Beware the siren Lebanon
By Steven Erlanger
JERUSALEM: ARIEL SHARON wakes up from his long coma in a sweat and says he's had a terrible nightmare. "What was it?" ask his aides. "I dreamed we were back in Lebanon."
The bitter joke, which has been making the rounds here since the war against Hezbollah last summer, goes to the heart of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's broken career. For a quarter-century, Lebanon has been the graveyard of Israeli politicians reckless enough to venture there.
Some, like Menachem Begin, never emerged again. That may be the fate of Olmert. A government commission issued a scathing first report last week on his leadership during the first five days of the war. A final segment, due some time this summer, may well urge him to resign. His foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, has already said he should.
Some politicians, like Sharon, managed to stagger out of Lebanon and eventually revive — despite, in his case, having been labeled by many a war criminal for not preventing or halting massacres of Palestinians by Israel's Lebanese Christian allies.
When he did emerge, his famous impetuosity was seared away. In a sense, it was the nightmare of Lebanon that had taught Sharon patience and allowed him to become a statesman in his second career.
Ehud
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It was Barak who suddenly pulled Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 to concentrate — in vain — on efforts to make peace first with Syria and then with the Palestinians. But his was a unilateral act, and neither he nor his successors reinforced it with the retaliation he had promised Hezbollah if it violated the border. Many Israelis now believe the combination made last summer's war inevitable.
"Lebanon has significantly harmed or destroyed the political careers of nearly every Israeli politician that has touched it," said Chuck Freilich, formerly Israel's deputy national security adviser and now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "The reason is not simply the nature of Lebanon, but the nature of Israeli decision-making in the last few decades, which has been shortsighted, focused on the immediate future and not part of a thought-out strategy."
But there is also a broader question of what might work in the specific conundrum of Lebanon. A sectarian patchwork of a state without a powerful central government or army, Lebanon has always been riven by religion and ethnicity and dominated by external forces like Syria or externally sponsored ones like Hezbollah and, before it, the Palestine Liberation Organization.
In trying to attack its enemies within Lebanon, Israel has always come up against the difficulties of conventional warfare against nonstate actors taking refuge in a semi-state.
Mark Heller, director of research for the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, notes that Lebanon itself was never an enemy, "but a theater in which the enemy operates" without a central address.
So Lebanon has become a marker, he said, for "the inability of the Israeli public in general, and the political system in particular, to adapt to the fact that it can't hold governments and armies to the same standards in Lebanon that it was holding them to before 1982 — before Lebanon."
In 1982, Sharon, as defense minister, pressed Begin into a full-scale attack on the PLO and Yasser Arafat, to deny them Lebanon as a theater of operations for attacks on Israel.
At first, the war went spectacularly well, and Arafat had to slink off to Tunis. But Sharon and Israel fell victim to the classic trap of assuming that Lebanon could be restructured to Israel's liking. The hand-picked Christian president, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated nine days before he was to take office; the initially welcoming Shiites of southern Lebanon revolted against their occupiers. Hezbollah, with the help of Iran, took hold.
Clinton Bailey, an Israeli scholar of the Bedouin culture, was an Israeli intelligence officer at the time. As he and I traveled to the Awali River in 1983, he told me: "We knew where the Palestinians had every gun — in this building, on the second floor, third window from the left. But what we didn't know was that the Shiites would turn against us."
Israel's occupation lasted 18 years, testimony to a continuing illusion of what it might be possible to accomplish, if only the Lebanese could be freed from outside pressures like Syria and Iran to follow their own self-interest. Of course, that never happened.
So what made Olmert's war so astonishing was that despite his long apprenticeship to Sharon, he bought all the old assumptions about Lebanon, hoping to have a masterstroke against Hezbollah by turning the central government of Fuad Siniora against it. Instead, the Israeli decision to bomb all over Lebanon, and not just Hezbollah targets in the south, weakened Siniora.
his Lebanese trauma, most Israelis believe, Sharon would not have gone to war. He would have responded, "but in a limited way, and in his own time, and in a way that would hurt the other side — Hezbollah — and not the Lebanese government," said Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University. Sharon used to say: "As far as action on the border with Lebanon goes: don't do whatever doesn't need to be done."
The inexperienced, incurious Olmert "didn't realize he was getting into a real war," Avineri said. Rather, the parliamentary committee found, "The prime minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one."
As damning, the report said, "His decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel." Amnon Rubinstein, a former legislator and cabinet minister who is now at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, said simply: "Lebanon is a swamp; that's why all the answers are sticky."
"Olmert is blamed," he said, "but he had no good alternatives to reach his stated goals."
Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, said, however, that it was easy for Olmert to be seduced by the claim that "air power alone can do it."
"That thesis," Feldman said, "fell on very receptive ears, and for good reason — because the civilian and military leadership were traumatized by the 18 years in Lebanon." The half-hearted war, he said, "was precisely the heritage of the demons of Israel's previous experiences in Lebanon."
Given
Monday, May 07, 2007
Again, Israeli gloom is misplaced
Claims Israel failed in Lebanon are premature - just as was similar condemnation 30 years ago, says edward luttwak
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 October War there was much joy in the Arab world. The myth of Israeli invincibility had been shattered by the surprise Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the Syrian offensive that swept across the Golan Heights. In Israel, there was harsh criticism of political and military chiefs alike, who were blamed for the loss of close to 3,000 soldiers in a war that ended without a clear victory. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff David Elazar and the chief of military intelligence were all discredited and soon replaced.
It was only later that a sense of proportion was regained, ironically by the Egyptian and Syrian leaders before anyone else. While commentators in Israel and around the world were still mourning (or gloating over) Israel's
Commentators endorsed Nasrallah’s claim. In fact, Israeli casualty figures show that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967
lost military supremacy, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad soberly recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 ceasefire on the Golan Heights, which remains unviolated.
Only in retrospect is it easier to read the 1973 war. Israel had been caught by surprise because perfectly good intelligence was misinterpreted in a climate of arrogant over-confidence. The fronts, left almost unguarded, were largely overrun. The Egyptians had an excellent war plan and fought well, Syrian tanks advanced boldly and, even where a lone Israeli brigade held out, they kept attacking in wave after wave for three days and nights. Within 48 hours, Israel seemed on the verge of defeat on both fronts. But as soon as its army was fully mobilised, as soon as the reservist brigades that made up nine-tenths of its strength were ready to deploy for battle, it turned out that they could stop both the Egyptian and Syrian armies in their tracks, and start their own advance almost immediately.
The war ended with Israeli forces 70 miles from Cairo, and less than 20 miles from Damascus. As for the Israeli air force, its strength over the battlefields was certainly blunted by concentrated anti-aircraft missiles and guns, but its air-combat supremacy prevented almost all attacks by the large Egyptian and Syrian air forces, while allowing it to bomb heavily almost at will. That was the real military balance of the 1973 war, which was obscured at the time by an over-reaction to Israel being taken by surprise and the usual fog of war.
The situation today, with the Lebanon war just ended, is the same. Future historians will no doubt see things much more clearly, but some gross misperceptions are perfectly obvious even now. That even the heaviest and best protected of tanks are sometimes penetrated by the latest anti-tank missiles should really not surprise anyone - they cannot be invulnerable, but still did well
Future historians will see things much more clearly, but gross misperceptions of this Lebanon war are perfectly obvious even now
enough in limiting Israeli casualties. Likewise, the lack of defences against short-range rockets with small warheads is unsurprising. Such weapons are just not powerful enough to justify the expenditure of many billions of dollars for laser weapon systems the size of football fields.
Many commentators repeated and endorsed Nasrallah's claim that his Hezbollah fighters fought much more bravely than the regular soldiers of Arab states in previous wars with Israel. In 1973 after crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian infantrymen by the thousand stood their ground unflinchingly against advancing 50-ton Israeli tanks, attacking them successfully with their puny hand-held weapons. They were in the open, flat desert, with none of the cover and protection that the Hezbollah had in their stone-built villages in Lebanon's rugged terrain. Later, within the few square miles of the so-called "Chinese farm" near the Suez Canal, the Israelis lost more soldiers against the Egyptians in a single day and night than the 116 - including the victims of accidents and friendly fire - killed in a month of war in Lebanon. Hezbollah certainly did not run away and did hold their ground, but their mediocrity is revealed by the casualties they inflicted, which were very few. When an Israeli reconnaissance company attacked the mountain town of Bint Jbail losing eight men in one night, that number was perceived in Israel and broadcast around the world as a disastrous loss. Any Allied veteran of the second world war's 1943-1945 Italian campaign must have been amazed by this reaction. There too it was one stone-built village and hilltop town after another and, though the Germans were outnumbered, outgunned and poorly supplied, a company that went against them would consider the loss of only eight men fortunate; attacking forces could suffer massive casualties. Israeli casualty figures in this month's war in the Lebanon demonstrate that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967.
What is perfectly true is that the Israelis lacked a coherent war plan, so that even
Israel lacked a coherent war plan; even its most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive
their most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive, while the ground actions were hesitant and inconclusive. There was, of course, a fully developed plan in the contingency folders - a sophisticated blend of swift amphibious, airborne and ground penetrations to reach deep behind the front, before rolling back, so as to destroy Hezbollah positions one by one from the rear, all the way to the Israeli border.
That plan was not implemented because of the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians. It had been a fair assumption that thousands of Hezbollah rockets fired in concentrated barrages would kill many civilians, perhaps hundreds of them each day. Barrages compensate for the inaccuracy of unguided rockets, and produce powerful compound blast effects. That would have made a large-scale offensive by more than 45,000 soldiers a compelling necessity, politically justifying the hundreds of casualties that it would cost.
Hezbollah, however, distributed its rockets to village militias, which were very good at hiding them from air attacks, and sheltering them from artillery and probing Israeli unmanned air vehicles, but quite incapable of launching them effectively, in waves against common targets.
Instead of hundreds of dead civilians, the Israelis were therefore losing one or two a day; and even after three weeks, the grand total was less than that caused by some one-man suicide bombings. That made it politically unacceptable to launch the planned offensive: which would have incurred many more casualties and would not have eradicated Hezbollah anyway since it is a political movement in arms, and not just an army or a bunch of gunmen.
For that very reason, the outcome of the war is likely to be viewed in the long term as more satisfactory than many now seem to believe it. Nasrallah is not another Arafat, who was fighting for eternal Palestine rather than the present generation of Palestinians (whose prosperity and safety he was always willing to sacrifice for the cause). Nasrallah has a political constituency, and it happens to be centered in southern Lebanon. Implicitly
The outcome of the war is likely to be more satisfactory for Israel than many now seem to believe
accepting responsibility for having started the war, Nasrallah has directed his Hezbollah to focus on rapid reconstruction in villages and towns, right up to the Israeli border. He cannot start another round of fighting because that would destroy everything again. Yet another unexpected result of the war is that Nasrallah's power-base in southern Lebanon is now a hostage to Hezbollah's good behaviour.
Claims Israel failed in Lebanon are premature - just as was similar condemnation 30 years ago, says edward luttwak
In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 October War there was much joy in the Arab world. The myth of Israeli invincibility had been shattered by the surprise Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and the Syrian offensive that swept across the Golan Heights. In Israel, there was harsh criticism of political and military chiefs alike, who were blamed for the loss of close to 3,000 soldiers in a war that ended without a clear victory. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff David Elazar and the chief of military intelligence were all discredited and soon replaced.
It was only later that a sense of proportion was regained, ironically by the Egyptian and Syrian leaders before anyone else. While commentators in Israel and around the world were still mourning (or gloating over) Israel's
Commentators endorsed Nasrallah’s claim. In fact, Israeli casualty figures show that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967
lost military supremacy, both Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and Syrian President Hafez Assad soberly recognized that their countries had come closer to catastrophic defeat than in 1967, and that it was absolutely imperative to avoid another war. That led to Sadat's peace and Assad's 1974 ceasefire on the Golan Heights, which remains unviolated.
Only in retrospect is it easier to read the 1973 war. Israel had been caught by surprise because perfectly good intelligence was misinterpreted in a climate of arrogant over-confidence. The fronts, left almost unguarded, were largely overrun. The Egyptians had an excellent war plan and fought well, Syrian tanks advanced boldly and, even where a lone Israeli brigade held out, they kept attacking in wave after wave for three days and nights. Within 48 hours, Israel seemed on the verge of defeat on both fronts. But as soon as its army was fully mobilised, as soon as the reservist brigades that made up nine-tenths of its strength were ready to deploy for battle, it turned out that they could stop both the Egyptian and Syrian armies in their tracks, and start their own advance almost immediately.
The war ended with Israeli forces 70 miles from Cairo, and less than 20 miles from Damascus. As for the Israeli air force, its strength over the battlefields was certainly blunted by concentrated anti-aircraft missiles and guns, but its air-combat supremacy prevented almost all attacks by the large Egyptian and Syrian air forces, while allowing it to bomb heavily almost at will. That was the real military balance of the 1973 war, which was obscured at the time by an over-reaction to Israel being taken by surprise and the usual fog of war.
The situation today, with the Lebanon war just ended, is the same. Future historians will no doubt see things much more clearly, but some gross misperceptions are perfectly obvious even now. That even the heaviest and best protected of tanks are sometimes penetrated by the latest anti-tank missiles should really not surprise anyone - they cannot be invulnerable, but still did well
Future historians will see things much more clearly, but gross misperceptions of this Lebanon war are perfectly obvious even now
enough in limiting Israeli casualties. Likewise, the lack of defences against short-range rockets with small warheads is unsurprising. Such weapons are just not powerful enough to justify the expenditure of many billions of dollars for laser weapon systems the size of football fields.
Many commentators repeated and endorsed Nasrallah's claim that his Hezbollah fighters fought much more bravely than the regular soldiers of Arab states in previous wars with Israel. In 1973 after crossing the Suez Canal, Egyptian infantrymen by the thousand stood their ground unflinchingly against advancing 50-ton Israeli tanks, attacking them successfully with their puny hand-held weapons. They were in the open, flat desert, with none of the cover and protection that the Hezbollah had in their stone-built villages in Lebanon's rugged terrain. Later, within the few square miles of the so-called "Chinese farm" near the Suez Canal, the Israelis lost more soldiers against the Egyptians in a single day and night than the 116 - including the victims of accidents and friendly fire - killed in a month of war in Lebanon. Hezbollah certainly did not run away and did hold their ground, but their mediocrity is revealed by the casualties they inflicted, which were very few. When an Israeli reconnaissance company attacked the mountain town of Bint Jbail losing eight men in one night, that number was perceived in Israel and broadcast around the world as a disastrous loss. Any Allied veteran of the second world war's 1943-1945 Italian campaign must have been amazed by this reaction. There too it was one stone-built village and hilltop town after another and, though the Germans were outnumbered, outgunned and poorly supplied, a company that went against them would consider the loss of only eight men fortunate; attacking forces could suffer massive casualties. Israeli casualty figures in this month's war in the Lebanon demonstrate that Hezbollah did not fight as fiercely as the Egyptians in 1973 or the Jordanians in 1967.
What is perfectly true is that the Israelis lacked a coherent war plan, so that even
Israel lacked a coherent war plan; even its most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive
their most purposeful bombing came off as brutally destructive, while the ground actions were hesitant and inconclusive. There was, of course, a fully developed plan in the contingency folders - a sophisticated blend of swift amphibious, airborne and ground penetrations to reach deep behind the front, before rolling back, so as to destroy Hezbollah positions one by one from the rear, all the way to the Israeli border.
That plan was not implemented because of the lack of casualties among Israeli civilians. It had been a fair assumption that thousands of Hezbollah rockets fired in concentrated barrages would kill many civilians, perhaps hundreds of them each day. Barrages compensate for the inaccuracy of unguided rockets, and produce powerful compound blast effects. That would have made a large-scale offensive by more than 45,000 soldiers a compelling necessity, politically justifying the hundreds of casualties that it would cost.
Hezbollah, however, distributed its rockets to village militias, which were very good at hiding them from air attacks, and sheltering them from artillery and probing Israeli unmanned air vehicles, but quite incapable of launching them effectively, in waves against common targets.
Instead of hundreds of dead civilians, the Israelis were therefore losing one or two a day; and even after three weeks, the grand total was less than that caused by some one-man suicide bombings. That made it politically unacceptable to launch the planned offensive: which would have incurred many more casualties and would not have eradicated Hezbollah anyway since it is a political movement in arms, and not just an army or a bunch of gunmen.
For that very reason, the outcome of the war is likely to be viewed in the long term as more satisfactory than many now seem to believe it. Nasrallah is not another Arafat, who was fighting for eternal Palestine rather than the present generation of Palestinians (whose prosperity and safety he was always willing to sacrifice for the cause). Nasrallah has a political constituency, and it happens to be centered in southern Lebanon. Implicitly
The outcome of the war is likely to be more satisfactory for Israel than many now seem to believe
accepting responsibility for having started the war, Nasrallah has directed his Hezbollah to focus on rapid reconstruction in villages and towns, right up to the Israeli border. He cannot start another round of fighting because that would destroy everything again. Yet another unexpected result of the war is that Nasrallah's power-base in southern Lebanon is now a hostage to Hezbollah's good behaviour.
Why Israel’s war went wrong
Israeli writer igal sarna says war in Lebanon has transformed the opinions of his countrymen
Last Saturday, with the impending ceasefire already in the air, I drove along Israel's northern border to the village of Zar'it. It was here, on July 12, that two Israeli soldiers where kidnapped, starting "the second Lebanon war", as it's now called, that has left more than 1,300 people dead, most of them Lebanese.
A woman who lives in Zar'it told me how her husband was ambushed in the very same place on June 6, 1969. It's a little valley where it's difficult to see far and easy to set a trap. She said the Israeli army knew exactly how dangerous the spot was but had done little to prevent a further ambush.
The fact is, little was done to prevent this summer's war, if anything. Two armies came face to face, spoiling for a fight - a Shia militia, well armed by Iran, and the great Israeli army, well equipped by the US. Neither could
A month ago, I wrote: ‘This is the most senseless war we have ever had’. A thousand readers cursed me
be restrained by their weak governments - the helpless Lebanese government on the one hand, and a beginner Israeli one, only recently elected, on the other. Both Hezbollah and the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) had opposite interests from their civilian populations, who wanted a quiet border and economic prosperity after long-lasting wars. "When everything is over," said the woman from Zar'it, "we will punish the generals who were in charge."
A month ago, in the first week of the war, when it had the overwhelming support of the Israeli public, I wrote in Yediot Aharonoth, Israel's largest daily paper, that "this could be the most senseless war we have ever got involved in. All that is happening could have been predicted and could have been taken care of - if there was an experienced Israeli political echelon and a restricting American influence."
About 1,300 readers cursed me, using Ynet, the newspaper's online edition, to call me an idiot or a traitor.
But by the time of the ceasefire the Israeli mood had changed radically. With the rising number of army casualties, the public had grown sober.
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert an even stronger moral influence than civilian casualties, because in Israel soldiers are considered to be "the children of everybody". Furthermore, military casualties are a sign that the system isn't working. Because this war was more transparent to the Israeli media than any war before, defective military actions were exposed. The reputation of the army, it transpired, was much higher than its operational capacity.
What went wrong? Part of the answer is to be found in our huge victory in 1967, when Israel managed, in a six-day blitzkrieg, to capture territories three times bigger than its own. The seeds of the next defeat can often be found in military victory.
Since 1967, the IDF has trained its fighters against Palestinians in the occupied territories. It has been a fight of the strong against the weak, which reached its destructive climax during the days of the
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert a strong moral influence as they are considered to be everybody’s children
second intifada, when Apache helicopters were used against Palestinian vans and special operations units against refugee camp children.
Since then, a once-powerful army has been reduced to managing road-blocks and acting as security guards, rather than training for the next big war.
The IDF went into Lebanon in the past fortnight not expecting to meet bloody resistance from a determined enemy, sophisticated and well-equipped with long and short range missiles, an enemy that fires back and hits cities, tanks and helicopters.
And that's why the Israel of mid-August is a sober, hurt and scared nation, completely different from the Israel of mid-July.
Some say this mood will lead to political moderation, maybe even to an all-inclusive treaty. But bitter experience says that painful failure is often followed by a new military effort to erase the trauma, bringing with it further tragedy.
Israeli writer igal sarna says war in Lebanon has transformed the opinions of his countrymen
Last Saturday, with the impending ceasefire already in the air, I drove along Israel's northern border to the village of Zar'it. It was here, on July 12, that two Israeli soldiers where kidnapped, starting "the second Lebanon war", as it's now called, that has left more than 1,300 people dead, most of them Lebanese.
A woman who lives in Zar'it told me how her husband was ambushed in the very same place on June 6, 1969. It's a little valley where it's difficult to see far and easy to set a trap. She said the Israeli army knew exactly how dangerous the spot was but had done little to prevent a further ambush.
The fact is, little was done to prevent this summer's war, if anything. Two armies came face to face, spoiling for a fight - a Shia militia, well armed by Iran, and the great Israeli army, well equipped by the US. Neither could
A month ago, I wrote: ‘This is the most senseless war we have ever had’. A thousand readers cursed me
be restrained by their weak governments - the helpless Lebanese government on the one hand, and a beginner Israeli one, only recently elected, on the other. Both Hezbollah and the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) had opposite interests from their civilian populations, who wanted a quiet border and economic prosperity after long-lasting wars. "When everything is over," said the woman from Zar'it, "we will punish the generals who were in charge."
A month ago, in the first week of the war, when it had the overwhelming support of the Israeli public, I wrote in Yediot Aharonoth, Israel's largest daily paper, that "this could be the most senseless war we have ever got involved in. All that is happening could have been predicted and could have been taken care of - if there was an experienced Israeli political echelon and a restricting American influence."
About 1,300 readers cursed me, using Ynet, the newspaper's online edition, to call me an idiot or a traitor.
But by the time of the ceasefire the Israeli mood had changed radically. With the rising number of army casualties, the public had grown sober.
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert an even stronger moral influence than civilian casualties, because in Israel soldiers are considered to be "the children of everybody". Furthermore, military casualties are a sign that the system isn't working. Because this war was more transparent to the Israeli media than any war before, defective military actions were exposed. The reputation of the army, it transpired, was much higher than its operational capacity.
What went wrong? Part of the answer is to be found in our huge victory in 1967, when Israel managed, in a six-day blitzkrieg, to capture territories three times bigger than its own. The seeds of the next defeat can often be found in military victory.
Since 1967, the IDF has trained its fighters against Palestinians in the occupied territories. It has been a fight of the strong against the weak, which reached its destructive climax during the days of the
Deaths of Israeli soldiers exert a strong moral influence as they are considered to be everybody’s children
second intifada, when Apache helicopters were used against Palestinian vans and special operations units against refugee camp children.
Since then, a once-powerful army has been reduced to managing road-blocks and acting as security guards, rather than training for the next big war.
The IDF went into Lebanon in the past fortnight not expecting to meet bloody resistance from a determined enemy, sophisticated and well-equipped with long and short range missiles, an enemy that fires back and hits cities, tanks and helicopters.
And that's why the Israel of mid-August is a sober, hurt and scared nation, completely different from the Israel of mid-July.
Some say this mood will lead to political moderation, maybe even to an all-inclusive treaty. But bitter experience says that painful failure is often followed by a new military effort to erase the trauma, bringing with it further tragedy.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
Rice and Moualem Meet: Has Syria Won?
Saturday, May 5th, 2007 By joshua Landis
"Has Syria won?" This is the question that a number of reporters have asked me on the heals of Rice's meeting with Walid Moualem at Sharm al-Sheikh.
First, it is necessary to take the larger perspective. The meeting was not about Syria. It was about Iran. Michael Slackman of the NYTimes gets it right when he concludes: "Little changed in what many here saw as the crucial factor: relations between Iran and the United States."
Mottaki, Iran's F.M. walked out of the dinner, where Rice and he might have met, before Rice arrived. The Americans tried to spin this as Iranian prudery at work. Evidently, the excuse was that a Ukrainian violinist in a red dress had a plunging neckline. Mottaki couldn't abide the flesh and took Iranian leave. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack cracked, "I'm not sure what woman he was afraid of, the one in the red dress or the secretary of state."
Mottaki was more honest. He explained that the US needs Iran more than Iran needs the US. The US had not prepared for the meeting properly and was not willing to discuss the an agenda important to Iran, comsequently Iran passed up the chance to talk to the Americans at the ministerial level.
Mr. Mottaki said of Washington’s stance in remarks made at a news conference at the end of the two-day meeting. “Even the ordinary people of the United States realize that the policies pursued by the United States in Iraq are flawed, and they at least must admit that the policies have failed.” Iraq has been pressuring the US to sit down with Iran and Syria to help it reduce violence: “It is in my country’s interest, really, to see a reduction in the tensions,” said the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari.
Mattaki is correct. The American public wants President Bush to engage Iran and Syria. The situation in Iraq demands it. Very troubling documents have surfaced recently that demonstrate that Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki is helping Iran infiltrate the two leading Shiite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, America's enemy in Iraq, and of Hakim's Badr forces, which is backed by the US.
Saudi Arabia is upset by Iran's internal takeover of the Iraqi security forces, which has been done under American noses. Not only has Maliki been unable to stop this, but increasingly, it seems he is supporting it. Irans takeover is documented in this report by Memri. Iraqi secret memos written by Maliki to Sadr warn the Shiite militia leader to hide his lieutenants during the surge lest Washington kill them. More detailed is this Washington Times article, which quotes from a 40-page Saudi assessment of Iran's influence over Iraq's security forces. The author of the report, Mr. Obaid, writes: "Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units." Hakim's Badr Organization, which is 25,000-strong and has roughly 3 million supporters, is the "key vehicle Iran is using to achieve its military, security and intelligence aims." The Saudis believe that Iran has thuroughly penetrated the new Iraqi state that the US is building.
Iran is in an increasingly strong position in Iraq and can afford to wait for America to recognize its failure. This is why Mottaki walked out on Rice. He doesn't want to give the Bush administration a photo opportunity for nothing. Beggars can not be choosers. This is the message, Iran is sending Americans.
Syria
"Isolation has failed." Walid Moualem, Syria's foreign minister, said on al-Jazeera last night. The N.Y. Times agrees, "But perhaps the most significant development, many people here said, was the more humble face of American diplomacy. This change suggests that the Bush administration now agrees with what Arab leaders have been saying for years: that Washington cannot succeed in the Middle East with unilateral action."
Here is what the N.Y. Times writes:
On Thursday, Ms. Rice met for 30 minutes with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem. It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Bush recalled his ambassador from Damascus in February 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister.
The decision to unfreeze relations came after State Department officials concluded that directly asking Syria to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was worth facing criticism from conservative hawks in Washington who argue that America should not talk to its foes.
But despite the opening, the issue of Lebanon remains a huge obstacle to American-Syrian ties. The Bush administration still plans to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the Hariri assassination, an inquest that is adamantly opposed in Damascus.
Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former senior adviser on Arab-Israeli relations at the State Department, said neither the United States nor Syria was willing to deliver what the other wanted. Syria, he said, wants the Hariri tribunal to go away, while the United States wants Syria to help with Iraq and to rein in the militant Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
Even so, he said, the Bush administration, running out of options in the Middle East, “may be looking for another lever to pull in Iraq, Lebanon and the peace process.”
Washington Post
Rice said she repeated to Moualem the U.S. concern about "foreign fighters," who are recruited by the group al-Qaeda in Iraq and pass through Syria, and asked for cooperation in stopping them. But she cautioned against reading too much into the meeting. "Let's take this one step at a time," she said. "I'm very glad we had the opportunity . . . but this was not about anything other than Iraq, and we will certainly see whether we can observe words being followed by deeds."
Tehran Times:
"I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me," Rice said after the first Cabinet-level talks in years between the countries. "It's a start," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said after the 30-minute session. Iraq's embattled prime minister was among those leaning on the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran, arguing they could help lessen the violence in neighboring Iraq.
Until now, Rice and President Bush had said Syria well knew what it could do to help Iraq — tighten its border — and did not need the U.S. to point it out. The U.S. claims Syria looks the other way while fighters from many countries cross its border to join the ranks of al-Qaeda and other insurgent or terrorist groups in Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said Syria had somewhat stemmed the flow of foreign fighters. "There has been some movement by the Syrians," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. "There has been a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq" for more than a month.
The administration has said it worries that Syria will use any contact with the U.S. as leverage in a dispute over alleged Syrian meddling in fragile Lebanon. Rice said that subject did not come up Thursday.
"We are serious and we expect the United States to show the same seriousness," Moallem said. "We agreed to continue dialogue."
Buthaina Shaaban:
Expatriates Minister Bussaina Shaaban has said that Thursday's meeting between the two foreign ministers on the sidelines of an international conference on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh was "proof of the recognition by the US administration that it finds itself in an impasse in Iraq."
"It is also proof that the American administration needs the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors and of several other countries," she said.
"It changes nothing with regard to Syria's stance on the unity and territorial integrity" of Iraq, Shaaban said, adding "The main solution is establishing a timetable for withdrawal" of US forces from Iraq.
The Syrian press has almost no mention of the Moualem-Rice meeting on their Websites. In part, this is because it is Saturday, the weekend, but also they are not trumpeting the meeting. On the one hand Syria did not gain much. The US met with Syria in order to assuage Iraqi and Arab demands that the US re-engage, as well as to undercut opposition at home. The Democrats have been scoring points by pointing out how stupid the isolation policy has become. On the other hand, Syria is not trumpeting the meeting in order to maintain solidarity with Iran. Washington will want to suggest that it can split Syria from Iran. Syria does not want to give the impression that it is breaking ranks with Iran.
Conclusion:
The meeting was a mitigated win for Syria because it signalled an end to Syria's formal isolation by the Bush administration. President Bush was wrong about Iraq. It did not become a show piece of American power or democracy promotion. Bashar, who called the US invasion illegal and an expression of imperialism that would be a disaster for Iraq and the whole Arab World on a par with 1948 or the WWI post war settlements, has been proven largely correct. Even Saudi authorities agree. They are Washington's closest allies; they now call the occupation illegal. Americans recognize the adventure as a disaster. Bashar proved he could read the Arab street better than Bush. The administration predicted that by this time Arabs would be laying wreaths at its feet for bringing them freedom, progress and the American way. Syria is coming out of isolation just as Washington finds itself out in the cold, its policies out of sync with the rest of the world. Bashar is not the "blind eye doctor" or "bumbling" neophyte, as most analysts argued. Bush and America were blind.
There is nothing sweet about this victory, however. Everyone is a loser. The Iraqis most of all.
What has Syria lost? Syria lost Lebanon, which in the greater scheme of things is a good thing. But the process was bungled. Rather than coming in the context of a broader regional peace deal that would have included Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was forced unilaterally, leaving Syrians feeling vengeful and victimized. With Washington's attempt to yank Lebanon away from Syria's orbit without accommodating Syria's legitimate demand for the Golan, Bush ensured that Syria would resist with all its guile and limited might. This led to the murder of Hariri, Lebanon's invaluable uniter. It has ensured the disintegration of Lebanon's delicate sectarian fabric. Lebanon is in tatters, pulled to the breaking point between the antipodes of Syria and Iran on one side and the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This is the result of Washington's divide-and-rule policy. Smart diplomacy might have avoided this.
Hizbullah has not been tamed or brought into Lebanon's political process, as it should have been. Israel's summer war, meant to destroy Hizbullah, only added to the weakening of all sides. Like a wounded lion, Hizbullah will exact a price for the West's high-handed attempts to ignore Shiite grievances. It is already exacting that price by opposing the Hariri tribunal, rearming, and bringing the Lebanese government and economy to a standstill. Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel as a proxy for Syria and as an inducement to Israel to cough up the Golan has been reduced. Because of Hizbullah's weakness, Syrians have less hope of getting the Golan back today. All the same, their determination to do so has not been undermined. This is a recipe for continued conflict and unhappiness to everyone.
Washington was unable to starve the Syrians into compliance through economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Syria's economy, although growing at a higher lever than it was in 2003 when the war in Iraq began, is not performing as it should be. 1.3 million Iraqi refugees in Syria are creating many difficulties. Rather than the Europeans helping with the reform process and offering expertise and assistance, they have stood on the side lines. The economic barriers with Europe are beginning to come down, but it will take years before relations return to the pre-2003 level. Reviving economic relations with Washington will take much longer. A web of sanction laws have been spun over the last four years that will be very hard to undo.
Bashar has survived, consolidated his power, and turned the tables on the US, but the victory is pyrrhic. Syria has lost a lot in the past 4 years.
Saturday, May 5th, 2007 By joshua Landis
"Has Syria won?" This is the question that a number of reporters have asked me on the heals of Rice's meeting with Walid Moualem at Sharm al-Sheikh.
First, it is necessary to take the larger perspective. The meeting was not about Syria. It was about Iran. Michael Slackman of the NYTimes gets it right when he concludes: "Little changed in what many here saw as the crucial factor: relations between Iran and the United States."
Mottaki, Iran's F.M. walked out of the dinner, where Rice and he might have met, before Rice arrived. The Americans tried to spin this as Iranian prudery at work. Evidently, the excuse was that a Ukrainian violinist in a red dress had a plunging neckline. Mottaki couldn't abide the flesh and took Iranian leave. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack cracked, "I'm not sure what woman he was afraid of, the one in the red dress or the secretary of state."
Mottaki was more honest. He explained that the US needs Iran more than Iran needs the US. The US had not prepared for the meeting properly and was not willing to discuss the an agenda important to Iran, comsequently Iran passed up the chance to talk to the Americans at the ministerial level.
Mr. Mottaki said of Washington’s stance in remarks made at a news conference at the end of the two-day meeting. “Even the ordinary people of the United States realize that the policies pursued by the United States in Iraq are flawed, and they at least must admit that the policies have failed.” Iraq has been pressuring the US to sit down with Iran and Syria to help it reduce violence: “It is in my country’s interest, really, to see a reduction in the tensions,” said the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari.
Mattaki is correct. The American public wants President Bush to engage Iran and Syria. The situation in Iraq demands it. Very troubling documents have surfaced recently that demonstrate that Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki is helping Iran infiltrate the two leading Shiite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, America's enemy in Iraq, and of Hakim's Badr forces, which is backed by the US.
Saudi Arabia is upset by Iran's internal takeover of the Iraqi security forces, which has been done under American noses. Not only has Maliki been unable to stop this, but increasingly, it seems he is supporting it. Irans takeover is documented in this report by Memri. Iraqi secret memos written by Maliki to Sadr warn the Shiite militia leader to hide his lieutenants during the surge lest Washington kill them. More detailed is this Washington Times article, which quotes from a 40-page Saudi assessment of Iran's influence over Iraq's security forces. The author of the report, Mr. Obaid, writes: "Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units." Hakim's Badr Organization, which is 25,000-strong and has roughly 3 million supporters, is the "key vehicle Iran is using to achieve its military, security and intelligence aims." The Saudis believe that Iran has thuroughly penetrated the new Iraqi state that the US is building.
Iran is in an increasingly strong position in Iraq and can afford to wait for America to recognize its failure. This is why Mottaki walked out on Rice. He doesn't want to give the Bush administration a photo opportunity for nothing. Beggars can not be choosers. This is the message, Iran is sending Americans.
Syria
"Isolation has failed." Walid Moualem, Syria's foreign minister, said on al-Jazeera last night. The N.Y. Times agrees, "But perhaps the most significant development, many people here said, was the more humble face of American diplomacy. This change suggests that the Bush administration now agrees with what Arab leaders have been saying for years: that Washington cannot succeed in the Middle East with unilateral action."
Here is what the N.Y. Times writes:
On Thursday, Ms. Rice met for 30 minutes with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem. It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Bush recalled his ambassador from Damascus in February 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister.
The decision to unfreeze relations came after State Department officials concluded that directly asking Syria to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was worth facing criticism from conservative hawks in Washington who argue that America should not talk to its foes.
But despite the opening, the issue of Lebanon remains a huge obstacle to American-Syrian ties. The Bush administration still plans to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the Hariri assassination, an inquest that is adamantly opposed in Damascus.
Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former senior adviser on Arab-Israeli relations at the State Department, said neither the United States nor Syria was willing to deliver what the other wanted. Syria, he said, wants the Hariri tribunal to go away, while the United States wants Syria to help with Iraq and to rein in the militant Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.
Even so, he said, the Bush administration, running out of options in the Middle East, “may be looking for another lever to pull in Iraq, Lebanon and the peace process.”
Washington Post
Rice said she repeated to Moualem the U.S. concern about "foreign fighters," who are recruited by the group al-Qaeda in Iraq and pass through Syria, and asked for cooperation in stopping them. But she cautioned against reading too much into the meeting. "Let's take this one step at a time," she said. "I'm very glad we had the opportunity . . . but this was not about anything other than Iraq, and we will certainly see whether we can observe words being followed by deeds."
Tehran Times:
"I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me," Rice said after the first Cabinet-level talks in years between the countries. "It's a start," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said after the 30-minute session. Iraq's embattled prime minister was among those leaning on the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran, arguing they could help lessen the violence in neighboring Iraq.
Until now, Rice and President Bush had said Syria well knew what it could do to help Iraq — tighten its border — and did not need the U.S. to point it out. The U.S. claims Syria looks the other way while fighters from many countries cross its border to join the ranks of al-Qaeda and other insurgent or terrorist groups in Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said Syria had somewhat stemmed the flow of foreign fighters. "There has been some movement by the Syrians," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. "There has been a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq" for more than a month.
The administration has said it worries that Syria will use any contact with the U.S. as leverage in a dispute over alleged Syrian meddling in fragile Lebanon. Rice said that subject did not come up Thursday.
"We are serious and we expect the United States to show the same seriousness," Moallem said. "We agreed to continue dialogue."
Buthaina Shaaban:
Expatriates Minister Bussaina Shaaban has said that Thursday's meeting between the two foreign ministers on the sidelines of an international conference on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh was "proof of the recognition by the US administration that it finds itself in an impasse in Iraq."
"It is also proof that the American administration needs the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors and of several other countries," she said.
"It changes nothing with regard to Syria's stance on the unity and territorial integrity" of Iraq, Shaaban said, adding "The main solution is establishing a timetable for withdrawal" of US forces from Iraq.
The Syrian press has almost no mention of the Moualem-Rice meeting on their Websites. In part, this is because it is Saturday, the weekend, but also they are not trumpeting the meeting. On the one hand Syria did not gain much. The US met with Syria in order to assuage Iraqi and Arab demands that the US re-engage, as well as to undercut opposition at home. The Democrats have been scoring points by pointing out how stupid the isolation policy has become. On the other hand, Syria is not trumpeting the meeting in order to maintain solidarity with Iran. Washington will want to suggest that it can split Syria from Iran. Syria does not want to give the impression that it is breaking ranks with Iran.
Conclusion:
The meeting was a mitigated win for Syria because it signalled an end to Syria's formal isolation by the Bush administration. President Bush was wrong about Iraq. It did not become a show piece of American power or democracy promotion. Bashar, who called the US invasion illegal and an expression of imperialism that would be a disaster for Iraq and the whole Arab World on a par with 1948 or the WWI post war settlements, has been proven largely correct. Even Saudi authorities agree. They are Washington's closest allies; they now call the occupation illegal. Americans recognize the adventure as a disaster. Bashar proved he could read the Arab street better than Bush. The administration predicted that by this time Arabs would be laying wreaths at its feet for bringing them freedom, progress and the American way. Syria is coming out of isolation just as Washington finds itself out in the cold, its policies out of sync with the rest of the world. Bashar is not the "blind eye doctor" or "bumbling" neophyte, as most analysts argued. Bush and America were blind.
There is nothing sweet about this victory, however. Everyone is a loser. The Iraqis most of all.
What has Syria lost? Syria lost Lebanon, which in the greater scheme of things is a good thing. But the process was bungled. Rather than coming in the context of a broader regional peace deal that would have included Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was forced unilaterally, leaving Syrians feeling vengeful and victimized. With Washington's attempt to yank Lebanon away from Syria's orbit without accommodating Syria's legitimate demand for the Golan, Bush ensured that Syria would resist with all its guile and limited might. This led to the murder of Hariri, Lebanon's invaluable uniter. It has ensured the disintegration of Lebanon's delicate sectarian fabric. Lebanon is in tatters, pulled to the breaking point between the antipodes of Syria and Iran on one side and the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This is the result of Washington's divide-and-rule policy. Smart diplomacy might have avoided this.
Hizbullah has not been tamed or brought into Lebanon's political process, as it should have been. Israel's summer war, meant to destroy Hizbullah, only added to the weakening of all sides. Like a wounded lion, Hizbullah will exact a price for the West's high-handed attempts to ignore Shiite grievances. It is already exacting that price by opposing the Hariri tribunal, rearming, and bringing the Lebanese government and economy to a standstill. Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel as a proxy for Syria and as an inducement to Israel to cough up the Golan has been reduced. Because of Hizbullah's weakness, Syrians have less hope of getting the Golan back today. All the same, their determination to do so has not been undermined. This is a recipe for continued conflict and unhappiness to everyone.
Washington was unable to starve the Syrians into compliance through economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Syria's economy, although growing at a higher lever than it was in 2003 when the war in Iraq began, is not performing as it should be. 1.3 million Iraqi refugees in Syria are creating many difficulties. Rather than the Europeans helping with the reform process and offering expertise and assistance, they have stood on the side lines. The economic barriers with Europe are beginning to come down, but it will take years before relations return to the pre-2003 level. Reviving economic relations with Washington will take much longer. A web of sanction laws have been spun over the last four years that will be very hard to undo.
Bashar has survived, consolidated his power, and turned the tables on the US, but the victory is pyrrhic. Syria has lost a lot in the past 4 years.
Saturday, May 05, 2007
الانتخابات الفرنسية: ساركو ضد سيغو.. والحكم بايرو
يدعونه في فرنسا باختصار «ساركو».. انه وزير الداخلية المستقيل نيكولا ساركوزي الذي حقق أعلى نسبة في اقتراع 22 ابريل الجاري مما أهله لتقاسم شوط ثان مع مرشحة الحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي سيغولين رويال التي يدعوها أنصارها توددا بسيغو. على عادة الفرنسين في «التدليع».
وجهان جديدان في الساحة الفرنسية وإن كانا ليس بالنكرتين على الرغم من أن كليهما في بداية العقد الخامس من عمره.. يرمزان على اختلافهما في الموقع والخلفية إلى تحول جوهري في الحقل السياسي الفرنسي الذي تشكل منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة عام 1958.
فإذا كانت سيغولين رويال هي أول امرأة تصل للشوط الثاني من الانتخابات الرئاسية في فرنسا، فإن نيكولا ساركوزي هو ابن المهاجر الذي استطاع أن يوحد اليمين الفرنسي حول شخصه، منتزعا مركز الصدارة من وجوه العائلات العريقة التي يتحدر منها عادة زعماء التيار الديغولي.
أقبل الفرنسيون على الانتخابات الأخيرة بوتيرة غير مسبوقة، وشغلوا بالحملة الرئاسية أكثر من أي وقت مضى، وبلغت نسبة المشاركة في الاقتراع 84 % (في مقابل 71% في انتخابات 2002).
أفلت نجوم المسرح السياسي الفرنسي المألوفة مثل العجوز اليميني المتطرف جان ماري لبان الذي عاد إلى نسبة العشرة بالمائة التي كانت له في الثمانينات ولم يتمكن من تحقيق مفاجأة سباق 2002 (الصعود للشوط الثاني). وانهار الحزب الشيوعي الفرنسي العريق فلم يحقق مرشحه ماري جورج بيفي الا نسبة هامشية لا تتجاوز 1 بالمائة.
كثير من المحللين ذهبوا إلى أن الحقل السياسي الفرنسي عاد إلى الثنائية المألوفة بين اليمين الديغولي واليسار المعتدل، في حين اعتبر البعض الآخر أن النسبة العالية التي حققها مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو (18.55) مؤشر بروز قطب سياسي ثالث سيضفي نكهة جديدة على الحياة السياسية الفرنسية. ومهما كان الأمر، اتفق الجميع على أن صوت بايرو سيكون مرجحا في الشوط الأخير من السباق الرئاسي المتوقع يوم 6 مايو القادم.
ينتمي الثلاثة إلى الجيل نفسه، فهم من مواليد بداية الخمسينات، ويتفقون في خاصية مشتركة إضافية وهي كونهم انبثقوا من حطام تشكيلاتهم السياسية.
ولنبدأ من المرشح اليميني نيكولا ساركوزي الذي استأثر بدون شك بالأضواء خلال الحملة الأخيرة واستطاع أن يمحورها حول نفسه.
ولد نيكولا ساركوزي عام 1955 في باريس من أب هونغري من أصل يهودي يوناني وأم يهودية شرقية، التقيا سنة 1944 فارين من الجحيم النازي مرورا بالنسب وألمانيا، استطاع المهاجر الهونغري الاندماج في أوساط الطبقة الوسطى الفرنسية التي تربى فيها أولاده الذين اختاروا مهنة الأعمال والتجارة باستثناء نيكولا الذي درس العلوم السياسية وتردد بين الصحافة والمحاماة، قبل ان تجرفه السياسة في عمر مبكر. انتمى لحزب اتحاد الجمهوريين عام 1976 والتحق بشيراك عندما أسس حزبه الديغولي عام 1976. ارتبط ارتباطا وثيقا في الحزب بشارل باسكوا الذي اعتبر أنه «الوجه التوأم له».
أصبح نائبا ولم تتجاوز سنه الرابعة والثلاثين. وتقلد وزارة المالية في حكومة بالادير وعمره 38 سنة، وغدا في الوقت نفسه ناطقا باسم الحكومة.
كانت طعنة ساركوزي الأولى لمعلمه شيراك عام 1995 عندما دعم منافسه بالادير الذي هزم في الشوط الأول من الاقتراع، ولذا غاب عن حكومة جوبيه التي تشكلت بعد وصول شيراك للسلطة، ولم يعد للوزارة إلا عام 2002 عندما تولى مقاليد الداخلية ثم المالية قبل أن يعود لوزارة الداخلية في حكومة خصمه اللدود رئيس الوزارء الحالي دفلبين ومنها ترشح للكرسي الأسمى.
لم يختلف الفرنسيون حول شخصية سياسية منذ ميتران مثل اختلافهم حول ساركوزي الذي استمالهم بحياته الشخصية المضطربة وزواجه المثير من عارضة الأزياء سيسيليا ذات الأصل اليهودي الروماني التي تعرف عليها عام 1984 وزوجها لصديقه النجم التلفزيوني جاك مارتين قبل أن يتزوجها سنة 1996. صرحت سيسيليا عام 2004 للصحافة بأنها «فخورة بأن شرايينها خالية من أي دم فرنسي» مما جلب لساركوزي من الضرر ما لم تجلبه له مغامراتها العاطفية الطائشة.
ساركوزي ماكينة سياسية مكتملة بطاقته الفريدة وقدراته الفائقة على التحكم في وسائل الإعلام. وعلاقاته الواسعة في الوسط المالي، وكفاءاته العالية في التنظيم.
وقد أهلته هذه المزايا لتوحيد تيارات اليمين في حزب سياسي جامع هو حزب «الاتحاد من أجل حركة شعبية» الذي اصبح رئيسه منذ نشأته عام 2002.
وبرئاسة الحزب ضمن ساركوزي التغلب على كل منافسيه من اليمين، وفي مقدمتهم الرئيس شيراك ورئيس حكومته دفلبين اللذين يبادلانه الكراهية والنفور، حتى لو اضطرا لدعمه في الانتخابات الحالية.
وعلى الرغم من أن ثقافة ساركوزي متواضعة ولم يكن بارعا في الدراسة الجامعية، إلا أنه الف عدة كتب في السنوات الاخيرة تناولت مواضيع فكرية وسياسية شتى من العلمانية إلى العولمة والعلاقات الدولية. ولم يتردد في حملته الأخيرة في الانتقال من موضوعات الدين إلى التحليل النفسي إلى التقنيات الجينية، ناجحا في كل مرة في توجيه الأنظار إليه.
ومع أن ساركوزي أحال في بعض خطبه إلى التراث الاشتراكي الفرنسي مستشهدا بجان جوريس وميتران، إلا أنه نافس اليمين المتطرف في أرضيته المألوفة، مركزا حملته حول الهوية الفرنسية المهددة، وتعهد بإنشاء وزارة خاصة بالهوية والهجرة، مما ولد نقمة واسعة عليه.
فابن المهاجر المرشح اليوم لرئاسة فرنسا خاطب الأفارقة مقترحا عليهم اعادة تصور استراتيجية الهجرة بالانتقال من «الهجرة المفروضة إلى الهجرة المنتقاة» التي اعتبرها الرئيس السنغالي عبد الله واد مفهوما عنصريا ومحاولة مدانة» لنهب الأدمغة الإفريقية.
والسياسي من أصل يهودي المندمج في النسيج العلماني الفرنسي، لم يتردد في المطالبة بمراجعة النظام العلماني بإعادة الاعتبار للدين في المسلك التربوي وفي القيم الجماعية منوها في أحد خطبه «بفرنسا الحروب الصليبية والكنائس» وهو نفسه الذي أشرف على إنشاء مجلس أعلى لمسلمي فرنسا يمثلهم لدى السلطات العمومية.
نجحت مقاربة ساركوزي في انتزاع قاعدة الجبهة الشعبية المتطرفة، وذهب بوضوح إلى القول إنه يرحب بمؤيدي ليبان داخل اليمين الجمهوري وأنه مستعد «لأن يبحث عنهم واحد واحدا».
اتهم ساركوزي بميوله الأمريكية وانبهاره باليمين المحافظ الحاكم في واشنطن، حتى ولو أراد في الواقع تقمص شخصية كلينتون الساحرة، الديناميكية. وقد تحدث بعد نجاحه على طريقة الأمريكيين عن «الحلم الفرنسي الجديد» القائم على ثالوت الهوية، السلطة والعمل ضمن «جمهورية متآخية».
يقدم اليوم ساركو وجها جديدا لليمين الفرنسي، يجمع بين الحس الوطني الديغولي والليبرالية الانغلوساكسونية والتقليد الأمريكي المحافظ.
ترجح أغلب استطلاعات الرأي فوزه في الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات في مقابل منافسته الاشتراكية، بنت الضابط الاستعماري التي ولدت قبله بسنتين في دكار عاصمة السنغال (1953).
درست سيغو الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية مثل ساركوزي وإن كانت تميزت عنه بالولوج للمدرسة الإدارية الفرنسية، ذلك المعهد العريق الذي تخرجت منه أبرز عناصر النخبة السياسية الفرنسية.
في المدرسة الإدارية تعرفت على فرانسوا هولاند الذي أصبح شريكها في البيت منذ عام 1970 ولها منه 4 أولاد وإن لم يتزوجا رسميا.
دخلت سيغو الساحة السياسية مبكرا، وانتمت للحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي عام 1978 والتحقت بديوان الرئيس ميتران منذ عام 1982 قبل أن تتقلد الوزارة في حكومة بريغفوا عام 1992 مسؤولة عن البيئة، وتعود لها عام 1997 وزيرة للتعليم ثم الأسرة في حكومة جوسبين في عهد شيراك.
ولم يكن ثمة ما يهيئ الفتاة المتمردة التي تربت سياسيا في سرايا الحزب لمنافسة اقطاب التيار الاشتراكي من قدامي الساسة المحترفين من امثال دومنيك ستروس كان وجاك لانغ ولوران فابيوس. ومع ذلك تمكنت سيغو من التغلب على منافسيها فانتخبها الحزب مرشحة عنه يوم 16 نوفمبر 2006 لتكون أول مرشحة نسائية ذات وزن هام في الانتخابات الرئاسية الفرنسية.
ولم تكن سيغو لتنتزع هذا الموقع، لولا أن الحزب الذي أسسه ميتران في بداية السبعينات قد شهد تحولات جذرية، بعد هزيمة أمينه العام جوسبان عام 1995 وخروجه من المعترك السياسي إثر مفاجأة إقصائه من الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات وتقدم جان ماري لبان عليه.
ففي الوقت الذي كان يرمز الحزب في الثمانينات للتحديث والتغيير، أصبح ينظر إليه في العقدين الأخيرين بأنه تشكيلة جامدة، عاجزة عن التجدد والتطور الذاتي.
وقد لمس الفرنسيون في شخصية السيدة رويال صورة المرأة الحديثة المتطورة التي تبنت الخطاب الاشتراكي التقليدي ولم تتردد في استخدام مصطلحات ومفاهيم جديدة عليه. تحدثت سيغو في حملتها عن «الديمقراطية المجددة» وعن حوار الثقافات، ورفعت شعار «الميثاق الجمهوري» الذي سيفضي إلى إنشاء جمهورية سادسة تتجاوز قسمة اليمين واليسار التي أصبحت بحسب رأيها متجاوزة.
تحدثت عن اعجابها برئيس الوزراء البريطاني توني بلير وبنظريته «الطريق الثالث» وتعهدت في لغة شاعرية صوفية برد البسمة إلى شفاه الفرنسيين وإعادة الدفء إلى قلوبهم.
يتهمها خصومها بالسطحية والتناقض والسذاجة وضعف الاطلاع على الشؤون الخارجية، ويضربون مثلا على ذلك ارتداؤها البياض (لون السواد في الصين) في زيارتها لسور الصين العظيم، ومطالبتها بتحريم الطاقة النووية السلمية على ايران، وتهجمها على نظام طالبان الذي توهمت أنه لا يزال قائما بعد خمس سنوات من الإطاحة به.
لم تفقد سيغولين رويال الأمل بعد إعلان نتائج الشوط الأول من الانتخابات الذي حصلت فيه على نسبة 25.8 %. وما دامت تعي أن أصوات التشيكلات اليسارية الصغيرة عاجزة عن تأمين الدعم المطلوب لفوزها، فإنها اتجهت الى مغازلة مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو، مقترحة عليه اشراكه في الحكومة بل التعاون معه في انشاء قطب جمهوري جديد يشمل الوسط واليسار.
رفض بايرو العرض، واختار السلامة، واعيا بأنه لا يتحكم في أصوات ناخبيه، متعهدا بمحاولة جمعهم في تشكيلة جديدة، تكون نواة منبر دعاه بالحزب الديمقراطي.
فهل سيتمكن بايرو من التأثير على توازنات الساحة السياسية الفرنسية بإنشاء هذا القطب الجديد الذي يرث حزب الوسط الصغير الذي يرأسه منذ عام 1998.
يتفق المراقبون على أن بايرو هو نجم الانتخابات الأخيرة باعتبار النتائج الباهرة التي حققها (في مقابل 6،84 في انتخابات 2002).
فهذا الأديب البارع الذي تغلب بطريقة مفاجئة على التأتأة التي كانت تحول بينه والتواصل مع الناس، استفاد بصفة واضحة من الأزمة الداخلية للحقل السياسي الفرنسي، وتمكن من استمالة بقايا التيار المسيحي المتنور، وقد نجح في توجيه النظر إلى ثغرات ونقائض النظام السياسي الفرنسي السائد منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة.
وتشير استطلاعات الرأي الأخيرة إلى أن قاعدته الانتخابية ستتوزع بالتناصف تقريبا على المرشحين الباقين في السباق، بالرغم من تودد سيغولين رويال وتوقع ساركوزي المتفائل.. وكما يقول المثل الفرنسي المشهور «لا احد يحصل على الزبدة وثمن الزبدة».
لها اهمية كبيرة على الساحة العالمية كما هي مهمة على الساحة الداخلي وما يمكن بان يعود على الشعب الفرنسي من اوضاع افضل قدر المستطاع عما هي عليه. إن المشكلات الداخلية التي مرت بها فرنسا في الفترة الاخيرة في حاجة إلى معالجة جريئة ولكن يجب بان تكون ايجابية وكلا المرشحين يضع المصلحة العليا الفرنسية فوق كل اعتبار. إن العرب ينتظروا نتائج الانتخابات حيث قد يكون هناك من متغيرات لابد من التعايش معها والحفاظ على كل تلك المكتسبات السياسية السابقة مع فرنسا.
يدعونه في فرنسا باختصار «ساركو».. انه وزير الداخلية المستقيل نيكولا ساركوزي الذي حقق أعلى نسبة في اقتراع 22 ابريل الجاري مما أهله لتقاسم شوط ثان مع مرشحة الحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي سيغولين رويال التي يدعوها أنصارها توددا بسيغو. على عادة الفرنسين في «التدليع».
وجهان جديدان في الساحة الفرنسية وإن كانا ليس بالنكرتين على الرغم من أن كليهما في بداية العقد الخامس من عمره.. يرمزان على اختلافهما في الموقع والخلفية إلى تحول جوهري في الحقل السياسي الفرنسي الذي تشكل منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة عام 1958.
فإذا كانت سيغولين رويال هي أول امرأة تصل للشوط الثاني من الانتخابات الرئاسية في فرنسا، فإن نيكولا ساركوزي هو ابن المهاجر الذي استطاع أن يوحد اليمين الفرنسي حول شخصه، منتزعا مركز الصدارة من وجوه العائلات العريقة التي يتحدر منها عادة زعماء التيار الديغولي.
أقبل الفرنسيون على الانتخابات الأخيرة بوتيرة غير مسبوقة، وشغلوا بالحملة الرئاسية أكثر من أي وقت مضى، وبلغت نسبة المشاركة في الاقتراع 84 % (في مقابل 71% في انتخابات 2002).
أفلت نجوم المسرح السياسي الفرنسي المألوفة مثل العجوز اليميني المتطرف جان ماري لبان الذي عاد إلى نسبة العشرة بالمائة التي كانت له في الثمانينات ولم يتمكن من تحقيق مفاجأة سباق 2002 (الصعود للشوط الثاني). وانهار الحزب الشيوعي الفرنسي العريق فلم يحقق مرشحه ماري جورج بيفي الا نسبة هامشية لا تتجاوز 1 بالمائة.
كثير من المحللين ذهبوا إلى أن الحقل السياسي الفرنسي عاد إلى الثنائية المألوفة بين اليمين الديغولي واليسار المعتدل، في حين اعتبر البعض الآخر أن النسبة العالية التي حققها مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو (18.55) مؤشر بروز قطب سياسي ثالث سيضفي نكهة جديدة على الحياة السياسية الفرنسية. ومهما كان الأمر، اتفق الجميع على أن صوت بايرو سيكون مرجحا في الشوط الأخير من السباق الرئاسي المتوقع يوم 6 مايو القادم.
ينتمي الثلاثة إلى الجيل نفسه، فهم من مواليد بداية الخمسينات، ويتفقون في خاصية مشتركة إضافية وهي كونهم انبثقوا من حطام تشكيلاتهم السياسية.
ولنبدأ من المرشح اليميني نيكولا ساركوزي الذي استأثر بدون شك بالأضواء خلال الحملة الأخيرة واستطاع أن يمحورها حول نفسه.
ولد نيكولا ساركوزي عام 1955 في باريس من أب هونغري من أصل يهودي يوناني وأم يهودية شرقية، التقيا سنة 1944 فارين من الجحيم النازي مرورا بالنسب وألمانيا، استطاع المهاجر الهونغري الاندماج في أوساط الطبقة الوسطى الفرنسية التي تربى فيها أولاده الذين اختاروا مهنة الأعمال والتجارة باستثناء نيكولا الذي درس العلوم السياسية وتردد بين الصحافة والمحاماة، قبل ان تجرفه السياسة في عمر مبكر. انتمى لحزب اتحاد الجمهوريين عام 1976 والتحق بشيراك عندما أسس حزبه الديغولي عام 1976. ارتبط ارتباطا وثيقا في الحزب بشارل باسكوا الذي اعتبر أنه «الوجه التوأم له».
أصبح نائبا ولم تتجاوز سنه الرابعة والثلاثين. وتقلد وزارة المالية في حكومة بالادير وعمره 38 سنة، وغدا في الوقت نفسه ناطقا باسم الحكومة.
كانت طعنة ساركوزي الأولى لمعلمه شيراك عام 1995 عندما دعم منافسه بالادير الذي هزم في الشوط الأول من الاقتراع، ولذا غاب عن حكومة جوبيه التي تشكلت بعد وصول شيراك للسلطة، ولم يعد للوزارة إلا عام 2002 عندما تولى مقاليد الداخلية ثم المالية قبل أن يعود لوزارة الداخلية في حكومة خصمه اللدود رئيس الوزارء الحالي دفلبين ومنها ترشح للكرسي الأسمى.
لم يختلف الفرنسيون حول شخصية سياسية منذ ميتران مثل اختلافهم حول ساركوزي الذي استمالهم بحياته الشخصية المضطربة وزواجه المثير من عارضة الأزياء سيسيليا ذات الأصل اليهودي الروماني التي تعرف عليها عام 1984 وزوجها لصديقه النجم التلفزيوني جاك مارتين قبل أن يتزوجها سنة 1996. صرحت سيسيليا عام 2004 للصحافة بأنها «فخورة بأن شرايينها خالية من أي دم فرنسي» مما جلب لساركوزي من الضرر ما لم تجلبه له مغامراتها العاطفية الطائشة.
ساركوزي ماكينة سياسية مكتملة بطاقته الفريدة وقدراته الفائقة على التحكم في وسائل الإعلام. وعلاقاته الواسعة في الوسط المالي، وكفاءاته العالية في التنظيم.
وقد أهلته هذه المزايا لتوحيد تيارات اليمين في حزب سياسي جامع هو حزب «الاتحاد من أجل حركة شعبية» الذي اصبح رئيسه منذ نشأته عام 2002.
وبرئاسة الحزب ضمن ساركوزي التغلب على كل منافسيه من اليمين، وفي مقدمتهم الرئيس شيراك ورئيس حكومته دفلبين اللذين يبادلانه الكراهية والنفور، حتى لو اضطرا لدعمه في الانتخابات الحالية.
وعلى الرغم من أن ثقافة ساركوزي متواضعة ولم يكن بارعا في الدراسة الجامعية، إلا أنه الف عدة كتب في السنوات الاخيرة تناولت مواضيع فكرية وسياسية شتى من العلمانية إلى العولمة والعلاقات الدولية. ولم يتردد في حملته الأخيرة في الانتقال من موضوعات الدين إلى التحليل النفسي إلى التقنيات الجينية، ناجحا في كل مرة في توجيه الأنظار إليه.
ومع أن ساركوزي أحال في بعض خطبه إلى التراث الاشتراكي الفرنسي مستشهدا بجان جوريس وميتران، إلا أنه نافس اليمين المتطرف في أرضيته المألوفة، مركزا حملته حول الهوية الفرنسية المهددة، وتعهد بإنشاء وزارة خاصة بالهوية والهجرة، مما ولد نقمة واسعة عليه.
فابن المهاجر المرشح اليوم لرئاسة فرنسا خاطب الأفارقة مقترحا عليهم اعادة تصور استراتيجية الهجرة بالانتقال من «الهجرة المفروضة إلى الهجرة المنتقاة» التي اعتبرها الرئيس السنغالي عبد الله واد مفهوما عنصريا ومحاولة مدانة» لنهب الأدمغة الإفريقية.
والسياسي من أصل يهودي المندمج في النسيج العلماني الفرنسي، لم يتردد في المطالبة بمراجعة النظام العلماني بإعادة الاعتبار للدين في المسلك التربوي وفي القيم الجماعية منوها في أحد خطبه «بفرنسا الحروب الصليبية والكنائس» وهو نفسه الذي أشرف على إنشاء مجلس أعلى لمسلمي فرنسا يمثلهم لدى السلطات العمومية.
نجحت مقاربة ساركوزي في انتزاع قاعدة الجبهة الشعبية المتطرفة، وذهب بوضوح إلى القول إنه يرحب بمؤيدي ليبان داخل اليمين الجمهوري وأنه مستعد «لأن يبحث عنهم واحد واحدا».
اتهم ساركوزي بميوله الأمريكية وانبهاره باليمين المحافظ الحاكم في واشنطن، حتى ولو أراد في الواقع تقمص شخصية كلينتون الساحرة، الديناميكية. وقد تحدث بعد نجاحه على طريقة الأمريكيين عن «الحلم الفرنسي الجديد» القائم على ثالوت الهوية، السلطة والعمل ضمن «جمهورية متآخية».
يقدم اليوم ساركو وجها جديدا لليمين الفرنسي، يجمع بين الحس الوطني الديغولي والليبرالية الانغلوساكسونية والتقليد الأمريكي المحافظ.
ترجح أغلب استطلاعات الرأي فوزه في الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات في مقابل منافسته الاشتراكية، بنت الضابط الاستعماري التي ولدت قبله بسنتين في دكار عاصمة السنغال (1953).
درست سيغو الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية مثل ساركوزي وإن كانت تميزت عنه بالولوج للمدرسة الإدارية الفرنسية، ذلك المعهد العريق الذي تخرجت منه أبرز عناصر النخبة السياسية الفرنسية.
في المدرسة الإدارية تعرفت على فرانسوا هولاند الذي أصبح شريكها في البيت منذ عام 1970 ولها منه 4 أولاد وإن لم يتزوجا رسميا.
دخلت سيغو الساحة السياسية مبكرا، وانتمت للحزب الاشتراكي الفرنسي عام 1978 والتحقت بديوان الرئيس ميتران منذ عام 1982 قبل أن تتقلد الوزارة في حكومة بريغفوا عام 1992 مسؤولة عن البيئة، وتعود لها عام 1997 وزيرة للتعليم ثم الأسرة في حكومة جوسبين في عهد شيراك.
ولم يكن ثمة ما يهيئ الفتاة المتمردة التي تربت سياسيا في سرايا الحزب لمنافسة اقطاب التيار الاشتراكي من قدامي الساسة المحترفين من امثال دومنيك ستروس كان وجاك لانغ ولوران فابيوس. ومع ذلك تمكنت سيغو من التغلب على منافسيها فانتخبها الحزب مرشحة عنه يوم 16 نوفمبر 2006 لتكون أول مرشحة نسائية ذات وزن هام في الانتخابات الرئاسية الفرنسية.
ولم تكن سيغو لتنتزع هذا الموقع، لولا أن الحزب الذي أسسه ميتران في بداية السبعينات قد شهد تحولات جذرية، بعد هزيمة أمينه العام جوسبان عام 1995 وخروجه من المعترك السياسي إثر مفاجأة إقصائه من الشوط الثاني من الانتخابات وتقدم جان ماري لبان عليه.
ففي الوقت الذي كان يرمز الحزب في الثمانينات للتحديث والتغيير، أصبح ينظر إليه في العقدين الأخيرين بأنه تشكيلة جامدة، عاجزة عن التجدد والتطور الذاتي.
وقد لمس الفرنسيون في شخصية السيدة رويال صورة المرأة الحديثة المتطورة التي تبنت الخطاب الاشتراكي التقليدي ولم تتردد في استخدام مصطلحات ومفاهيم جديدة عليه. تحدثت سيغو في حملتها عن «الديمقراطية المجددة» وعن حوار الثقافات، ورفعت شعار «الميثاق الجمهوري» الذي سيفضي إلى إنشاء جمهورية سادسة تتجاوز قسمة اليمين واليسار التي أصبحت بحسب رأيها متجاوزة.
تحدثت عن اعجابها برئيس الوزراء البريطاني توني بلير وبنظريته «الطريق الثالث» وتعهدت في لغة شاعرية صوفية برد البسمة إلى شفاه الفرنسيين وإعادة الدفء إلى قلوبهم.
يتهمها خصومها بالسطحية والتناقض والسذاجة وضعف الاطلاع على الشؤون الخارجية، ويضربون مثلا على ذلك ارتداؤها البياض (لون السواد في الصين) في زيارتها لسور الصين العظيم، ومطالبتها بتحريم الطاقة النووية السلمية على ايران، وتهجمها على نظام طالبان الذي توهمت أنه لا يزال قائما بعد خمس سنوات من الإطاحة به.
لم تفقد سيغولين رويال الأمل بعد إعلان نتائج الشوط الأول من الانتخابات الذي حصلت فيه على نسبة 25.8 %. وما دامت تعي أن أصوات التشيكلات اليسارية الصغيرة عاجزة عن تأمين الدعم المطلوب لفوزها، فإنها اتجهت الى مغازلة مرشح الوسط فرانسوا بايرو، مقترحة عليه اشراكه في الحكومة بل التعاون معه في انشاء قطب جمهوري جديد يشمل الوسط واليسار.
رفض بايرو العرض، واختار السلامة، واعيا بأنه لا يتحكم في أصوات ناخبيه، متعهدا بمحاولة جمعهم في تشكيلة جديدة، تكون نواة منبر دعاه بالحزب الديمقراطي.
فهل سيتمكن بايرو من التأثير على توازنات الساحة السياسية الفرنسية بإنشاء هذا القطب الجديد الذي يرث حزب الوسط الصغير الذي يرأسه منذ عام 1998.
يتفق المراقبون على أن بايرو هو نجم الانتخابات الأخيرة باعتبار النتائج الباهرة التي حققها (في مقابل 6،84 في انتخابات 2002).
فهذا الأديب البارع الذي تغلب بطريقة مفاجئة على التأتأة التي كانت تحول بينه والتواصل مع الناس، استفاد بصفة واضحة من الأزمة الداخلية للحقل السياسي الفرنسي، وتمكن من استمالة بقايا التيار المسيحي المتنور، وقد نجح في توجيه النظر إلى ثغرات ونقائض النظام السياسي الفرنسي السائد منذ قيام الجمهورية الخامسة.
وتشير استطلاعات الرأي الأخيرة إلى أن قاعدته الانتخابية ستتوزع بالتناصف تقريبا على المرشحين الباقين في السباق، بالرغم من تودد سيغولين رويال وتوقع ساركوزي المتفائل.. وكما يقول المثل الفرنسي المشهور «لا احد يحصل على الزبدة وثمن الزبدة».
لها اهمية كبيرة على الساحة العالمية كما هي مهمة على الساحة الداخلي وما يمكن بان يعود على الشعب الفرنسي من اوضاع افضل قدر المستطاع عما هي عليه. إن المشكلات الداخلية التي مرت بها فرنسا في الفترة الاخيرة في حاجة إلى معالجة جريئة ولكن يجب بان تكون ايجابية وكلا المرشحين يضع المصلحة العليا الفرنسية فوق كل اعتبار. إن العرب ينتظروا نتائج الانتخابات حيث قد يكون هناك من متغيرات لابد من التعايش معها والحفاظ على كل تلك المكتسبات السياسية السابقة مع فرنسا.
منظمة دولية تؤكد وصول الجنرال الإيراني إلى تركيا بجواز سفر سوري
آصف شوكت "باع" علي اصغري إلى"سي أي أيه"
كشفت مصادر متطابقة في دمشق واسطنبول امس ان رئيس المخابرات العسكرية السورية اللواء آصف شوكت هو المسؤول عن تسليم نائب وزير الدفاع الإيراني الأسبق علي رضا اصغري الى عملاء المخابرات المركزية الاميركية "سي اي ايه" في اطار صفقة بين النظام السوري والادارة الاميركية لم تحدد طبيعتها بعد.
ونقل موقع " الحقيقة " الالكتروني السوري عن مصادره في دمشق واسطنبول أن اللواء آصف شوكت هو من تولى عملية الاتصال بالأميركيين وإعلامهم بوجود علي اصغري في دمشق وإمكانية تسليمهم إياه بموجب عملية أمنية مركبة شارك الملحق العسكري التركي في دمشق , الذي يتولى في الآن نفسه مهمة ضابط الاتصال بالمخابرات التركية والتنسيق الأمني مع المخابرات السورية منذ توقيع اتفاق أضنة الأمني بين البلدين في أكتوبر .1998
واشارت المصادر الى ان جواز السفر الخاص الذي قدم به اصغري من إيران إلى سورية في ديسمبر الماضي كان ممهورا بعبارة " مسموح له السفر بهذا الجواز إلى سورية فقط " , الأمر الذي يعني أنه كان بحاجة إلى وثيقة سفر أخرى ليغادر بها إلى تركيا .
وأوضحت المصادر ذاتها انها حصلت من أحد موظفي فرع تركيا في " المنظمة الكاثوليكية الدولية للهجرة " , وهي المنظمة العالمية الوحيدة المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة في مجال مساعدة طالبي الهجرة وتنسق مع هذه الأخيرة في كل ما يتصل بذلك , تؤكد أن علي رضا اصغري وصل إلى تركيا بوثيقة سفر سورية قدمت لها مع أوراقه الأخرى من قبل القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول لتنظيم " هجرته " إلى الولايات المتحدة دون أن يحضر صاحب العلاقة (أصغري) شخصيا إلى مركز المنظمة المشار إليها . وتشير هذه الرسالة إلى أن وثيقة " الهجرة " الخاصة بعلي رضا اصغري تم تنظيمها " لصالح القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول " بتاريخ 25 يناير الماضي .
وتتقاطع هذه المعلومات التي تؤكد أن المخابرات السورية استخرجت للمسؤول الايراني السابق وثيقة سفر موقتة بالاتفاق مع السفارة التركية بدمشق , وتحديدا ضابط الاتصال الأمني, تمكنه من مغادرة مطار دمشق ودخول مطار أتاتورك في اسطنبول دون لفت الانتباه . فموجب الاتفاق الأمني بين إيران وسورية يتوجب على دمشق منع أي مواطن إيراني من مغادرة الأراضي السورية إلى بلد ثالث إذا كان جواز سفره لا يسمح له بذلك , أو إذا كانت السلطات السورية تلقت طلبا بها المعنى بشأن شخص معين . وتقوم سلطات أمن المطارات السورية , التي تسيطر عليها المخابرات الجوية , بتخزين هذه المعلومات في أجهزة كومبيوتر نقاط الخروج لتنفيذ ما يلزم بهذا الخصوص .
واكدت المصادر أن الجنرال اصغري تعرض لعملية خداع من قبل آصف شوكت لدفعه إلى السفر إلى تركيا بإرادته الشخصية , حيث تم تدبير " صفقة تجارية " صورية مغرية بالمواد التي يتاجر بها , وهي الزيت التركي والسوري عادة , مع أحد التجار الأتراك . وحين أخبر شوكت بأن جوازه لا يسمح له بالسفر خارج سورية , تولى هذا الأخير استخراج وثيقة سفر سورية مؤقتة له , وإعلام الأتراك والأميركيين بالأمر , من أجل تسهيل عملية سفره ومن أجل تضليل نقاط أمن المخابرات الجوية في مطار دمشق!
آصف شوكت "باع" علي اصغري إلى"سي أي أيه"
كشفت مصادر متطابقة في دمشق واسطنبول امس ان رئيس المخابرات العسكرية السورية اللواء آصف شوكت هو المسؤول عن تسليم نائب وزير الدفاع الإيراني الأسبق علي رضا اصغري الى عملاء المخابرات المركزية الاميركية "سي اي ايه" في اطار صفقة بين النظام السوري والادارة الاميركية لم تحدد طبيعتها بعد.
ونقل موقع " الحقيقة " الالكتروني السوري عن مصادره في دمشق واسطنبول أن اللواء آصف شوكت هو من تولى عملية الاتصال بالأميركيين وإعلامهم بوجود علي اصغري في دمشق وإمكانية تسليمهم إياه بموجب عملية أمنية مركبة شارك الملحق العسكري التركي في دمشق , الذي يتولى في الآن نفسه مهمة ضابط الاتصال بالمخابرات التركية والتنسيق الأمني مع المخابرات السورية منذ توقيع اتفاق أضنة الأمني بين البلدين في أكتوبر .1998
واشارت المصادر الى ان جواز السفر الخاص الذي قدم به اصغري من إيران إلى سورية في ديسمبر الماضي كان ممهورا بعبارة " مسموح له السفر بهذا الجواز إلى سورية فقط " , الأمر الذي يعني أنه كان بحاجة إلى وثيقة سفر أخرى ليغادر بها إلى تركيا .
وأوضحت المصادر ذاتها انها حصلت من أحد موظفي فرع تركيا في " المنظمة الكاثوليكية الدولية للهجرة " , وهي المنظمة العالمية الوحيدة المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة في مجال مساعدة طالبي الهجرة وتنسق مع هذه الأخيرة في كل ما يتصل بذلك , تؤكد أن علي رضا اصغري وصل إلى تركيا بوثيقة سفر سورية قدمت لها مع أوراقه الأخرى من قبل القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول لتنظيم " هجرته " إلى الولايات المتحدة دون أن يحضر صاحب العلاقة (أصغري) شخصيا إلى مركز المنظمة المشار إليها . وتشير هذه الرسالة إلى أن وثيقة " الهجرة " الخاصة بعلي رضا اصغري تم تنظيمها " لصالح القنصلية الأميركية في اسطنبول " بتاريخ 25 يناير الماضي .
وتتقاطع هذه المعلومات التي تؤكد أن المخابرات السورية استخرجت للمسؤول الايراني السابق وثيقة سفر موقتة بالاتفاق مع السفارة التركية بدمشق , وتحديدا ضابط الاتصال الأمني, تمكنه من مغادرة مطار دمشق ودخول مطار أتاتورك في اسطنبول دون لفت الانتباه . فموجب الاتفاق الأمني بين إيران وسورية يتوجب على دمشق منع أي مواطن إيراني من مغادرة الأراضي السورية إلى بلد ثالث إذا كان جواز سفره لا يسمح له بذلك , أو إذا كانت السلطات السورية تلقت طلبا بها المعنى بشأن شخص معين . وتقوم سلطات أمن المطارات السورية , التي تسيطر عليها المخابرات الجوية , بتخزين هذه المعلومات في أجهزة كومبيوتر نقاط الخروج لتنفيذ ما يلزم بهذا الخصوص .
واكدت المصادر أن الجنرال اصغري تعرض لعملية خداع من قبل آصف شوكت لدفعه إلى السفر إلى تركيا بإرادته الشخصية , حيث تم تدبير " صفقة تجارية " صورية مغرية بالمواد التي يتاجر بها , وهي الزيت التركي والسوري عادة , مع أحد التجار الأتراك . وحين أخبر شوكت بأن جوازه لا يسمح له بالسفر خارج سورية , تولى هذا الأخير استخراج وثيقة سفر سورية مؤقتة له , وإعلام الأتراك والأميركيين بالأمر , من أجل تسهيل عملية سفره ومن أجل تضليل نقاط أمن المخابرات الجوية في مطار دمشق!
Thursday, May 03, 2007
The wisdom of Ronald Reagan speaks down the years
Gerard Baker
If you hang around Los Angeles for a day to two you will see enough strange things to fill a respectable screenplay.
The biggest news this week was the surprise comeback of Britney Spears, who returned to touring after a three-year break. She showed up unannounced at the House of Blues in Anaheim, clad in a brunette wig, knee-high go-go boots and a fur coat that revealed glimpses of a jewel-encrusted bra.
Lip-synching her way through the full repertoire of Spears classics, she won rave reviews from her neglected fans. “She looked so freaking hot,” Julie West, 16, told the Los Angeles Times.
But if you think that odd, consider this. Ten Republican presidential hopefuls gathered here last night to make their case that they should be the next US president. Though no-one showed up in a jewel-encrusted bra (Rudolph Giuliani presumably resisting what must have been a powerful temptation), the event was still an unusual spectacle in this part of Southern California.
Los Angeles is hostile territory for Republicans. The city’s entertainment elite is committed to the belief that conservatives are so evil that they should only ever be portrayed in adult films and played by Manichean-looking British actors.
Republicans have also alienated the city’s massive Latino population – once thought of as potentially solid Republican voters – with a nativist message on immigration.
So what were these Republican hopefuls doing here, or more accurately, just outside the metropolis in the lumpy scrubland of the Simi Valley? The answer is Ronald Reagan.
The candidates had been invited by Nancy Reagan to the Reagan Presidential Library. The event was a useful reminder of the power the Reagan legacy has over Republicans. Margaret Thatcher, Mr Reagan’s partner in the 1980s, is now seen as something of a liability by her party. There are a few Republican intellectuals who would like American conservatives to follow suit and tone down some of the Reagan-worship. Some think the roots of today’s conservative crisis actually go back to Mr Reagan and his simple embrace of free markets and assertive American idealism.
Even some of those who admired the former president think he is simply no longer relevant – that the Reagan message of smaller government and firm resolve against global ideological enemies is just not suited to the modern challenges of rising economic insecurity and the diverse and complex threat from Islamic radicalism.
That the world is a different place from 25 years ago ought not to be in dispute. But it seems to me that the problem with the Republican Party in the past five years is not that it has tried unsuccessfully to apply the Reagan principles to modern times, but that they have misappropriated the Reagan legacy for their own ill-advised and indefensible objectives.
The Reagan imprimatur has been rolled out and sent into service in defence of things the great man would find incomprehensible. He stood for less government, for a start, but Republicans have joyfully expanded the size and scope of government, while ignoring a looming fiscal catastrophe from an ageing population.
Mr Reagan cut taxes from absurdly high levels to regenerate American enterprise. This successful approach has turned over the years into a calcified dogma that says no Republican can challenge the contention that taxes should be cut all the time and as often as possible, whatever the economic circumstances, on the alchemist’s proposition that such cuts will always and everywhere “pay for themselves” in increased government revenues.
In foreign policy, Mr Reagan’s legacy has also been traduced by his would-be successors. He did indeed challenge the prevailing diplomatic assumptions and directly took on the enemies of freedom in the world. But he never shrank from making uncomfortable compromises with reality. So distorted has US foreign policy discussion on the Right become that some of the things Mr Reagan did would probably provoke cries of appeasement if they were done today. In 1983, for example, after 200 US Marines were murdered by a suicide truck bomber in Lebanon, Mr Reagan immediately pulled all US forces out of the country.
My favourite story about him concerns the US invasion of Grenada, just after that infamous Beirut incident in 1983. It illustrates the kind of wisdom that has been sorely lacking in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in the last five years.
The President was being briefed on the invasion plans by his senior military officers just before the Grenada operation. As was often the case, Mr Reagan did not seem to be paying close attention, according to one of those present. But when the briefing was over he had one question. He wanted to hear again the number of troops the planners were going to send in. He was told a figure and shook his head. “Make it twice that,” he told a slightly puzzled general. Asked why, the President said calmly: “If Jimmy Carter had sent 16 helicopters rather than eight to Desert One to rescue the US hostages in Iran in 1980, you’d be sitting here briefing him today, not me.” Grenada was not Iraq, but just as assuredly George W. Bush is no Ronald Reagan.
What may be most relevant about Reagan is this: he became President in the midst of one of those periodic crises of American self-confidence, in which the nation’s spirit had been sapped by a disastrous war, a series of scandals that undermined confidence in government and the failures of a comically inept Administration.
Within a few years the President had led the American people back to an improbable victory in the Cold War and an unchallenged status as the world’s economic superpower. America needs that leadership again.
Gerard Baker
If you hang around Los Angeles for a day to two you will see enough strange things to fill a respectable screenplay.
The biggest news this week was the surprise comeback of Britney Spears, who returned to touring after a three-year break. She showed up unannounced at the House of Blues in Anaheim, clad in a brunette wig, knee-high go-go boots and a fur coat that revealed glimpses of a jewel-encrusted bra.
Lip-synching her way through the full repertoire of Spears classics, she won rave reviews from her neglected fans. “She looked so freaking hot,” Julie West, 16, told the Los Angeles Times.
But if you think that odd, consider this. Ten Republican presidential hopefuls gathered here last night to make their case that they should be the next US president. Though no-one showed up in a jewel-encrusted bra (Rudolph Giuliani presumably resisting what must have been a powerful temptation), the event was still an unusual spectacle in this part of Southern California.
Los Angeles is hostile territory for Republicans. The city’s entertainment elite is committed to the belief that conservatives are so evil that they should only ever be portrayed in adult films and played by Manichean-looking British actors.
Republicans have also alienated the city’s massive Latino population – once thought of as potentially solid Republican voters – with a nativist message on immigration.
So what were these Republican hopefuls doing here, or more accurately, just outside the metropolis in the lumpy scrubland of the Simi Valley? The answer is Ronald Reagan.
The candidates had been invited by Nancy Reagan to the Reagan Presidential Library. The event was a useful reminder of the power the Reagan legacy has over Republicans. Margaret Thatcher, Mr Reagan’s partner in the 1980s, is now seen as something of a liability by her party. There are a few Republican intellectuals who would like American conservatives to follow suit and tone down some of the Reagan-worship. Some think the roots of today’s conservative crisis actually go back to Mr Reagan and his simple embrace of free markets and assertive American idealism.
Even some of those who admired the former president think he is simply no longer relevant – that the Reagan message of smaller government and firm resolve against global ideological enemies is just not suited to the modern challenges of rising economic insecurity and the diverse and complex threat from Islamic radicalism.
That the world is a different place from 25 years ago ought not to be in dispute. But it seems to me that the problem with the Republican Party in the past five years is not that it has tried unsuccessfully to apply the Reagan principles to modern times, but that they have misappropriated the Reagan legacy for their own ill-advised and indefensible objectives.
The Reagan imprimatur has been rolled out and sent into service in defence of things the great man would find incomprehensible. He stood for less government, for a start, but Republicans have joyfully expanded the size and scope of government, while ignoring a looming fiscal catastrophe from an ageing population.
Mr Reagan cut taxes from absurdly high levels to regenerate American enterprise. This successful approach has turned over the years into a calcified dogma that says no Republican can challenge the contention that taxes should be cut all the time and as often as possible, whatever the economic circumstances, on the alchemist’s proposition that such cuts will always and everywhere “pay for themselves” in increased government revenues.
In foreign policy, Mr Reagan’s legacy has also been traduced by his would-be successors. He did indeed challenge the prevailing diplomatic assumptions and directly took on the enemies of freedom in the world. But he never shrank from making uncomfortable compromises with reality. So distorted has US foreign policy discussion on the Right become that some of the things Mr Reagan did would probably provoke cries of appeasement if they were done today. In 1983, for example, after 200 US Marines were murdered by a suicide truck bomber in Lebanon, Mr Reagan immediately pulled all US forces out of the country.
My favourite story about him concerns the US invasion of Grenada, just after that infamous Beirut incident in 1983. It illustrates the kind of wisdom that has been sorely lacking in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy in the last five years.
The President was being briefed on the invasion plans by his senior military officers just before the Grenada operation. As was often the case, Mr Reagan did not seem to be paying close attention, according to one of those present. But when the briefing was over he had one question. He wanted to hear again the number of troops the planners were going to send in. He was told a figure and shook his head. “Make it twice that,” he told a slightly puzzled general. Asked why, the President said calmly: “If Jimmy Carter had sent 16 helicopters rather than eight to Desert One to rescue the US hostages in Iran in 1980, you’d be sitting here briefing him today, not me.” Grenada was not Iraq, but just as assuredly George W. Bush is no Ronald Reagan.
What may be most relevant about Reagan is this: he became President in the midst of one of those periodic crises of American self-confidence, in which the nation’s spirit had been sapped by a disastrous war, a series of scandals that undermined confidence in government and the failures of a comically inept Administration.
Within a few years the President had led the American people back to an improbable victory in the Cold War and an unchallenged status as the world’s economic superpower. America needs that leadership again.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion
Book Review by Amir Taheri
One of the nightmares of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the mullah who ruled Iran with an iron fist for a decade, was ha he called "the Americanization of Islam."
Khomeini feared that the infiltration of such an American ideas as the rule of law, democracy, the rights of the individual, alternative life-styles and, above all, the separation of religion and state, into Muslim communities would undermine commitment to the faith. For the old curmudgeon, the slogan "Death to America!" was as important as any testimony of faith.
Paul M. Barrett, a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal, however, shows that millions of Muslims live in the United States, the homeland of "The Great Satan", without abandoning their faith. In a sense, Muslims enjoy far ore religious freedom in the United States than they do in the Islamic Republic built by Khomeini. (In the US, all versions of Islam are free to practice and propagate. In the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, only the Khomeinist version has full freedom.)
No one knows for sure how many Muslims there are in the United States, and Barrett offers no conclusive figures. Estimates, however, put the number at anything between three to six million. It is unfortunate that Barrett did not pay more attention to the need for establishing a credible figure to help end an old controversy on the subject.
Barrett starts by dispelling a number of common misconceptions with regard to American Muslims. For example, he shows that, contrary to common assumptions, black Americans do not form a majority of Muslims in the US. (They are only 20 per cent, mostly recent converts to Islam.) The largest bloc of Muslims in the US, some 34 per cent, belongs to Indians and Pakistanis, recent immigrants who started arriving in large numbers only after the 1970s. Turks, Iranians and "others" account for the remainder.
According to Barrett, some 85 per cent of American Muslims are Sunnis, with the Shiites accounting for the remaining 15 per cent. What is not clear, however, is whether Barrett includes the Nation of Islam, a mostly Afro-American movement, in the Sunni column.
Barrett offers a number of surprising facts. For examples, almost 60 per cent of American Muslims hold college or university degrees, more than twice the number for average Americans. Most American Muslims work in service industries, especially in managerial positions, and earn 20 per cent more than the average American.
Thanks to continued massive immigration, especially from India and Pakistan, and because of larger families, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the US. It also attracts the largest number of converts, in competition not only against Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Baha'ism, but also against such fashionable sects such as The Church of Scientology. Barrett also reminds his readers that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world.
Barrett's book has no clear structure and could be read as a series of independent reportages. He devotes a god part of the book to the portraits of seven Muslims, supposed to represent the diversity of the American Muslims. He gives each of the seven a label: "scholar", "activist", and "feminist" for example.
Of the seven, only one, Osama Siblani, is a Shiite. Of Lebanese origin, Siblani immigrated to the US from Lebanon in 1976 and settled in Dearborn, Michigan, the stronghold of Arab-Americans since the middle of the last century. Siblani, who publishes the newspaper Arab American, the largest Arab [publication in the US, emerges as a complex figure. On the one hand, he is a great admirer of the so-called "American dream" while, on the other, his paper blames the US for much that goes wrong in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A passionate supporter of the Hezballah, a branch of the Khomeinist movement, Siblani is critical of Lebanese politicians and parties that resist its attempt to seize power in Beirut.
One of the colorful figures presented by Barrett is Siraj Wahhaj, an African-American Muslim who promotes many of the themes, such as self-reliance and hard work, originally developed by Malcolm X. Wahhaj believes that the US will one day adopt the Shariaa as its basic law to save itself from alcohol, drugs, gambling, pornography and prostitution.
It is hard to see in what way the seven individuals portrayed here represent Muslims in the United States. In fact, speaking of a single Muslim community in the US, or anywhere else for that matter, could be misleading. Islam is a faith that is adhered to and practiced individually. There are no formal church structures as in Christianity, and certainly no priesthood and papacy.
The fact is worth stressing for at least two reasons.
The first concerns integration. The so-called "American melting pot" cannot integrate people as communities. It integrates people from countless backgrounds and cultures only as individuals. To lump millions of people from dozens of different cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds together because of their assumed common faith is an exercise in artificial communiatrianism.
There is a second reason why putting the emphasis on the community aspect of Islam in America is wrong. This is because American Muslims have different cultural aspirations and political sensibilities. In the year 2000, for example, American Muslims of Arab and Iranian origin voted overwhelmingly for George W Bush while Muslims of Afro-American background chose Al Gore. In 2004, most Arab-Americans , along with Afro-American Muslims, voted against Bush while Muslims of Indo-Pakistani and Iranian origin, remained loyal to Bush.
Barrett devotes a good part of the book to his thoughts about what should be done to improve relations between American Muslims and the broader American reality.
Sadly, his analysis is often shaky while he offers few serious suggestions. Barrett's claim that Muslim students from the Middle East, bring radicalism to America is certainly hard to sustain. There is evidence that things work the other way round. It is in US universities that Muslim students from the Middle Eats become radicalized.
Two examples would suffice to illustrate the point.
First, all nine members of the leadership of the Iranian Trotskyite party that helped the mullahs overthrow the Shah in 1979 were graduates of US universities while five members of the first ministerial Cabinet set up by Khomeini were naturalized American citizens of Iranian origin.
Second, between 1970 and 2002 the US was the single most important source of funding for radical Islamist movements outside the Middle East. It was also in Dallas, Texas, that in 1985 the various branches of Hezbollah managed to hold their first and only international gathering outside Iran
.
Today, the bulk of the anti-American material that is used in the Muslim world is produced in the United States itself, mostly by non-Muslims.
Barrette's most surprising recommendation is that the US should modify its foreign policy and enforce some measure of censorship in order not to hurt Muslim "sensibilities." The truth, however, is that millions of Muslims immigrated to the US precisely because they wanted to live in a society based on freedom of belief and expression
Book Review by Amir Taheri
One of the nightmares of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the mullah who ruled Iran with an iron fist for a decade, was ha he called "the Americanization of Islam."
Khomeini feared that the infiltration of such an American ideas as the rule of law, democracy, the rights of the individual, alternative life-styles and, above all, the separation of religion and state, into Muslim communities would undermine commitment to the faith. For the old curmudgeon, the slogan "Death to America!" was as important as any testimony of faith.
Paul M. Barrett, a former reporter for the Wall Street Journal, however, shows that millions of Muslims live in the United States, the homeland of "The Great Satan", without abandoning their faith. In a sense, Muslims enjoy far ore religious freedom in the United States than they do in the Islamic Republic built by Khomeini. (In the US, all versions of Islam are free to practice and propagate. In the Islamic Republic in Iran, however, only the Khomeinist version has full freedom.)
No one knows for sure how many Muslims there are in the United States, and Barrett offers no conclusive figures. Estimates, however, put the number at anything between three to six million. It is unfortunate that Barrett did not pay more attention to the need for establishing a credible figure to help end an old controversy on the subject.
Barrett starts by dispelling a number of common misconceptions with regard to American Muslims. For example, he shows that, contrary to common assumptions, black Americans do not form a majority of Muslims in the US. (They are only 20 per cent, mostly recent converts to Islam.) The largest bloc of Muslims in the US, some 34 per cent, belongs to Indians and Pakistanis, recent immigrants who started arriving in large numbers only after the 1970s. Turks, Iranians and "others" account for the remainder.
According to Barrett, some 85 per cent of American Muslims are Sunnis, with the Shiites accounting for the remaining 15 per cent. What is not clear, however, is whether Barrett includes the Nation of Islam, a mostly Afro-American movement, in the Sunni column.
Barrett offers a number of surprising facts. For examples, almost 60 per cent of American Muslims hold college or university degrees, more than twice the number for average Americans. Most American Muslims work in service industries, especially in managerial positions, and earn 20 per cent more than the average American.
Thanks to continued massive immigration, especially from India and Pakistan, and because of larger families, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the US. It also attracts the largest number of converts, in competition not only against Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Baha'ism, but also against such fashionable sects such as The Church of Scientology. Barrett also reminds his readers that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world.
Barrett's book has no clear structure and could be read as a series of independent reportages. He devotes a god part of the book to the portraits of seven Muslims, supposed to represent the diversity of the American Muslims. He gives each of the seven a label: "scholar", "activist", and "feminist" for example.
Of the seven, only one, Osama Siblani, is a Shiite. Of Lebanese origin, Siblani immigrated to the US from Lebanon in 1976 and settled in Dearborn, Michigan, the stronghold of Arab-Americans since the middle of the last century. Siblani, who publishes the newspaper Arab American, the largest Arab [publication in the US, emerges as a complex figure. On the one hand, he is a great admirer of the so-called "American dream" while, on the other, his paper blames the US for much that goes wrong in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A passionate supporter of the Hezballah, a branch of the Khomeinist movement, Siblani is critical of Lebanese politicians and parties that resist its attempt to seize power in Beirut.
One of the colorful figures presented by Barrett is Siraj Wahhaj, an African-American Muslim who promotes many of the themes, such as self-reliance and hard work, originally developed by Malcolm X. Wahhaj believes that the US will one day adopt the Shariaa as its basic law to save itself from alcohol, drugs, gambling, pornography and prostitution.
It is hard to see in what way the seven individuals portrayed here represent Muslims in the United States. In fact, speaking of a single Muslim community in the US, or anywhere else for that matter, could be misleading. Islam is a faith that is adhered to and practiced individually. There are no formal church structures as in Christianity, and certainly no priesthood and papacy.
The fact is worth stressing for at least two reasons.
The first concerns integration. The so-called "American melting pot" cannot integrate people as communities. It integrates people from countless backgrounds and cultures only as individuals. To lump millions of people from dozens of different cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds together because of their assumed common faith is an exercise in artificial communiatrianism.
There is a second reason why putting the emphasis on the community aspect of Islam in America is wrong. This is because American Muslims have different cultural aspirations and political sensibilities. In the year 2000, for example, American Muslims of Arab and Iranian origin voted overwhelmingly for George W Bush while Muslims of Afro-American background chose Al Gore. In 2004, most Arab-Americans , along with Afro-American Muslims, voted against Bush while Muslims of Indo-Pakistani and Iranian origin, remained loyal to Bush.
Barrett devotes a good part of the book to his thoughts about what should be done to improve relations between American Muslims and the broader American reality.
Sadly, his analysis is often shaky while he offers few serious suggestions. Barrett's claim that Muslim students from the Middle East, bring radicalism to America is certainly hard to sustain. There is evidence that things work the other way round. It is in US universities that Muslim students from the Middle Eats become radicalized.
Two examples would suffice to illustrate the point.
First, all nine members of the leadership of the Iranian Trotskyite party that helped the mullahs overthrow the Shah in 1979 were graduates of US universities while five members of the first ministerial Cabinet set up by Khomeini were naturalized American citizens of Iranian origin.
Second, between 1970 and 2002 the US was the single most important source of funding for radical Islamist movements outside the Middle East. It was also in Dallas, Texas, that in 1985 the various branches of Hezbollah managed to hold their first and only international gathering outside Iran
.
Today, the bulk of the anti-American material that is used in the Muslim world is produced in the United States itself, mostly by non-Muslims.
Barrette's most surprising recommendation is that the US should modify its foreign policy and enforce some measure of censorship in order not to hurt Muslim "sensibilities." The truth, however, is that millions of Muslims immigrated to the US precisely because they wanted to live in a society based on freedom of belief and expression
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