summer in the last 72 hours of the war after the cease fire agreement had been brokered. The report explores Israel's violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which stipulates that American-manufactured weapons must only be used in self-defense, in an open area against two or more invading armies, and never used against civilians.As Speaker of the House it is Pelosi's job (along with Senator Majority Leader Joseph Biden) to review this report and if the violations are corroborated, which evidence from organizations like Human Rights Watch already substantiated, Israel could be sanctioned. Indeed, in response to Israel's use of American-made cluster bombs in Lebanon last summer, Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch reported, "we've never seen use of cluster munitions that was so extensive and dangerous to civilians ... The issue is not whether Israel used the American cluster munitions lawfully, but what the US is going to do about it." As Speaker, Pelosi can and should do something about it. After all, there is a precedent: Ronald Reagan imposed a six-year ban on the sale of munitions to Israel in 1982 after Congress investigated Israel's use of cluster bombs against civilians. For all the talk about "peace" before AIPAC and the Knesset, if Pelosi were actually invested in regional peace she could begin by holding Israel accountable for its violations of the Arms Export Control Act by sanctioning Israel. But this option seems rather unlikely given her congressional voting record. For instance, last summer she voted for her colleague Lantos' resolution in Congress (HR 921), entitled "Condemning the recent attacks against the State of Israel, holding terrorists and their state-sponsors accountable for such attacks, supporting Israel's right to defend itself, and for other purposes." That bill, which overwhelmingly passed (410-8), led to "other purposes," namely selling $120 million of oil to re-fuel Israel's American-made fighter jets that bombed and killed civilians in Lebanon as well as an expedited delivery of 1,300 M26 artillery rockets for Israel to use in its war on Lebanon.If Pelosi's delegation to the Middle East is seriously interested in creating "peace" here, it should begin at home. She should respond to the report on her desk and make the decision to sanction Israel. Moreover, Pelosi and Lantos should both draft legislation that does not focus exclusively on Syria, Lebanon, and Iran for their weapons if only because the U.S. itself provides Israel with extensive military support and political cover. The burden should be shifted to Israel as the occupying power of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Further, Pelosi would do well to join her colleagues in the Senate who drafted the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2007 (S 594) and support the effort of forty other nations who have banned cluster munitions.
Dr. Marcy Newman is a Visiting Professor at the Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut and a Fellow at the Initiative for Middle East Policy Dialogue.
Dr. Marcy Newman,
U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (right) at AIPAC's annual policy conference. (AIPAC)This week U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi concluded her visit to the Middle East in Damascus, Syria, to which President George W. Bush's response was that her visit "sends mixed messages." While Pelosi's delegation to the region should be met with applause for refusing to participate in isolating Syria, her visit to Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria should be met with a great deal of caution.Twice in the last month Pelosi delivered a speech -- of more or less the same message -- before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) annual policy conference and before the Israeli Knesset. In these speeches, she unequivocally stated: "When Israel is threatened, America's interests in the region are threatened. America's commitment to Israel's security needs is unshakable." Statements such as this have made Pelosi, along with her traveling companion Congressman Tom Lantos, one of the top ten recipients of AIPAC donations. She received a standing ovation for these sentiments in the Knesset where she linked the U.S. and Israel's "common cause": " a safe and secure Israel living in peace with her neighbors."Perhaps Pelosi genuinely wants to secure peace in the region. If this were the case, however, we would have seen some indication of balance in her fact-finding mission. While in Israel, Pelosi discussed her visits with the families of Israeli soldiers taken last summer in Gaza and Lebanon, naming them and relaying stories about them. Not once was a Palestinian or Lebanese killed or wounded in Israel's wars dignified with any such humanizing gesture. Instead Pelosi focused entirely on Hezbollah's violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 for failing to disarm. Not once did she mention Israel's almost daily violation of that same resolution with military jets invading Lebanese airspace or recent military incursions into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, she failed to mention Israel's continued occupation of Shaaba Farms and Ghajar, which are also violations of 1701; nor did she engage with serious discussions of the occupation of the Golan Heights or the Palestinian Territories with leaders in the region.If Pelosi, Lantos, and the other congressional leaders traveling in their delegation wanted to understand what peace means to all parties they could have spent their time in Lebanon meeting with victims of Israel's war and she could have toured the areas of the country destroyed by Israel. She could have visited with Lebanese families affected by American-made cluster bombs. Such meetings could have helped Pelosi to respond to a report on her desk from the State Department, which states Israel may have violated legal agreements made with the U.S. in the 1970s when it dropped between 2.6 and 4 million American-made cluster munitions on Lebanon last summer in the last 72 hours of the war after the cease fire agreement had been brokered. The report explores Israel's violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which stipulates that American-manufactured weapons must only be used in self-defense, in an open area against two or more invading armies, and never used against civilians.As Speaker of the House it is Pelosi's job (along with Senator Majority Leader Joseph Biden) to review this report and if the violations are corroborated, which evidence from organizations like Human Rights Watch already substantiated, Israel could be sanctioned. Indeed, in response to Israel's use of American-made cluster bombs in Lebanon last summer, Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch reported, "we've never seen use of cluster munitions that was so extensive and dangerous to civilians ... The issue is not whether Israel used the American cluster munitions lawfully, but what the US is going to do about it." As Speaker, Pelosi can and should do something about it. After all, there is a precedent: Ronald Reagan imposed a six-year ban on the sale of munitions to Israel in 1982 after Congress investigated Israel's use of cluster bombs against civilians. For all the talk about "peace" before AIPAC and the Knesset, if Pelosi were actually invested in regional peace she could begin by holding Israel accountable for its violations of the Arms Export Control Act by sanctioning Israel. But this option seems rather unlikely given her congressional voting record. For instance, last summer she voted for her colleague Lantos' resolution in Congress (HR 921), entitled "Condemning the recent attacks against the State of Israel, holding terrorists and their state-sponsors accountable for such attacks, supporting Israel's right to defend itself, and for other purposes." That bill, which overwhelmingly passed (410-8), led to "other purposes," namely selling $120 million of oil to re-fuel Israel's American-made fighter jets that bombed and killed civilians in Lebanon as well as an expedited delivery of 1,300 M26 artillery rockets for Israel to use in its war on Lebanon.If Pelosi's delegation to the Middle East is seriously interested in creating "peace" here, it should begin at home. She should respond to the report on her desk and make the decision to sanction Israel. Moreover, Pelosi and Lantos should both draft legislation that does not focus exclusively on Syria, Lebanon, and Iran for their weapons if only because the U.S. itself provides Israel with extensive military support and political cover. The burden should be shifted to Israel as the occupying power of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Further, Pelosi would do well to join her colleagues in the Senate who drafted the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2007 (S 594) and support the effort of forty other nations who have banned cluster munitions.
Dr. Marcy Newman is a Visiting Professor at the Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut and a Fellow at the Initiative for Middle East Policy Dialogue.
Who Pushed America into War in Iraq?
Patrick Seale - 13/04/07//
A shadowy Pentagon unit -- the Office of Special Plans, headed by Douglas Feith, former U.S. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy -- deliberately fabricated intelligence linking Saddam Hussein's regime to al-Qaida in order to incite the United States to make war on Iraq.This conclusion, long suspected by most observers of the Middle East, has now been confirmed by Thomas F. Gimble, Inspector General of the U.S. Defence Department, in a declassified report, released on April 5 at the request of Carl M. Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Together with his boss, Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Defence Secretary, Douglas Feith was one of an influential group of pro-Israeli neo-conservatives in the Bush administration who exploited the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. to campaign and intrigue for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.According to the Inspector General's report, Feith produced intelligence assessments which claimed that there was a 'mature, symbiotic relationship [between Iraq and al-Qaida]' in no fewer than ten specific areas, including training, financing and logistics. To bolster his case, Feith made much of an alleged meeting in Prague in April 2001 between Muhammad Atta, one of the Al-Qaida hijackers, and an Iraqi intelligence officer, Ahmad al-Ani.To mobilize the American public for an attack on Iraq, Feith leaked his fraudulent conclusions to the Weekly Standard, the neo-con magazine which, under its editor William Kristol, had been stridently calling for 'regime change' in Iraq since the late 1990s - and which has now turned its attention to calling for war against Iran. After a thorough examination of the evidence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) both concluded that Feith was wrong. They found 'no conclusive signs' of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida and no evidence of 'direct cooperation.'But Feith was not deterred. Instead, he did his best to discredit the CIA and DIA findings and, bypassing the intelligence community, he presented his phoney evidence as fact to another prominent neo-con, I. Lewis Libby, Vice-President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, and to Deputy National Security Director Steven Hadley. In due course, by means of complicities in the Administration, Feith's dubious material was passed up to President Bush and Vice-President Cheney who used it in speeches preparing the public for war in March 2003. The intrigue was successful.Senator Carl Levin said in a written statement last week that the Defence Department's report fully demonstrated why the Inspector General had concluded that Douglas Feith had 'inappropriately' written intelligence assessments before the March 2003 invasion alleging connections between Iraq and al-Qaida. The word 'inappropriately' is hardly a precise description of Feith's criminal behaviour. As is now plain for everyone to see, the war has been an unmitigated disaster for the United States, for Iraq and for the whole Middle East. But it is only now, four years after the American seizure of Baghdad, that an official report has clearly pointed the finger at the men largely responsible.Why did Feith and his neo-con associates do it? And how did they manage to get away with it?Clearly, in pressing for war, they were primarily concerned to enhance Israel's security by smashing a major Arab state, thereby removing any potential threat to Israel from the east. As they schemed to transform the region with America's military power, they dreamed of defeating all of Israel's enemies -- Arab nationalists, Islamic radicals and Palestinian militants -- at a single stroke. Overthrowing Saddam was to be only the first step in a thorough transformation of the region to the advantage of both Israel and the United States.In the event, the United States has suffered a devastating blow to its political influence and moral authority, as well as to its finances and to the fighting ability of its armed services, while Israel, confronted by a resurgent Iran, is itself less secure than before the war.The reckless enterprise of Feith and his fellow neo-cons would probably have had little chance of success had they not managed to team up with men like Dick Cheney and former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who were evidently seduced by the prospect of taking control of Iraq's oil reserves, second-largest in the world after Saudi Arabia's, and of turning a submissive Iraqi client state into a base for the projection of American power throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.President George W Bush himself bought their agenda - a decision he must now bitterly regret, as he and his advisers seek desperately to find a way out of the Iraqi quagmire.In retrospect, the campaign by Israel and its American friends to push the United States into war with Iraq must be judged one of the most audacious sabotage operations of the Arab world ever mounted.Israel has a long history of seeking to destabilise its neighbours in the belief that a weak and divided Arab world is to its advantage. Over the years, it has sent funds, weapons and military instructors to stiffen the southern Sudanese in their long war against Khartoum and has provided even greater support to the Kurds against Baghdad. Its repeated invasions of Lebanon - in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and 2006 -- have been designed to wrest that country out of Syria's sphere of influence and bring to power in Beirut a government prepared to do Israel's bidding. In the Occupied Territories it has sought to destroy Palestinian resistance not only by boycotts, military strikes and a systematic campaign of murder of Palestinian activists, but also by setting one Palestinian faction against another, notably Islamists against nationalists.But for sheer daring, the intrigue which carried the U.S. into war against Iraq can best be compared to the Iran-Contra Scandal of the mid-1980s.It will be recalled that Israel started sending American weapons secretly to Iran from the start of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, even while American hostages were held captive in Tehran and in infringement of the arms embargoes imposed by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations.Israel's interest was to fuel the war so as to rule out any possibility that Iraq might turn westwards and combine its military power with that of Syria. Selling arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was then fighting for its survival, was a way to weaken two potential enemies - Iran and Iraq. It was also highly profitable for Israel's arms dealers.To persuade Washington to turn a blind eye to this arms trade, Israel came up with an ingenious idea. It proposed overcharging Iran for the American weapons it was secretly supplying and diverting the profits to the Nicaraguan Contras. The Americans fell for it. They had been looking for ways to support the Contras after Congress had cut off funding.On 17 January 1986, President Reagan signed a Finding which formally re-launched the clandestine arms programme. Israel's arms sales to Iran were freed from all constraint. But the exposure of what was to become known as 'Irangate' crippled the last years of the Reagan Administration, much as Bush's last years have now been crippled by the Iraq war.Can Israel now be persuaded to seek its long-term security by means of good neighbourly relations with the Arabs rather than by spreading mayhem among them?The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, re-launched at the recent Arab Summit in Riyadh - which offers Israel peace and normal relations with all 22 members of the Arab League if it withdraws to its 1967 borders -- could perhaps be seen as an invitation to Israel to play a constructive rather than a destructive role in the region.The Arab message to Israel seems to be this: 'Stop being the bad boy on the block. Let's put war behind us and cooperate for a better future.' But Israel's interventionist instincts are so deeply ingrained that it would take something of a revolution in its military and security thinking for it to seize the opportunity now being presented to it.
Patrick Seale - 13/04/07//
A shadowy Pentagon unit -- the Office of Special Plans, headed by Douglas Feith, former U.S. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy -- deliberately fabricated intelligence linking Saddam Hussein's regime to al-Qaida in order to incite the United States to make war on Iraq.This conclusion, long suspected by most observers of the Middle East, has now been confirmed by Thomas F. Gimble, Inspector General of the U.S. Defence Department, in a declassified report, released on April 5 at the request of Carl M. Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Together with his boss, Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Defence Secretary, Douglas Feith was one of an influential group of pro-Israeli neo-conservatives in the Bush administration who exploited the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. to campaign and intrigue for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.According to the Inspector General's report, Feith produced intelligence assessments which claimed that there was a 'mature, symbiotic relationship [between Iraq and al-Qaida]' in no fewer than ten specific areas, including training, financing and logistics. To bolster his case, Feith made much of an alleged meeting in Prague in April 2001 between Muhammad Atta, one of the Al-Qaida hijackers, and an Iraqi intelligence officer, Ahmad al-Ani.To mobilize the American public for an attack on Iraq, Feith leaked his fraudulent conclusions to the Weekly Standard, the neo-con magazine which, under its editor William Kristol, had been stridently calling for 'regime change' in Iraq since the late 1990s - and which has now turned its attention to calling for war against Iran. After a thorough examination of the evidence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) both concluded that Feith was wrong. They found 'no conclusive signs' of a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida and no evidence of 'direct cooperation.'But Feith was not deterred. Instead, he did his best to discredit the CIA and DIA findings and, bypassing the intelligence community, he presented his phoney evidence as fact to another prominent neo-con, I. Lewis Libby, Vice-President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, and to Deputy National Security Director Steven Hadley. In due course, by means of complicities in the Administration, Feith's dubious material was passed up to President Bush and Vice-President Cheney who used it in speeches preparing the public for war in March 2003. The intrigue was successful.Senator Carl Levin said in a written statement last week that the Defence Department's report fully demonstrated why the Inspector General had concluded that Douglas Feith had 'inappropriately' written intelligence assessments before the March 2003 invasion alleging connections between Iraq and al-Qaida. The word 'inappropriately' is hardly a precise description of Feith's criminal behaviour. As is now plain for everyone to see, the war has been an unmitigated disaster for the United States, for Iraq and for the whole Middle East. But it is only now, four years after the American seizure of Baghdad, that an official report has clearly pointed the finger at the men largely responsible.Why did Feith and his neo-con associates do it? And how did they manage to get away with it?Clearly, in pressing for war, they were primarily concerned to enhance Israel's security by smashing a major Arab state, thereby removing any potential threat to Israel from the east. As they schemed to transform the region with America's military power, they dreamed of defeating all of Israel's enemies -- Arab nationalists, Islamic radicals and Palestinian militants -- at a single stroke. Overthrowing Saddam was to be only the first step in a thorough transformation of the region to the advantage of both Israel and the United States.In the event, the United States has suffered a devastating blow to its political influence and moral authority, as well as to its finances and to the fighting ability of its armed services, while Israel, confronted by a resurgent Iran, is itself less secure than before the war.The reckless enterprise of Feith and his fellow neo-cons would probably have had little chance of success had they not managed to team up with men like Dick Cheney and former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who were evidently seduced by the prospect of taking control of Iraq's oil reserves, second-largest in the world after Saudi Arabia's, and of turning a submissive Iraqi client state into a base for the projection of American power throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.President George W Bush himself bought their agenda - a decision he must now bitterly regret, as he and his advisers seek desperately to find a way out of the Iraqi quagmire.In retrospect, the campaign by Israel and its American friends to push the United States into war with Iraq must be judged one of the most audacious sabotage operations of the Arab world ever mounted.Israel has a long history of seeking to destabilise its neighbours in the belief that a weak and divided Arab world is to its advantage. Over the years, it has sent funds, weapons and military instructors to stiffen the southern Sudanese in their long war against Khartoum and has provided even greater support to the Kurds against Baghdad. Its repeated invasions of Lebanon - in 1978, 1982, 1993, 1996 and 2006 -- have been designed to wrest that country out of Syria's sphere of influence and bring to power in Beirut a government prepared to do Israel's bidding. In the Occupied Territories it has sought to destroy Palestinian resistance not only by boycotts, military strikes and a systematic campaign of murder of Palestinian activists, but also by setting one Palestinian faction against another, notably Islamists against nationalists.But for sheer daring, the intrigue which carried the U.S. into war against Iraq can best be compared to the Iran-Contra Scandal of the mid-1980s.It will be recalled that Israel started sending American weapons secretly to Iran from the start of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, even while American hostages were held captive in Tehran and in infringement of the arms embargoes imposed by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations.Israel's interest was to fuel the war so as to rule out any possibility that Iraq might turn westwards and combine its military power with that of Syria. Selling arms to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was then fighting for its survival, was a way to weaken two potential enemies - Iran and Iraq. It was also highly profitable for Israel's arms dealers.To persuade Washington to turn a blind eye to this arms trade, Israel came up with an ingenious idea. It proposed overcharging Iran for the American weapons it was secretly supplying and diverting the profits to the Nicaraguan Contras. The Americans fell for it. They had been looking for ways to support the Contras after Congress had cut off funding.On 17 January 1986, President Reagan signed a Finding which formally re-launched the clandestine arms programme. Israel's arms sales to Iran were freed from all constraint. But the exposure of what was to become known as 'Irangate' crippled the last years of the Reagan Administration, much as Bush's last years have now been crippled by the Iraq war.Can Israel now be persuaded to seek its long-term security by means of good neighbourly relations with the Arabs rather than by spreading mayhem among them?The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, re-launched at the recent Arab Summit in Riyadh - which offers Israel peace and normal relations with all 22 members of the Arab League if it withdraws to its 1967 borders -- could perhaps be seen as an invitation to Israel to play a constructive rather than a destructive role in the region.The Arab message to Israel seems to be this: 'Stop being the bad boy on the block. Let's put war behind us and cooperate for a better future.' But Israel's interventionist instincts are so deeply ingrained that it would take something of a revolution in its military and security thinking for it to seize the opportunity now being presented to it.
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