Comparing the two paths of Syria's Bashar and Pakistan's

Musharraf. Has Bashar erred?

By EHSANI212 May 2006,

In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, a former commando, assumed power in Pakistan. Seven months later, Bashar Assad, an aspiring ophthalmologist, came to power one week after the death of his father. When Pakistan and the world awoke to the news of a new military coup in October 1999, the consensus opinion was: “Another coup, another general”. In contrast, when Syria and the world glimpsed their new leader, many hoped that his training in London and his facility with English and his British-born wife would make him a different kind of dictator than his iconic and Soviet era father. Syria could now look forward to a new breed of leadership free of ideological demagoguery and endemic corruption.
How did the two leaders and their countries do since then? Let us now recap:
Pakistan’s Musharraf:
When the general assumed power, Pakistan was being described as a failing state sinking in a debt quagmire and kept afloat by the IMF and World Bank as several times during the decades the country was near default and bankruptcy. On the political front, there were economic sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests. The coup, of course, brought its new political sanctions. The country was in effect a political and economic pariah.
As soon as he took power, Musharraf’s first move was to ask his senior advisors to identify for him the most qualified incorruptible Pakistani national whom he could task with turning the economy around. Once that person was identified, the General personally called him the next morning. Shaukat Aziz was a hugely successful senior executive at Citibank in New York. General Musharraf pleaded with Mr. Aziz to leave his immensely powerful and lucrative job, move to Pakistan and help put the country’s economic house in order. Mr. Aziz was promised a free hand in designing his own policies with the full support of the new leader.
The economic plan that Mr. Aziz designed had to address the following problems:
Increase foreign reserves from the equivalent of only two weeks of imports at the end of 1999.
Reorganize the country’s debt by lowering the 11% rates paid on mostly short term loans.
Cut the budget deficit from 8% to 4% of GDP.
Lower inflation from double digits.
Undertake a massive structural reform
Sell public sector enterprises and embark on a fast-track approach to privatizing the state’s biggest companies.
As the economic plan went into its implementation stage, Mr. Bin Laden and his Jihadists struck on that infamous September 11th. Mr. Musharraf of course had his own Islamist elements in his midst. His military and secret service were taken over by Islamists during the dictatorship of Zia ul Haq. But Musharraf recognized the world-changing significance of 9/11, withdrew recognition from the Taliban, and began helping the CIA. As Pakistan found itself on the frontline and under the microscope of the world, the canny general made full use of the opportunity presented to him and his country. He knew that he could now get all the aid that his county needed from the U.S. and the west if he chose to fight alongside them. Sure enough, the enormous handouts poured in. The economy was already on an upswing and the reform process was already in full force but the new American sure helped. A huge portion of the country’s debt was forgiven. The results have been nothing short of spectacular. The country’s stock market is up 806% since 2002 alone, property markets in key cities are on a tear as interest rates were lowered and housing finance boomed. Last year alone, overseas Pakistanis sent close to $ 4 billion home. Foreign capital has also been attracted due to the massive privatization effort. Since 2003, the country raised $5 billion through the auction of its state enterprises. This year, it has plans to raise another $ 3 Billion by selling off its oil, gas and steel assets.
In sum, President Musharraf knew from day one that his success hinged on tackling his country’s economy. In order to do so, he relied on incorruptible technocrats and gave them free reign to plan and execute their strategies. In the wake of 09/11, he had the foresight to take full advantage of the opportunity presented to him and his country. Here was an opportunity to appear like he was helping America and a chance to reap huge financial benefits as a result. He masterfully and opportunistically made full use of it. Some may argue that his move towards the west was merely cosmetic. How could Musharraf not have known about his country’s nuclear smuggling ring headed by A.Q. Khan they ask? How did Musharraf pardon the man and allow him to live peacefully in the country after the devastating news became public? Nonetheless, this President convinced America that he had made the decision to fight the Islamic elements within his society and side with the U.S. The result was that financial aid started to pour in. The country’s foreign reserves went from the lowest to the highest in its history. In the meantime, the country has become one of the world’s most aggressive sellers of state companies. It has overhauled its tax system. The country’s strategy has been to maintain rapid growth, in part to encourage a prosperous middle class, which might pre-empt the appeal of the radical Islamist movement and put the country on a more politically moderate path.
But significant challenges remain. Per Capita GDP is still only close to $600. Nearly 30% of the population still lives below the poverty line. More state funds are needed for education and infrastructure. The country is still ruled by the same army general who has resisted calls for free elections. But, given the hand that he was dealt, this astute and opportunistic general has arguably done an outstanding job steering his troubled country.
Syria’s Bashar:
Though Bashar inherited a socialist-based economy riddled with corruption, the expectations surrounding his ascension to the Presidency run high. Here was a western-educated young President who was an ophthalmologist in training and a surfer of the Internet in his spare time. His marriage to his British-born wife with her Chanel look, fancy education and banking experience bolstered hopes and pride even further. Add promises of reform to the mix, and it was easy to see why 20 million Syrians had nothing but hope for a better future that would involve more freedoms and higher standards of living. Western capitals were at least as hopeful. Bashar and his elegant wife had now become on the “A “ list of invitees to meet the world’s Kings, Queens and Heads of State.
As the clock ticked, Bashar’s promises of reforms were slow in coming. The conventional thinking then, as it still is now, was that the young President “wants to reform but his father’s old guard cronies were blocking him”. This has helped the leadership shift the blame of any delays in the implementation of reforms to this phantom group of old guard. Note how Bashar did nothing to find Syria’s equivalent of Shaukat Aziz. Those technocrats that were identified were not empowered to exert any personal influence of their own. Key decisions were exclusively entrusted to the regional command of the Baath party and the Presidential Palace. To this day, the economic polices of his administration have been shameful. Without a clear vision to guide him, he has stumbled at every turn when it comes to turning his economy around. Economic growth continues to languish. Youth Unemployment continues to soar. The state continues to dominate the economy at the expense of the private sector. Insane economic subsidies continue to bleed the state treasury. The Price of heating oil (Mazot) is at Syp 7 when the neighboring countries sell it for 29 and 70 in Lebanon and Turkey respectively. As a result, corruption is rampant. Every time, talk surfaced that these subsidies were going to be lifted, there was uproar from an already struggling populace.
Just as Sep 11th presented President Musharraf with an opportunity to forge closer ties with the U.S., Bashar’s first instincts were similar. In the months that followed, the CIA was granted an office in one of Aleppo’ security headquarters. Information about Al-Qaeda operatives was constantly passed along in the ensuing months. As this healthy cooperation continued, Bashar was busy making overtures to Saddam’s regime in the months leading to his collapse from power. One has to assume that Bashar and his enterprising clique saw a huge opportunity to make outrageous sums of money from the dictator next door. With the U.N. oil for food corruption in high gear, the opportunities were too attractive to pass up. Saddam also needed to hide his cash. His new brotherly neighbors were more than happy to oblige.
As Saddam’s regime suffered its military collapse, Bashar was about to make his biggest geopolitical blunder yet. What I will argue below is going to be very controversial and is likely to elicit a lot of angry responses.
Bashar was understandably threatened by the American army’s massive military success next door. The conventional thinking at the time was Syria’s Baath was next on the menu. As soon as the American army was done in Iraq, they were surely heading west to Damascus to topple the Syrian regime. Bashar and his advisors went to work. Their model was presumably the American Marine’s experience in Lebanon in 1983. Were the American army to suffer enough casualties in Iraq, they may cut and run just like Reagan’s America did. Or so the thinking went.
This was a major strategic blunder by the young President.
If Bashar did not want to be a U.S. ally, he at least should have been a non-aggressor. By foolishly providing moral and material support to the insurgency in Iraq and by harboring high-ranking Iraqi officials, he has made himself a marked man at the White House. It was widely reported that Secretary of State Colin Powel repeatedly tried to change the young leaders’ tactics. All reported promises were not kept.
In this writer’s opinion, Bashar should have imitated Musharraf’s canny use of the opportunity presented to him. His country had already lost its Soviet patronage. His economy is saddled with inefficiencies and corruption. His natural resources are running out fast. His population is increasing at double the rate of the country’s economic growth rate. His people’s standards of living are stagnant if not falling. His Baath party is on the wrong side of history. Most importantly, his late father and regime have credible credentials in fighting Islamic Fundamentalists.
Here was a historic chance to edge Syria towards the west and reform. Here was the chance to break away from the past and the so-called Stalinist era old guard. Here was the chance to ask for massive amounts of financial aid and turn around his economy. Here was the chance to sign a peace treaty with Israel in return for the Golan Heights. Regrettably, Bashar chose not to grab the opportunity. Rather than do all or some of the above, he finds himself and his regime implicated in the murder of his neighbor’s Prime Minister. His army was humiliatingly ordered to leave Lebanon. His country faces a list of economic and political sanctions. His nation has become a regional and national pariah.
Gone are the days of visiting the western capitals with his elegant wife. Gone are the days when foreign leaders and Kings visited.
Thanks to Bashar’s strategic blunders, the Syria of today can only count “Bearded Men” as its friends.
Both Bashar and Musharraf were faced with the same fork on the road during their Presidency. Musharraf had the foresight and courage to at least seem to stand up to the Islamists within his society and make a break with the past. He was able to convince America that he was their new friend. His genuine efforts to fix his economy and reform it from day one has had an enormous benefit for his people. Bashar, of course, took the other road at the fork. Presumably, he did not feel that he had the credibility that his father may have had to make such a geopolitical decision and edge his country to the west. Regrettably, niether did he have a vision or a plan to turn his languishing economy around.
Even though both their countries are still ruled by dictators, it is the opinion of this writer that Bashar and the Syrian people lost this contest.