A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL

THE LEBANESE villagers who danced with joy as the last truckloads of Syrian soldiers left their country on Tuesday had it right: They were seeing a big victory for freedom in Lebanon and the Middle East. True, the pullout was not complete -- Syrian intelligence cadres reportedly have burrowed into Palestinian refugee camps and Beirut safe houses -- and Lebanon still has big hurdles to cross to create a democratic and sovereign government. But it is worth summarizing what has occurred since Feb. 14: Responding to the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, the Middle East's first modern people-power movement coalesced to demand an end to Syria's proxy police state. The Bush administration worked skillfully with France, the United Nations and Arab governments to support that popular cause, boosting its damaged prestige around the region. Syria's 14,000 troops departed, its puppet government in Beirut resigned, its Lebanese security appointees were ousted and a new prime minister promised yesterday to hold elections by the end of May.
If those elections go forward, the world will watch as Arabs cast free ballots for the third time in 2005, an unprecedented development and one that few imagined possible six months ago. Getting there will require more of the political formula that has worked so far: popular pressure from the Lebanese and smart diplomacy by the United States and its allies.
For the Bush administration, the starting point must be continued heat on the Syrian dictatorship of Bashar Assad, which still aspires to dominate its neighbor. Fortunately, a ready instrument of multilateral leverage remains available, in the form of U.N. missions that are monitoring the Syrian withdrawal and investigating Mr. Hariri's murder. If proof can be found of a continuing Syrian presence or involvement in the assassination, the United States and France can press for sanctions. Mr. Assad is vulnerable to such pressure; as it is, his situation is so precarious that he may launch his own political liberalization in a bid to save himself.
In Lebanon, the administration is rightly pressing for parliamentary elections to be held on time and for international observers to ensure that they are free and fair. Any such vote is likely to reject the factions closest to Syria in favor of the opposition coalition of Christian, Druze and Sunni parties. Still, prospects for the far-reaching political change hoped for by many Lebanese are not favorable: The victors may include several notorious warlords from Lebanon's bloody past. The Islamic Hezbollah party, with support from the Shiite community, probably will be strengthened, and so far there is little domestic pressure on it to disarm its militia, though that, too, is mandated in U.N. resolutions.
Beyond the elections, continued progress in Lebanon will require a shift of tactics and more patience from its people and from outsiders. Syria's presence muted abiding sectarian differences that will have to be carefully managed if the country is to govern itself successfully. Hezbollah must somehow be disarmed and converted into a purely political movement, and a solution must be found for tens of thousands of disenfranchised Palestinians, some of them armed, who continue to live in refugee camps. People power and Western pressure helped restore Lebanon's independence; fashioning a stable and democratic order will require more time and more compromise.